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The Terrorists’ Best Ally: The Quebec Media Coverage of the FLQ Crisis in October 1970Abstract: During the past 40 years or so there have been many instances in which media coverage of terrorist events was problematic, evoking public criticism and antagonizing the authorities. The paper opens by mentioning some of the most troubling episodes and then reflects on some incidents that took place in Canada, a country that has not typically suffered from terrorism. The paper focuses on the FLQ crisis in October 1970, arguably the most problematic event of all, and shows that some organs of the French media co-operated with the terrorists because they felt sympathy with the FLQ's basic premise and did not really perceive them as terrorists. The crisis escalated rapidly into a state of national emergency and the War Measures Act was invoked. Some segments of the media played a significant role in provoking the authorities to such a dramatic action. Résumé: Au cours des quarante dernières années à peu près, il est survenu plusieurs incidents où la couverture médiatique d'actes terroristes a posé des problèmes, soulevant la critique du public et éveillant l'antagonisme des autorités. Cet article commence par mentionner quelques-uns des épisodes les plus troublants, après quoi il examine quelques incidents qui ont eu lieu au Canada, un pays qui n'a pas typiquement souffert de terrorisme. L'article se concentre sur la crise du FLQ en octobre 1970, peut-être l'incident le plus problématique parmi tous, et montre que certains organes des médias francophones ont coopéré avec les terroristes parce qu'ils sympathisaient avec la raison d'être fondamentale du FLQ et ne percevaient pas ses membres comme étant réellement des terroristes. La crise s'aggrava rapidement, menant à un état d'urgence nationale, et on invoqua la Loi sur les mesures de guerre. Certains organes médiatiques ont contribué de manière significative à encourager les autorités à prendre ces mesures draconiennes. IntroductionIn the nineteenth century, a terrorist attack in Washington, DC would have become known to the people of Tennessee only after a few days. The evolution of mass communication dramatically changed the scene of terrorism and the way terrorists conduct their affairs. Today's terrorists are well aware of the power of the media and manipulate them to their own advantage and need. By giving unusual events extensive coverage, the mass media evoked the notion that "you cannot be revolutionary without a color TV: it's as necessary as a gun" (Rapoport, 1988, p. 33; see also Cordes, 1988; Weimann & Winn, 1994). The present paper does not purport to delve into discussion on the distinction between terrorists and freedom fighters.1 It constricts its assumptions to terrorism only in liberal democracies, not to terrorism as such. Terrorism is defined here as the threat or employment of violence against citizens for political, religious, or ideological purposes by individuals or groups who are willing to justify all means to achieve their goals. The underlying assumption is that a zero sum game exists between terrorism and democracy, that is, a win for the one constitutes a loss for the other. Democracy needs to provide ample alternatives for citizens to voice their satisfaction as well as their grievances with regard to governmental policies. Political groups and associations have legal avenues to explore in order to achieve their aims. Terrorism is conceived as inhuman, insensitive to human life, cruel, and arbitrary. To remain morally neutral and objective toward terrorism and to sympathize with terrorist acts is to betray ethics and morality (Cohen-Almagor, in press). Terrorists should be explicitly condemned for their deeds by all who care about the underlying values of democracy: not harming others, and granting respect to others (Cohen-Almagor, 1994; Dworkin, 1977, 1985). Terrorism, by definition, runs counter to these underlying values. The media should, of course, report acts of terror, but when they report on terrorists, they do not have to view themselves as detached observers; they should not only transmit a truthful account of "what's out there" (Reese, 1990, p. 394). Instead, they should feel free to make moral judgments. It is an objective matter-a matter of how things really are-that terrorism in democracies is wrong. That is another way of emphasizing that terrorism in democracies is inherently wicked, not wicked only because people think it is (Dworkin, 1996). There is a delicate relationship between terrorists and the media. Free speech and free media-the basic instruments (many would say values) of every democracy-provide terrorists with the publicity they need to inform the public about their operations and goals. Indeed, democracy is the best arena for those who wish to reach their ends by violent means. Violent movements and individuals exploit the democratic instruments to find "golden paths" (from their point of view) to further their ends without holding themselves to the rules of law and order. Those movements and individuals would be crushed immediately were they to employ similar tactics in autocratic systems (Cohen-Almagor, 1999). The media have been accused of being the terrorist's best friend. Walter Laqueur explains that if terrorism is propaganda by deed, the success of a terrorist campaign depends decisively on the amount of publicity it receives. The terrorist's act by itself is nothing; publicity is everything (Laqueur, 1976, 1977, 1987; see also Schmid, 1992). Dowling (1986) goes as far as arguing that terrorists owe their existence to the media in liberal societies. The media are helping terrorists orchestrate a theatre of terror in which the terrorists and their victims are the main actors, creating a spectacle of tension and agony. At the heart of the theatre metaphor is the audience. The media personnel are a bit like drama critics who convey information to the public. Furthermore, like good drama critics, the media also interpret the event. The slant they give by deciding what to report and how to report it can create a climate of public support, apathy, or anger (Catton, 1978; Rubin & Friedland, 1986). By their theatrics, the insurgent terrorists serve the audience-attracting needs of the mass media, and since the media care primarily about holding the attention audience, this symbiosis is beneficial for both (Jenkins, 1975; Schmid & de Graaf, 1982). Terrorists, news people, and media experts share the view that those whose names make the headlines have power-that getting one's name on the front page and being included in prime time electronic news constitute a major political achievement. Modern terrorists seek access to the media by committing acts that closely fit news agencies' definitions of news: being timely and unique, involving adventure or having entertainment value, and affecting the lives of those being informed (Dowling, 1986). Gerbner & Gross (1979) argued that representation in the media gives an idea, a cause, and a sense of public identity, importance, and relevance. No movement can get going without some visibility. This is especially true when the movement is weak. Then media access might be its major, sometimes sole significant asset. In covering controversial issues, the media have an ethical and social responsibility to uphold basic precepts of journalism, such as balance, fairness, honesty, and accuracy, and also to make an effort to provide socially responsible coverage that fosters the common good in their communities and affirms constitutional freedom.2 During the past 40 years there have been many instances in which media coverage of terrorist events was problematic and irresponsible, evoking public criticism and antagonizing the authorities. This paper sheds light on a number of irresponsible actions of some organs of the media in crisis situations. The paper opens by mentioning some of the most troubling episodes and then discusses incidents that took place in Canada, a country not normally plagued by terrorism. Subsequently, the paper offers close analysis of the le Front de libération de Québec (FLQ) crisis in October 1970, arguably the most problematic event of all. Here some organs of the French media (most notably two radio stations and some newspapers) co-operated with the terrorists because they felt sympathy with the raison d'être of the FLQ and did not really perceive its members as terrorists. The crisis escalated rapidly to the extent that Canada declared a state of national emergency and brought military troops to the streets of Quebec. Some organs of the French media played a significant role in provoking the authorities to such a dramatic action.3 The present research benefited from a review of previously undisclosed 1970 Cabinet records concerning the FLQ and the kidnapping of James Cross and Pierre Laporte. This information was made public only recently. In certain instances, information has been removed in accordance with various sections of the Access to Information Act (e.g., section 14, information that would be injurious to the conduct of federal-provincial affairs), but I was allowed to look at more than 200 pages of relevant records showing the sense of urgency the government felt during and immediately after the October crisis.4 The major bulk of deliberations dealt with questions of law and order, means to combat terrorism, police powers and responsibilities, mobilization of troops into Quebec and their withdrawal, intelligence resources, and ways to deal with separatism. The files show there was a real fear that things might get out of control to the point of insurrection. For three weeks, the government had been forced to concentrate on virtually nothing but the FLQ. The files also show that members of the government were very dissatisfied with the media's role in the crisis and sought ways to regulate the media. The Prime Minister and his cabinet were aware of the media's power and of the need to publicize their own views in order to mobilize public support for their decisions. The new data shed an interesting light on how the government perceived the role of the CBC. The data provide insight on the deliberations revolving around whether or not to broadcast the FLQ manifesto. The documents also present direct quotes from Prime Minister Trudeau on his views of the role of the media during the crisis as well as quotes of other senior public officials. There are illuminating discussions on censorship, media regulation, and suggestions to amend the existing laws to promote the integration of Canada. The documents also testify about the efforts that were made to calm the heads of the media organizations after the invocation of the War Measures Act on October 16, 1970. Troubling episodesA Rand Corporation review of 63 terrorist incidents between 1968 and 1974 showed that terrorists achieved 100% probability of gaining major publicity (Bell, 1978). Media coverage of some of these episodes was ethically problematic, helping terrorism or contributing to the prolongation of the violent episodes. Laqueur (1987) mentions two incidents in this regard: the Bogota siege of 1977, which lasted 60 days, and the 444 days' detention of the American diplomats in Tehran two years later. Only after the captors had squeezed out the last drop of publicity were the hostages released (see also Altheide, 1982, 1985; Larson, 1986; Meeske & Javaheri, 1982; Schlesinger, 1981; Sick, 1990). The media failed to adequately consider the consequences of their reporting in an incident that took place in 1974, when terrorists took over part of the courthouse in the District of Columbia. The hostages were kept in a room separated by a two-way mirror from another room, which allowed the police to watch them closely. This advantage was removed when the media disclosed the fact, whereupon the terrorists ordered the hostages to tape the mirror with newspapers (Schmid & de Graaf, 1982). Other problematic episodes concerned the most extensive media coverage of the kidnapping of Patricia Hearst in February 1974, and the hijacking of TWA 847 to Beirut in 1985. Hearst was kidnapped by a small terrorist organization called the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA). The terrorists demanded that the media carry their messages in full and the media agreed; they magnified the case out of proportion and provided sensational mass entertainment that served the publicity needs of the ephemeral organization. Yonah Alexander (1981) argued that the most disturbing aspect of this case was that the media gave a small group of criminal misfits a Robin Hood image and transformed it into an internationally known movement possessing power and posing an insurmountable problem to the authorities. As for the TWA hijacking, some of the hostages bitterly resented the activities of the American media networks, referring to ABC as the "Amal Broadcasting Corporation" and NBC as the "Nabih Berri Corporation." One American hostage stated: "Maybe ABC had us hijacked to improve their ratings" (quoted in Brown, 1990, p. 228; see also Atwater, 1991; Laqueur, 1987; Schmid, 1989; Weimann, 1987; Weimann & Winn, 1994). The media reported much of the Shi'ite leader Nabih Berri's version of the TWA story, portraying the person who orchestrated the ordeal as a peacemaker. Berri made an appeal through the media, urging Americans to write to the president supporting the release of 700 Shi'ite prisoners in Israel. The news media helped Berri's attempt to equate the fate of the innocent American hostages with the fate of the Shi'ite terrorists imprisoned in Israel. ABC news, as well as the other media, broadcast pictures of the hostages of the TWA jet and the Shi'ite prisoners, equating in the minds of the public these two very different groups. Good Morning America featured the families of the imprisoned terrorists, drawing an analogy between them and the families of the hostages. In addition, ABC's David Hartman took upon himself the role of a mediator when he concluded a live interview with a spokesman for the Amal militia by asking: "Any final words to President Reagan this morning?" as if the president of the United States and the terrorist spokesman were equal and legitimate partners in a dialogue, and as if it is part of the media's role to serve as mediator (Good Morning America, June 28, 1985; cited in Raynor, 1987, pp. 150-151). David Hartman is a capable broadcaster, but his qualifications as mediator in such a tenuous situation are questionable. This delicate role, involving human life, should be left to those who have the proper expertise. The Hanafi Muslim takeover of three buildings at the heart of Washington, DC in March 1977 also became a major media event.5 The conduct of the media was ethically reckless and ran counter to the best interests of the hostages. The media furnished the terrorists with direct intelligence information by continuing on-site television coverage and depicted them as kind and merciful. Some members of the media made direct telephone calls to interview the terrorists and thereby tied up communication between the police negotiators and the terrorists. One television report showed a basket lifted up by rope to the fifth floor where some people who had evaded the terrorists' round-up had barricaded themselves. Their presence was unknown until then to the terrorists who were holding their prisoners on the eighth floor. Fellow Hanafis who were monitoring the news outside the captured buildings informed the terrorists of the television report. Another reporter speculated that boxes of ammunition were taken into the building in preparation for a police assault when, in fact, they were boxes of food for the hostages. There were a number of other incidents of reporters endangering lives, such as when the Hanafi leader Khaalis was asked if he intended to give an ultimatum, when none had been stated earlier. The security experts thought that the absence of a deadline was an encouraging sign; luckily Khaalis was too engrossed in his own rhetoric to pay adequate attention to this thoughtless question. One radio reporter prompted Khaalis to mark 10 hostages for execution after suggesting to the Hanafi leader that the police were trying to trick him. To calm him down, the police withdrew sharpshooters from nearby buildings. Evidently, the journalists decided to increase the tension for their audience, as if the tension for those under duress was not enough. Among the terrorists' demands was to stop the screening of a film called Mohammad, Messenger of God, which the Hanafis regarded as blasphemous. The Washington television station WTTG showed a brief clip of the film, which might have satisfied the curiosity of the audience, but could have been dangerous for the hostages. Furthermore, when the police negotiators tried to build their credibility with the terrorists, one talk show journalist asked the Hanafis: "How can you believe the police?" Moreover, one of Khaalis' demands was that the convicted murderers of his family and their accomplices be delivered to him. The negotiator stalled by pleading ignorance of the accomplices' location when a reporter unwittingly leaked that one of these people was in Washington at that time. This information not only enhanced Khaalis' position in the negotiation process, but also undermined the relationship the negotiator was trying to build. And as if this were not enough, Khaalis was outraged when a misinformed reporter called him "Black Muslim," not knowing that the Hanafis were bitter rivals of the Black Muslim sect and that members of Khaalis' family were murdered by Black Muslims. Khaalis stormed into the hostages' room and threatened to kill one of them in retaliation for the reporter's words. Only after the newscaster issued an apology did Khaalis back down from his threat (Alexander, 1981; Deitch, 1999; Schmid & de Graaf, 1982).6 It is inappropriate for journalists to interview members of groups taking part in terrorist acts while such acts are underway. This type of interview has occurred many times during the course of hijacking, building sieges, kidnapping, and other prolonged acts of terror.7 Interviews under such conditions are a direct reward for the specific act of terrorism underway and can interfere with efforts to resolve the crisis. In addition, such interviews all too often increase the spectacle of the event, spread fear, and provide a contrived platform for the views of the groups involved (Picard, 1991a). In the Hanafi episode, fortunately no hostage was killed due to the irresponsible behaviour of the media.8 There have been cases in which hostages were killed because of the urge for journalistic scoops. For instance, the killing of a German businessman in November, 1974 in a British Airways plane on its way from Dubai to Libya, and the murder of Jürgen Schumann, the captain of a Lufthansa jet in Mogadishu (October 13, 1977). In both cases, the hijackers had learned from the media that their demands had not been fulfilled and the authorities were just playing for time to prepare a rescue mission. In the case of the German captain, he had passed on information via the plane's radio. The media broadcast the information he had transmitted; the terrorists heard the broadcast and killed him (Laqueur, 1987; Schmid & de Graaf, 1982). The Israeli television coverage of the hijacked Lufthansa airplane to Mogadishu was also problematic. A special German anti-terror unit, established after the massacre of 11 Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympic games, freed the passengers from the plane in a daring military act on the night of October 18, 1977. The ethical problem arose when Michael Gordus, the Kol Israel's radio expert, managed to locate the German attack force's frequency while they were preparing to take over the plane. In the evening edition of the news on national television, the Channel One anchorman, Haim Yavin, decided to broadcast the item, disregarding Mr. Gordus' pleas to wait until after the takeover of the plane. The item was reported about five hours before the manoeuvre, at 9:00 p.m., when the takeover was scheduled for 2:00 a.m. Mr. Yavin insisted that the broadcast take place. It seems that he did not consider the potentially dangerous consequences of his action: the possibility that the hijackers would discover the rescue plan before the rescuers could take over, further jeopardizing the hostages and causing difficulties for the German force.9 In another incident, a reporter phoned a hostage-taker and asked why he wanted only $10,000 in ransom. The thug took the suggestion and increased his demand (Russell, 1995). Here too, the reporter was not satisfied with the existing tension and wished to raise its level. When people are coerced into alarming situations, the media
should accept the instructions of the authorities. Experienced
personnel can be an important factor. In sensitive circumstances it
is better to have senior reporters on the scene than eager, less
experienced reporters who may act without adequate judgment, as
occurred in the Hanafi crisis, for example, where young, highly
motivated, and ambitious reporters were involved. Another incident
of immature and irresponsible behaviour involved a reporter during
the Turkish embassy siege in Ottawa in 1985, who asked the Armenians
occupying the embassy if they had any demands other than the vague
ones announced to the media (Crelinsten, 1992). This half-witted
question could have pushed the kidnappers to more violent acts and
increased the drama in this highly tense crisis.10
In this context it is important to note that The Radio and
Television News Directors Association of Canada's Code of Ethics
holds:
The Code maintains that "Broadcast journalists will always display respect for the dignity, privacy and well-being of everyone with whom they deal" (quoted in Russell, 1995, p. 200).11 In turn, Section IV (A) 9.2 of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's Journalistic Standards and Practices (1993) says: "CBC journalists must ensure that any action they take will not further endanger the lives of the hostages or interfere with efforts of authorities to secure the hostages' release. They must guard against being used or manipulated by the terrorists/hostage takers" (p. 62).12 In the FLQ crisis, the irresponsible behaviour of some organs of the French media (especially the part played by two local radio stations) not only endangered the life of the two hostages but also contributed, to a certain extent, to the killing of one of them. The two French radio stations, CKLM and CKAC, played a significant role because at that period of time Canadians tended to prefer radio in an emergency news crisis. They felt that a radio broadcast was easier to cut into with a news flash than a television program. One of the findings of the Special Senate Committee on Mass Media (1970c) was that radio "is generally `background' in most homes, it is more likely that a bulletin on radio would be received than if it were televised" (p. 43; see also Stewart, 1975). Furthermore, as the recently released documents of the Canadian government reveal, the Quebec French media did not adequately reflect the views of the Ottawa government but presented the terrorists' views in a sympathetic, co-operative manner. It will be argued that while the English-language newspapers perceived Canadian unity as a major objective in evaluating the developments during the crisis, some organs of the French media helped the FLQ terrorists by supporting their separatist inclinations. Furthermore, the French papers on the whole were concerned in the main with the impact of the crisis on Quebec without giving much consideration to the ethical aspects involved in dealing with a terrorist incident. The FLQ crisis of October 1970Philip Schlesinger (1981) notes that the media generally reflect their government's perspectives when covering terrorism, and that perspectives that conflict with the government's views are rarely carried. Robert Picard (1991b) argues that journalists also amplify the rhetoric of government officials and leaders of other institutions targeted in or responding to political violence. However, the FLQ crisis exhibits a totally different pattern of behaviour on the part of the media. Unlike other media events that reported acts of terror, some organs of the Quebec French media did not aim to reinforce the existing order in the face of the FLQ challenge. Instead of amplifying the government's argumentation, they served the interests of the terrorists. Their activities outraged the Canadian government and did not help to mitigate the tension. On the contrary: the behaviour of some organs of the French media exacerbated the crisis and forced the government to contemplate possible procedures for monitoring the media. There was a genuine feeling that large segments of the Quebec French media helped mobilize public support for the terrorists' ends. Indeed, it could be argued that their conduct in this affair was arguably a model for teaching us how the media should not behave during a time of crisis. To better understand the behaviour of the media, some introductory contextualization of the crisis is useful. French Canadians (Québécois) constituted 28% of Canada's population, but 80% of Quebec's. The Québécois have had a provincial government for several hundred years. They have had the classical characteristics of a nation: sharing a common language, common culture, common history, and a geographical entity that is their homeland. The Québécois have considered themselves a nation and have had a well-developed national consciousness (Young, 1971). The national struggle in Quebec has a very long history. Nationalist sentiment has constituted the core ideology of French Canadians for at least two centuries (see Barreto, 1998; Clift, 1982; Cook, 1986; Gourevitch, 1979; Lévesque, 1979; Quinn, 1963; Reid, 1972). Since the late 1950s, Canada, like the rest of North America, had been in the throes of a serious economic recession, and Quebec was particularly hard hit by its effects. Unemployment at that period affected as many as 50% of households in some small communities in the rural areas, compared to 18% in the metropolitan areas. The time was propitious for the appearance of a protest movement (Pinard, 1971). In the 1960s, there was a growing nationalist struggle that was combined with tendencies towards socialism, on the one hand, and separatism, on the other. During that period, independent organizations of the Québécois working class were developing. In their own province, French Canadians as a group occupied the lower rungs of the economic ladder. Their average incomes were lower, and unemployment remained a serious problem, with a much higher rate than that of the Anglo-Canadians, who controlled approximately 80% of Quebec industry. There were very few French-speaking people heading large corporations. The Québécois tended to blame their economic and social ills on the Anglo-Canadians, and many saw separation from English Canada and independence for Quebec as the solution to their problems (Handler, 1988; Pinard, 1992; Wainstein, 1977). Many Québécois saw the language policy in their province during the 1960s as a profound form of discrimination and oppression. All offices functioned in English. Citizens had to speak English in order to be served in many of the stores. The federal government conducted all its meetings and functions in English only. Even to be a policeman in Quebec, one had to speak English. It was more advantageous in terms of economic opportunity to be a unilingual Anglophone than to be a bilingual Francophone, and many Francophones could not use French in the ordinary course of their work (Carens, 1995; Young, 1971). Yet during the same period of time, a quiet revolution was taking place in an attempt to change the norms and to shape history in a way that would better represent the French interests in Quebec. At the ideological level, this revolution constituted the long-avoided reconciliation with social and economic development. Traditionalism was abandoned. Social and economic development were openly welcomed. The spirit of independence and enquiry that was frozen for over a century reappeared, making the Québécois realize that they possess the power to change their society (McRoberts, 1988). At a practical level, the government in Quebec had assumed many, if not most, of the powers associated with an independent state. While it lacked actual independence, the government had the capacity for it. For the first time, a strong government had emerged, concentrating within itself the expectations of the French-speaking population and subsequently assuming the task of inspiring and promoting nationalist sentiment. This was a highly significant development (Clift, 1982).13 Of all the attempts made to bring Quebec outside the main stream of North America, the most problematic and violent was that of le Front de libération de Québec (FLQ). The FLQ was a small revolutionary organization that aimed to separate Quebec from Canada through violence and terror. Its members were influenced by the writings of Carlos Marighella and, in particular, by his book Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla (1970). Marighella recommended the formation of groups consisting of no more than four or five persons in order to reduce to a minimum the risks of penetration and betrayal. The FLQ organized its ranks accordingly (Special Committee of the Security Panel, 1970).14 During the 1960s, the FLQ concentrated on bombings, holdups, and thefts of arms, with few victims and little property damage. While public opinion was vocal in its condemnation of violence, it nevertheless rejoiced in the political effect it seemed to have on the use of the French language in business and industry, and on the sharing of power and responsibilities between Quebec and Ottawa (Clift, 1982). However, the shape of events took a dramatic twist in October, 1970. The FLQ crisis, also known as the Cross-Laporte affair, was the most serious terrorist crisis in the second half of the twentieth century in Canada. The crisis began on Monday, October 5, 1970, when James Cross, the British consul in Montreal, was kidnapped by a group of seven individuals who called themselves the Liberation Cell of the FLQ. Within a matter of a few hours, the kidnappers, in an anonymous call to radio station CKAC in Montreal,15 claimed credit for the abduction and subsequently issued a communiqué that enumerated seven specific demands and was accompanied by a political manifesto of several pages. The demands were: (1) the cessation of all police activities; (2) the publication of the FLQ manifesto in Quebec newspapers and its broadcast on national radio and television; (3) the liberation of 23 individuals described as "political prisoners"; (4) their transport to Cuba or Algeria; (5) the reintegration in the ranks of the Canadian Postal Service of the strikers; (6) a "voluntary" income tax of $500,000 to be paid to the prisoners; and (7) the name and picture of the individual who had recently helped the police apprehend members of another FLQ cell. A time limit of 48 hours was specified to meet these demands (LaTouche, 1983, pp. 197-198; see also Winter, Waters, & Collister, 1970). Hostage taking is one of the most spectacular terrorist phenomena. It has been called smart terrorism because the terrorists involved maintain control over the situation, gain media attention for their cause over a sustained period of time, and force the government to recognize them in the course of negotiations to free the hostage person(s). In effect, argue Margaret Hermann & Charles Hermann (1990), the leadership of the terrorist group taking the hostages becomes the puppet master, pulling the strings of the concerned government. The aims of the terrorist organization are to gain maximum press and television coverage for their cause and themselves and to increase their bargaining power for the next round. On October 6, the Liberation Cell issued two further communiqués. A letter from James Cross to his wife was delivered through radio station CKAC, calling upon the media to make all communiqués public and to break "the wall of silence that the fascist police have erected around the liberation operation" (Saywell, 1971, p. 38; Wainstein, 1977, p. 9). Robert Lemieux, a Montreal lawyer who was sympathetic to the FLQ and who represented many of the FLQ members, complained to the press that the authorities were not allowing him to see some of his jailed clients who were on the list of 23 prisoners to be freed ("Lawyer Polls Clients . . . ," 1970; Saywell, 1971; Wainstein, 1977). The following day the newspapers printed texts of the kidnappers' communiqués. This signaled a flood of communiqués containing specific demands, political objectives, and ideological propaganda. On the same day, radio station CKAC broadcast the complete text of the manifesto live. Secretary of State Pelletier expressed the opinion in a closed Cabinet meeting that publication of the manifesto in itself would do little harm. The document was of an extreme nature, a fact that would be quite evident to listeners. However, there remained the question of the direction to be given to the CBC in this regard, as this was clearly a matter for government decision (Cabinet, 1970a). Prime Minister Trudeau said that the language of the manifesto was of a highly scurrilous nature, raising the question whether the government should stop its publication. He thought it was better to defer any decision on the matter until the situation could be assessed more fully (Cabinet, 1970a). Later in the afternoon, the Cabinet agreed that the government itself must be responsible for the decision on whether or not to broadcast the FLQ manifesto, and that the CBC should be informed that "the matter was an element of a situation which should be regarded as a national emergency," with the consequence that the CBC should take no action with regard to broadcasting the manifesto unless and until directed by the government to do so (Cabinet, 1970a, p. 5).16 The FLQ manifesto stated that "The Front de Libération du Québec wants the total independence of Quebeckers, united in a free society, purged forever of the clique of voracious sharks, the patronizing `big bosses' and their henchmen who have made Quebec their hunting preserve for `cheap labor' and unscrupulous exploitation." It maintained that "We are terrorized by the closed circles of science and culture which are the universities and by their monkey directors," calling upon "production workers, miners, foresters, teachers, students and unemployed workers" to "take what belongs to you: your jobs, your determination and your liberty" (Haggart & Golden, 1979, pp. 277-281; Pelletier, 1971, pp. 59-67). Some of the newspapers in Quebec saw no difficulty identifying with these goals. Québec-Presse was a weekly, leftist paper located in Montreal and supported by the major trade unions in the province of Quebec. It did not enjoy large circulation among the French Canadians but was well read by students, intellectuals, and leftists. Mr. Michel Roy, President of Conseil de Press du Québec, estimates that its circulation was around 30-40,000 copies, maybe more, during the time of the crisis (personal communication, December 13, 1999).17 The Québec-Presse's declaration of principles holds the paper as the people's response to "the domination of the press by cultural, political or economic dictatorship or by the private interests that support such a dictatorship." It maintained that the paper is entirely independent of "the capitalist forces dominating society, and it intends to act in concert with the aspirations of the people and their organizations" (Raboy, 1984, p. 59). Québec-Presse published the manifesto of the FLQ several
months before the outbreak of the October crisis, in June 1970. In
October 1970, it gave editorial support to the FLQ's analysis,
adding that Québec-Presse saw itself as carrying out the same
struggle-for the liberation of Quebec-but by other means, namely
through information. In a special editorial, the
Québec-Presse wrote:
The Montreal daily, Le Devoir, an elite newspaper for intellectuals that was described as "the best written newspaper in Canada" (Kesterton, 1967, p. 94), soon became a key protagonist in the crisis, suggesting that the government negotiate "in good faith" with the FLQ to ensure the safe release of the hostages. It should be noted that although Le Devoir has had a small circulation (Michel Roy estimates that its daily circulation was between 38-42,000 copies, and that the circulation went up by a few thousand during the October crisis),18 its influence was always far greater than its numbers because political and media leaders always read it. The French intellectuals who supported the separatist movement primarily read this newspaper and also contributed to it.19 The editor-in-chief and publisher of Le Devoir, Claude Ryan, organized and led a movement in support of a negotiated settlement (Dagenais, 1992; LaTouche, 1983). The members of the Liberation Cell were well aware of the power of the media and of the political views of the senior people who ran the affairs. They used the media, releasing communiqués once to CKAC, another time to the rival radio station, CKLM20; both were happy to receive the messages and to broadcast them. Both stations were eager to participate in this game and quite happy to provide the terrorists with open channels of communication. The fourth communiqué, issued on October 7, was addressed to CKLM reporter Pierre Pascau. The reporters were co-operative to the extent that when the terrorists released their sixth communiqué in which they set down their detailed demands, they also named two reporters, one working for CKLM, the other for CKAC, as observers to assure that everything would go smoothly (Crelinsten, 1989). The two radio stations had become active agents of the news. Reporters became the trustees of terrorists, taking part in the negotiation process. Crelinsten argues that the Liberation Cell won the battle over the means of communication in which the authorities blocked publication of the FLQ communiqués by sending duplicates to the media. After two and a half days of futile attempts, the government tried to stall and, instead of suppressing communiqués as they had done previously, to draw the kidnappers away from their use of the media and towards direct and secret negotiations. At the same time, federal officials tried to delay broadcast or publication of the manifesto as long as possible, even to the point of phoning newspaper publishers directly to request that they refrain from publishing the text. However, the redundancy created by the terrorists' provision of multiple copies to the media ultimately undermined these attempts (Crelinsten, 1988). On Thursday, October 8, the CBC decided to accept the FLQ's demand to broadcast its manifesto "for humanitarian reasons" (Morf, 1970, p. 165). Even so, the CBC was careful to ensure that the broadcast was presented in an appropriate format and issued instructions that the FLQ manifesto should be read as a "communication" rather than as a news item. It was to be read by an announcer rather than by a CBC reporter or commentator ("CBC, Government Made Decision," 1970). Over Radio-Canada, announcer Gaëtan Montreuil sat in front of a television camera and for 13 minutes read in a dull, flat monotone voice the manifesto of the Front de Libération du Québec. Because the broadcast was carried in French and few English-language newspapers carried the full text, it was argued that not many English-speaking Canadians appreciated the enormity of the government's concession (Haggart & Golden, 1979; Saywell, 1971). Mitchell Sharp, who as External Affairs Minister was responsible for the safety of Cross, approved the CBC broadcast without requesting the permission of Prime Minister Trudeau, who was outraged, thinking that what the CBC did was giving way to blackmail (Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence, 1970a; Nash, 1995). The public reaction to hearing the manifesto on Radio-Canada was remarkably sympathetic. Although most people condemned the kidnapping, more than 50% of callers to the radio stations talk shows were in favour of the spirit of the manifesto (Charney, 1970; Crelinsten, 1989).21 On October 9, the FLQ manifesto was published in the newspapers. One paper devoted its entire front page to the text, and several papers introduced the text with warnings about its contents, dissociating the paper from the message or justifying its publication as a humanitarian gesture aimed at saving the life of Mr. Cross. In addition, the practice of publishing the communiqués continued, and the full text of the fifth communiqué appeared in all the papers (Crelinsten, 1989). A Le Devoir editorial, signed by Claude Ryan, said a number of jailed terrorists might be released to save Mr. Cross' life (Siegel, 1974). Communiqué No. 6, addressed to Pierre Pascau of CKLM, went astray and was sent again at 6:00 p.m., along with a later message (No. 7) accusing the authorities of trying to gain time by not releasing the earlier communiqué (Saywell, 1971; Wainstein, 1977; Waters, 1970). The crisis escalated on October 10 when Pierre Laporte, Quebec Minister of Labour and Immigration and Deputy Premier, was kidnapped by four people who identified themselves as members of the Chenier Cell whose ends were very similar to those of the Liberation Cell.22 The media were bombarded with communiqués issued by both cells and reported them. The role of the French media, which persisted in disseminating rumours and which published the terrorists' communiqués before handing them over to the police, troubled the government in Ottawa. Crelinsten reports that government officials were particularly angered over the role played by CKLM and CKAC in providing easy access and free publicity to the terrorists. The officials also felt that the French radio stations impeded the establishment of direct negotiations between the government and the kidnappers (Crelinsten, 1989). It seemed that the radio reporters were happy to take upon themselves a very subjective political role. From its first communiqué, the FLQ specified that it wanted the media to be associated with its action. Without the media their act would become an isolated episode of an insignificant gang. They instructed that their political manifesto must appear in its entirety on the front page of all major Quebec newspapers. They also specified that upon their release from prison, the political prisoners be accompanied by at least two political columnists from two of Quebec's French-language dailies. They made the kidnapping a prolonged media event that lasted for weeks and months. Indeed, hostage situations are full of suspense because human life hangs in the balance and the whole society, sometimes the world, is watching and praying for a peaceful resolution. The journalists were accused of manipulating information to further a cause that they approved (Dagenais, 1990, 1992; Laplante, 1997). Early on Sunday, October 11, Daniel McGinnis of CKAC was informed of an envelope near a subway station. This was Communiqué No. 1 from the Chenier Cell, accompanied by Laporte's National Assembly identification card, demanding that all seven demands of the Liberation Cell be met in full. Later in the afternoon, CKAC received Communiqué No. 2, claiming to be its last, from the Chenier Cell. However, four hours later, CKAC had another communiqué from the Chenier Cell containing Laporte's credit cards and a letter from Laporte to Premier Bourassa. At 9:55 p.m., five minutes before the deadline set by Laporte's abductors, Bourassa broadcast an appeal to the FLQ for negotiation mechanisms and for some assurance that the release of political prisoners would result in the release of the hostages. A few hours after the Premier's address, the kidnappers sent another note, this time to CKLM, reiterating their demands and suggesting Robert Lemieux as intermediary between the two cells and the authorities (Wainstein, 1977). The same day, October 11, Québec-Presse published a
pertinent editorial. Some of the striking paragraphs deserve to be
quoted at length:
Monday, October 12, the papers were full of FLQ communiqués. Communiqué No. 8 of the Cross-kidnappers was received by CKLM. The Chenier Cell informed CKAC of a letter sent by Laporte. Later that afternoon, the Chenier Cell summarized the situation in a communiqué and sent it to Pierre Pascau of CKLM (Saywell, 1971). Two parliamentary correspondents reported that Ottawa was troubled by the lack of public outrage over both the kidnapping and the role played by the French media. While the people in Quebec spoke of the need for dialogue, the government in Ottawa distanced itself from the discussions and resorted to a display of military strength (Crelinsten, 1988, 1989). On October 13, all the papers focused their front-page coverage of the FLQ crisis on the beginning of negotiations between the Quebec government and the kidnappers' representative, Robert Lemieux. In Ottawa, Prime Minister Trudeau took advantage of Question Period in the House of Commons to attack the media for giving the FLQ the very publicity that it was seeking. He further argued that it was a mistake to encourage the use of the term "political prisoners" for men who are bandits (House of Commons, 1970, p. 52; "PM Urges Press...," 1970; Trudeau, 1970). On October 14, the two cells of the FLQ issued a joint communiqué through Pierre Pascau of CKLM (Saywell, 1971; Wainstein, 1977). In the Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence, convened that day, Prime Minister Trudeau expressed worries that the crisis might result in the creation of a separatist popular movement. To prevent such a development, he thought it would be necessary for the government to act quickly, and that such action "might have to include rigid control of the mass media and strong counter-propaganda action by the government" (Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence, 1970b, p. 3). Minister of Justice Turner spoke of the need for voluntary co-operation of station owners to ensure that broadcasters would act in a more responsible manner than they had thus far. Turner maintained that if Quebec could demonstrate the need for unusual short-term police action, this co-operation would be forthcoming from the media, provided it stopped short of the suspension of fair comment. Turner said, "it was of the utmost importance that the government retain public support" (p. 3). The Committee spoke of the need to secure the co-operation of press media in publicizing the Prime Minister's statements and in ensuring responsible reporting of events. The police went public to deplore the attitude of the press in this affair (Le Devoir, October 14, 1970), stating that by publishing all sorts of rumours without verifying their authenticity and harassing headquarters with questions, the journalists were doing considerable harm to the police efforts. The police called upon the press to show a greater concern for accuracy. Besides broadcasting the messages before the police were even aware of them, and meddling with the hard-copy communiqués to the point of blurring all significant fingerprints, the reporters were accused of frequently broadcasting news that led only to confusion and sensational competition (Le Journal de Montreal, October 14, 1970, quoted in Dagenais, 1992, pp. 127-128). G. Constantineau, commentator for Le Devoir, wrote that the radio stations, particularly the "FLQ mailboxes" CKLM and CKAC, had become involuntary participants in the affair and that journalism had become an active agent of the news instead of its passive purveyor (Le Devoir, October 14, 1970, p. 2, quoted in Crelinsten, 1989, p. 435). In his editorial of October 14, 1970, Roger Bruneau of
L'Action 23
wrote:
That same day, the Editor-in-Chief and Publisher of Le Devoir, Claude Ryan, together with a group of respected Quebec citizens, including the leader of the separatist Parti Québécois René Lévesque, signed a statement urging the government to comply with the demands of the FLQ (Le Devoir, October 15, 1970). The government in Ottawa met again on October 14 and discussed at length the media's role in the crisis. Mr. J. Davey, Program Secretary to the Prime Minister, reviewed a memorandum dealing with the role of communications. He said that communiqués from and speculation about the FLQ had dominated the media and there was a need to ensure adequate provision of information from well-briefed ministers and from senior authorized personnel. Planning for communications was also aimed at obtaining from the media a degree of self-discipline in their reporting during the crisis (Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence, 1970c; on media speculation see, for instance, Jackson, 1970). Marc Lalonde, Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, noted that the press in Montreal appeared not to want to raise the pressure for further manifestations (Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence, 1970c). Prime Minister Trudeau said that the actions of the media generally had been "quite irresponsible" and had contributed significantly to an escalation of the crisis by giving the FLQ the status of a parallel government (p. 8). It was therefore incumbent upon the government to consider what action might be taken to foster a more responsible attitude. In turn, Minister of Justice Turner said that the government should avoid threatening the mass media in any way. If the government were to introduce restrictive legislation, it would be essential to have the support of the media as well as that of the public. He suggested trying to obtain the media's agreement to exercise voluntary restraint in their reporting of news relating to the crisis (Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence, 1970c). The terrorists did not exploit the media, but rather used them to gain public attention to their ends and popular support in Quebec for separatism. The term "exploitation" is inappropriate to describe the behaviour of media organs that willingly accepted the terrorists terms and demands, and seemed quite happy to co-operate. The FLQ created a situation saturated with anxieties that was favourable for their strategic aims. The kidnapping demonstrated that the authorities were not in control and exacerbated the ongoing social conflict, polarized the groups in tension, and probably also sought to pull political militants across the threshold of using violence. This is a well-known strategy of terrorism around the world (Gerrits, 1992). Some organs of the French media were happy to be used to the point that later they were accused of co-operating with the terrorists. The Editor of the popular24 Montreal weekly Le Petit Journal wrote: "I believe that the unrestrained freedom of the press led little by little to the death of a Quebec minister" (October 25, 1970) (quoted in Dagenais, 1992, p. 129). A great number of attacks were made on the press after the crisis, suggesting that the media were irresponsible in the way they amplified rumours during a time of severe threat (LaTouche, 1983). The French papers had about 40% more picture space coverage than the English dailies, aiming to sensationalize the story. The French press editorial space coverage was far more extensive in comparison to the English press editorials, tending to put virtually all stories dealing with the FLQ negotiations on page one. In the editorial columns, negotiation was the most strongly pressed matter and the main thrust, especially of Le Devoir. In comparison with the English press, the French press had more stories related to the FLQ's communiqués. This policy was designed to pressure the government towards a compromise approach to resolving the crisis (Siegel, 1974). The French media thought that their sympathetic viewpoint represented the view of large sectors of Quebec. An opinion was heard that "journalists agree that 50 per cent of the people of Quebec sympathize with the aims of the FLQ" (Haggart & Golden, 1979, p. 32). Indeed, while the public condemned the kidnapping, many identified with their goals. As the crisis continued, public support for the FLQ's cause continued to grow. Ottawa feared that things were getting out of control. On October 15, the Cabinet gathered; it agreed that in view of the existing situation, the government had no alternative but to declare an emergency, to give the abductors an ultimatum for the release of Cross and Laporte, to begin arresting FLQ members, and to invite the media privately to meet with the Secretary of State, who would order them to refrain from giving publicity to those advocating violence in Quebec (Cabinet, 1970b). At four o'clock on the morning of October 16, 1970, the government invoked the War Measures Act. Immediately afterwards a massive arrest operation began. The following day, his kidnappers killed Pierre Laporte, apparently after he tried to escape (Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence, 1970e; Wainstein, 1977).25 Only then did the media suddenly become very cautious, and the issue of censorship became a focus of intense debate in the ensuing weeks. Bernard Dagenais, a communications professor at Laval University and a specialist on the October Crisis, said that the French media sided with the FLQ until Laporte's murder, whereas the English-language media were less interested. Dagenais maintained that Laporte's murder was a cold shower for the media and from that point they started to support the government. The media went from being a leader in the crisis to following the government line (Cobb, 1995). Several members of the Quebec National Assembly and government ministers criticized the media sharply. The Liberal Party whip, Louis-Philippe Lacroix, accused the journalists of being responsible for the death of Pierre Laporte; he labeled them the gravediggers of democracy. Legislative member Henri Coiteux called reporters "a gang of parasites, failures, pseudo-intellectuals" (Cobb, 1995, p. B4). Cultural Affairs Minister François Cloutier stated that there had clearly been abuse of freedom of the press. For him, the FLQ's use of the radio stations exceeded the normal rules of liberty in a democracy. Premier Bourassa said there was a need to examine, after the event, the limitless freedom of expression that Quebec enjoyed (Dagenais, 1992).26 The Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence met on the evening of October 16. Secretary of State Pelletier said he had discussed the desirability of exercising voluntary restraint in reporting events related to the crisis with most of the owners of broadcast networks. They had been very co-operative but unable to establish firm and consistent control within their own networks. Several owners of the media had expressed the fear that, without further legal sanctions, any restraints would result in a series of strikes by broadcast employees whose unions were Separatist-oriented. Mr. Pelletier said he had discussed ways of achieving restraint regulation with the Chairman of the Canadian Radio Television Commission (CRTC). However, both concluded that such action would lead to accusations of censorship and should not be attempted (Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence, 1970d). Several ministers expressed concern at the apparent readiness of persons in authority in the networks to make their facilities available to Separatists and FLQ supporters. Some suggested that the Broadcast Act might be amended to give the government power of direction in cases where it believed the mass media were being used to promote the disintegration of Canada and report its actions to Parliament. Prime Minister Trudeau suggested that the Cabinet Committee on Priorities and Planning might consider this in the context of the National Unity priority problem (Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence, 1970d). After the invocation of the War Measures Act by the federal Cabinet, the police arrested 456 Quebec citizens. All but a handful were released without any charges being made (R.C.M.P. Strategy..., 1970; Starnes, 1998). This suggests that the police reaction was panicky rather than carefully calculated. The media operations, as described above, had a considerable role in creating this panic. CBC news reporters in Ottawa received a directive that they were to broadcast only stories that could be attributed to an identifiable source. Although on the surface this could be defended as an attempt to keep rumours off the air, its effect was to confine CBC news to official reports from the government or to the restrained comments the opposition parties were willing to make. CBC reporters were reminded in another directive that they were not to allow their names to be identified with political statements (Haggart & Golden, 1979). On Saturday, October 17, the Liberation Cell sent out its tenth communiqué along with a letter from Cross to his wife. The Chenier Cell contacted CKAC to announce that Pierre Laporte had been executed and directed the reporters to the location of his body (Saywell, 1971; Wainstein, 1977). The English-Canadian press gave cautious approval to the invocation of the War Measures Act. Most editorial writers were concerned about the suspension of civil liberties. The Toronto Telegram (October 16) saw it as "a drastic but necessary action." The Winnipeg Free Press (October 17) saw it as a "desperate cure," an unhappy choice "between anarchy and a period of repressive government." The popular quality newspaper in English in Quebec, read also by French Canadians, the Montreal Gazette (October 17) saw it as "the only course to take, however distasteful it may appear, if society is to be freed of the threat of continued terrorism."27 The Ottawa Citizen (October 17) concluded that there was a need to "give the government full support....The cause is nothing less than making sure that the people we have elected by democratic process will run this country, and that a band of anonymous criminals will not." The Globe and Mail asserted (October 17): "Only if we can believe that the Government has evidence that the FLQ is strong enough and sufficiently armed to escalate the violence that it has spawned for seven years now, only if we can believe that it is virulent enough to infect other areas of society, only then can the Government's assumption of incredible powers be tolerated." And the Vancouver Sun (October 16) applauded the decision to "fight fire with fire and match ruthlessness with ruthlessness." All English-Canadian newspapers denounced the murder of Pierre Laporte (all quotes are taken from Saywell, 1971, pp. 94-95, 105-107).28 In French Canada, the two large and popular newspapers La Presse (based in Montreal) and Le Soleil (based in Quebec City) supported the use of the Act.29 Le Devoir (October 17) did not, arguing that Quebec had been taken over by Ottawa.30 The editors of Québec-Presse (October 18) went as far as calling for passive resistance, saying, "we must resist the repression which is striking everywhere in Quebec," and calling upon popular movements, citizens committees, all associations, and the unions to organize the resistance in a common, concerted effort. Most Quebec papers deplored Laporte's murder. Québec-Presse, on the other hand, held a supportive view of the FLQ. One separatist writer said (October 25): "It is too easy to say that Pierre Laporte was killed by a handful of terrorists. A handful of terrorists with their finger on the trigger. But who put the gun into their hands?...I refuse to pass judgment" (Saywell, 1971, pp. 96, 99). On October 18, some radio and television stations broadcast erroneous news that the body of Mr. Cross had also been found (Siegel, 1974). That same day the Cabinet contemplated posting policemen in radio and television stations to prevent information coming from the FLQ or any other sources from being mishandled by the press. This measure would also have permitted the police to have it instantly and to act on it. In the end it was decided that the Secretary of State should see that the public and private sectors of the media abide by the government decisions. Specifically, it was decided not to release any letters or other documents coming from Mr. Cross or his abductors (Cabinet, 1970c). The following day, October 19, The Ottawa Journal reported that the CBC was served notice to refrain from editorial comment on the terrorist situation and that it was also hoped that the CTV network and all private stations would toe this policy line until the crisis is over. Sandy Gardiner voiced the opinion that the broadcasters should have been put in their place right from the outset, and that the two networks must shoulder some of the blame for adding fuel to the fire. Gardiner added that viewers are entitled to the facts with analysis, if pertinent, but speculation should have been outlawed: "Speculation, especially at a time when lives are at stake, is irresponsible journalism" (Gardiner, 1970). On October 22, 1970, the government met to discuss its strategy for dealing with the FLQ. Secretary of State Pelletier said the media heads needed reassuring: "They had got themselves into a difficult situation and had lost control" (A Strategy . . . , 1970). Minister of Transport Jamieson felt that the Prime Minister should meet with the heads of the media to explain to them what the problems were (Cabinet, 1970d). Two weeks later, Mr. J. Davey, Program Secretary to the Prime Minister, thought that the government should concentrate attention on four areas of interest, one of them the necessity for the Strategic Operations Centre to continue monitoring the media from week to week (Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence, 1970f). On November 6, police raided the Montreal apartment where the four Laporte kidnappers had been hiding since the murder; one of the suspects was captured, but the other three eluded the police. Later, they sent their last communiqué, describing their escape and mocking the police. The Liberation Cell sent their last communiqué on November 21 to the Québec-Presse, enclosing a letter from Mr. Cross. The communiqué complained of government torture, searches, arrests, and censorship, and called on the UN to mediate with the government to release the political prisoners (Wainstein, 1977). A final note should be made regarding the differences between the French-language and English-language dailies. Previous research showed that English-speaking journalists saw their principal function as straight news reporting while French-language journalists were much more inclined to perceive their journalistic function to include interpreting the news.31 During the FLQ crisis, their interpretation of events coincided with the terrorists' aims. Arthur Siegel, who conducted a multidimensional content analysis of Canadian newspaper coverage from the kidnapping of James Cross until the funeral of Pierre Laporte 17 days later, found the French dailies tended to be homogenous in their coverage of the affair. The French-language papers stressed the search for a peaceful solution and the negotiation aspect of the situation; they were interested in the international reaction to the crisis, especially from Europe and la Francophonie. They also focused more on personalities and on civil rights issues. The English-language press, in contrast, focused attention on the manhunt for the terrorists, largely dealing with police activities connected with apprehending the kidnappers and freeing the hostages. They also reported on political institutions and on the economic cost of the crisis, and showed a greater interest in the national and American reaction to the crisis. The French papers were not nearly as interested as the English papers in bringing up the economic implications of the crisis, nor were they interested in the legalistic elements of the situation. Siegel (1974) explains this restrictive coverage of the crisis by saying that this was designed to lead to the emergence of a sharper, more easily defined picture. In addition, English-speaking editorials were more hostile to terrorism generally and the FLQ specifically. They expressed strong support for both the Ottawa and Quebec governments, enthusiastically endorsed the invocation of the War Measures Act, and stressed their support and concern for Canadian unity. The French-speaking editorials had a different perspective. Their editorial emphasis was on the implications of the crisis for Quebec society. Social and economic injustices, which were almost always associated with French Canadians, were often discussed. These editorials generally did not relate separatism to terrorism, tending to differentiate between legitimate separatism and "bad" terrorist separatism, and warning against the deterioration of civil rights. While the English dailies tended to stress the legislative branch of government, the Ottawa Parliament that was asked to approve the War Measures Act, and emphasizing the importance of Canadian unity, the French dailies emphasized the positions of the political executives, that is, the federal and Quebec governments. Canadian unity ranked low in the French papers' editorials and so was the level of support for unity. On the whole, the picture that emerged from the French newspapers suggested far more popular opposition to the authorities than one would have envisaged from reading the English dailies (Siegel, 1974, 1996).32 ConclusionThroughout the roughly two weeks of peak crisis, some influential organs of the French media depicted the FLQ as an equal partner in a political dialogue with the government, as if we speak of symmetrically powerful rivals with legitimate concerns and deeds (as discussed earlier, this pattern was followed during the TWA crisis of 1985). Furthermore, in the rush for news under time constraints, some organs of the media were tempted to report first and make the proper inquiry and verification later. During the FLQ crisis, a woman in Hull, Quebec, was allegedly tortured by the dissidents, who released her with a message that topped the Saturday Vancouver Sun: "New FLQ Warning: `Women and Children Next' Hull Torture Message to PM" ("Women and Children Next," 1970; see also Lemieux, 1970; Russell, 1995). It was a fearful development at a time of high tension. But it was a hoax. Several days later, a tiny story well inside the paper said the torture marks were apparently self-inflicted. No wonder that Jean-Paul Desbiens, editorialist for La Presse, wrote on October 24, 1970, "there would be a lot to say about the lack of intellectual rigour on the part of the written and spoken press" (quoted in Dagenais, 1992, pp. 128-129). The French media took it upon themselves to play an active role as mediator. On Friday, October 9, through Pierre Pascau of CKLM, Quebec Justice Minister Choquette asked the kidnappers to supply proof that Mr. Cross was still alive. In reply through CKLM to Mr. Choquette, the kidnappers wrote back giving a fifth and final deadline for 6:00 p.m., Saturday, October 10 (Haggart & Golden, 1979). In addition, the role that Claude Ryan assumed upon himself on his own initiative has already been described. As mentioned earlier, this delicate role of mediation should be left to professional negotiators who have the expertise to deal with kidnappers and potential murderers. Like in the Hanafi episode, some journalists during the FLQ crisis did not hesitate to make irresponsible speculations designed to introduce a fresh new dimension to the story, as if it was not dramatic enough. During the second week, Cross felt the hostility of his kidnappers increase as news speculation that he was sending coded messages appeared in the papers. In making this speculation, some journalists mentioned that Cross had worked previously for British military intelligence. His letters to his wife had been rewritten on the direction of his guards to prevent a code. When finally released on December 4, 1970, Mr. Cross reported that his treatment had deteriorated significantly during the second week, until he could convince his captors that the speculations were false: "There's been a lot of talk about journalistic responsibility. But people have responsibility to the kidnapped, to the chap in there, he's the loneliest man in the world. And speculation about what he's trying to do may cost him his life" (Crelinsten, 1992, p. 233; Haggart & Golden, 1979, p. 234). Cross was further quoted saying: "The news media were either thoughtless, ruthless, or stupid....It should have been obvious that the speculation that (my) letters possibly carried a coded message, could create a dangerous situation for (me), or prevent (me) from sending any further messages" (The Globe and Mail, December 15, 1970, quoted in Dagenais, 1992, p. 129). Shortly after James Cross was freed and his kidnappers had departed for Cuba, Québec-Presse (December 13, 1970) published the transcript of an audio tape recorded by the kidnappers prior to their capture. On this tape, the kidnappers confirmed having deliberately pitted two private radio stations against each other so as to have more coverage.33 In fact, information was and remained uncontrolled until the imposition of the War Measures Act which set up an official state of censorship that was never applied, but was sustained by a real self-censorship and by the death of minister Laporte, which made any support for the assassins impossible (Dagenais, 1992). On the tape, the kidnappers also observed smugly that the forced broadcast of their manifesto had elicited considerable sympathy: "For the first time, patriots of the Front managed to express themselves by entering every home, through Radio Canada...by making them read our manifesto" (Weimann & Winn, 1994, p. 114). A month after the crisis, Premier Bourassa said in a Quebec National Assembly debate, "the government's leaders were treated like dogs by the newspapers," suggesting re-examination of the inherent dangers of verbal violence (Wainstein, 1977, pp. 48-49).34 It is one thing to criticize the government for what might be conceived as an inappropriate handling of a crisis, and quite another to serve the interests of terrorists, readily playing into their hands, assuming responsibilities that are outside the scope of journalism, and conducting their affairs in a way that might risk the lives of hostages. May I conclude with some personal words: I have studied the relationships between terrorism and the media for many years and cannot think of a better example of irresponsible media behaviour. Influential segments of the French media served the interests of the terrorists and ignored the interests of the victims, as well as the interests of Canada as a free, democratic society. Journalists broke almost every ethical norm that is accepted during hostage taking episodes; they did not hesitate to sensationalize and to dramatize the event, stirring up emotions in a way that hindered governmental operations. Influential segments of the French media wanted to exert more pressure on the government by expressing concern for the fate of Cross and Laporte, thereby hoping to push the government to succumb to the terrorists' demands. They gladly offered their services as mediators and messengers of the terrorists, disregarding their obligation to accurate reporting, and broadcast the terrorists' communiqués without the consent of the authorities. Through their extensive sympathetic coverage, French journalists not only provided a grand platform for the terrorists, but also legitimized their demands and actions. Some of the editors also offered ways to resolve the situation, ways the government felt were damaging to the interests of Canada. With their sensational speculations about Cross' coded letters, the reporters endangered his life. They forgot that their story was Cross' real-life drama. The FLQ crisis raises a loud and frightening alarm, signaling us to be aware of the media's lack of concern for human life if the terrorists' political ends are to their liking. The public's "right to know" becomes a cover-up for the most insensitive and irresponsible behaviour. This type of media coverage, which does not consider the consequences of its actions, is unprofessional and immoral-and this is especially true during a time of crisis. AcknowledgmentsThe author is grateful to the referees of the Canadian Journal of Communication, Rick Abel, and Gabi Weimann for their comments and criticism, and to Ronald Cohen, Michel Roy, Conrad Winn, Bob Rupert, Guy Caron, Mike Gasher, Marc Raboy, and the librarians of UCLA School of Law for their invaluable assistance. Notes
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