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Foundations of Violence, Terror and War in the Writings of Marx, Engels and Lenin

Raphael Cohen-Almagor

The aims of this essay are (A) to examine the extent to which Marx, Engels and Lenin believed in revolution by peaceful means and what was their attitude towards the phenomenon of war, and (B) to reflect on the different interpretations of their writings, discerning between three schools of thought. It is argued that Marx and Engels considered violence only as an instrument of secondary importance and desirable in so far as there is no other alternative to change the system. It is further contended that while they, in the course of years, adopted a more moderate position regarding the use of violence, Lenin's viewpoint radicalized as the possibility of a revolution in Russia became real. As years went by Lenin affirmed not only the use of violence but also the resort to terrorist activities. Unlike Marx and Engels he became an ardent supporter of all types of terror.

Introduction

Many past and present national liberation movements, which chose violence and terror as means for achieving their ends, stated that they had drawn their revolutionary inspiration from Marx, Engels, and Lenin. The attitudes of these three figures toward the use of violence, terror and war, the centrality assigned to these practices in their teachings, and the extent, to which they justified them and considered them legitimate revolutionary instruments have not been clearly determined by academic scholars of their thought. The main intentions of this article are twofold: first, it examines the extent to which Marx, Engels and Lenin believed in revolution by peaceful means, without resorting to violence; and, second, it reflects on the different interpretations of their writings. With regard to the first aim it will be argued that in the course of years Marx and Engels changed their views from a radical standpoint regarding the use of violence to more moderate thinking; while Lenin shifted in exactly the opposite direction. At the outset of his activities Lenin denounced the resort to terrorist activities, and gradually he became an ardent supporter of their use.

In formulating these questions, however, one is well aware of the difficulties that may be involved in trying to provide definite answers. If we carefully examine the statements made by Marx, Engels and Lenin throughout the years, then we will be able to defend almost any position, for the contradictions are numerous. Still, the intention is to demonstrate that over the years Marx had changed his position somewhat, and had become increasingly sympathetic toward the idea of peaceful revolution. With regard to Lenin, it is possible to establish more precise principles, for he has to his credit, as well as to his debit, not only his sayings, but also his deeds as a revolutionary leader.

The second aim of this article is to achieve some order in classifying the different interpretations of Marx's and Engels' writings. Thus, three schools will be discerned: the first holds that violence in their view was conceived as compulsory and essential in order to put an end to the bourgeois rule (the Radical School). The second argues that violence was only an instrument of secondary importance in their thought, desirable insofar as there is no other alternative (the Instrumental School). Finally, the third school postulates that Marx and Engels never believed in the efficiency of terror as a means. In fact, so it maintains, the resort to terror really constitutes an admission of the fact that the circumstances are not yet ripe for revolution (the Moderate School). This is so far as the use of *terror* is concerned. However, it cannot be argued that they exclude the resort to *violence* altogether.

My main contention will be that Marx and Engels did not consider violence to be a sacred principle of practical action, but at the very most an indispensable principle under certain circumstances. In their opinion, it would be silly to ignore the variability of conditions, and adopt a single dogmatic method: solutions must be found in accordance with given conditions. If violence constitutes the most efficient and essential instrument without which the revolution cannot succeed, then it is desired, rational and justified. In Marx's and Engels' opinion, force¹ can provide the ultimate push to a development, but it can never provide anything absolutely new; it cannot contribute anything when social and political readiness are lacking.² Force is a means, not an end. Force will be the midwife of revolution in those countries which have not advanced from the point of democratic processes, a fact which may force the proletariat to take sword in hand.

The Concept of Political Violence

The concept of political violence should not be dealt with as a unitary concept. There are various levels of violence, and different circumstances in

which violence is applied. A forceful defence against a threatening invader is not the same as a forceful assault against someone else's property. There is a significant difference between indiscriminate shedding of blood and mass uprising against cruel oppressors, although both may involve the use of physical force. Can one impose a taboo on the use of violence, and condemn a nation to absolute slavery? Is the value of abstention from violence higher than the value of freedom? And likewise, Marx may ask: Is violence more ruthless than the ruthlessness of capitalism and its henchmen?

Before turning to the protagonists, a definition of political violence should be supplied. Following Gurr, political violence may refer to all collective attacks occurring within given political boundaries aiming against the regime, its actors or its policies.³ Gurr's definition includes actual and threatened violence, the most common manifestations of the former being revolutions, guerrillas, warfare, rebellions and riots. In a similar fashion Honderich defines political violence as the use of significant or destructive power against people or things, in violation of established legal norms, aiming to cause a change in the policies, the mentality or the system of government, and hence also intending to cause changes in the way of life of individual members of society and perhaps other societies.⁴ It is an attempt to coerce peoples and governments in a way which will bring them to have certain attitudes and to make certain decisions. This is in distinction from an exercise of force which leaves no place for decision. Resorting to violence is thought by those who are applying it to grant them greater influence than that of others in society, who are not organized for the use of violence.

The following analysis will focus exclusively on Marx's and Engels' views, and on Lenin's views and deeds, as they pertain to the use of violence and terror. With regard to Lenin, the discussion concentrates only on his views and deeds *prior to the 1917 revolution*. While, as we know, this question is a relevant one for the post-revolutionary period as well, still there is a fundamental difference between the use of violence and terror by a revolutionary organization and its use by a state, with the latter case raising a different set of moral and political issues.

I. Marx: The Possibility of Revolution by Peaceful Means

A most relevant question concerning the use or non-use of force relates to its *limits*, i.e. is it intended to establish a regime in which force will or will not be a central and decisive factor, and are force and violence necessary conditions for carrying out the revolution? It has been argued that Marx answered this in his 1872 speech at Amsterdam in which he categorically stated:

We are aware of the importance that must be accorded to the institutions, customs, and traditions of different countries; and we do not deny that there are countries like America, England (and, if I knew your institutions better, I would add Holland) where the workers can achieve their aims by peaceful means. However true that may be, we ought also to recognise that, in most of the countries on the continent, it is force that must be the lever of our revolutions; it is to force that it will be necessary to appeal for a time in order to establish the reign of labour.⁵

Marx first statement on this matter was in an article entitled 'The Charterists', published on 9 October 1852, in *The People's Paper*.⁶ Marx emphasized that in Britain socialist objectives are attainable through the use of general voting rights, which amount – in the English context of class structure – to a revolution. He asserted that universal suffrage is the equivalent of political power for the working class of England, where the proletariat forms the large majority of the population; where in a long underground civil war it has gained a clear consciousness of its position as a class. Therefore, the carrying of voting rights in England would be a far more socialistic measure than anything with the same name on the Continent.⁷

This revolutionary significance of universal voting rights in England is related to the socio-economic structure of English society. Marx insisted that the ten-hour law and other industrial legislation, which contradict the principle of the free market economy, reflect the working class's political strength.⁸ In *Capital* Marx asserted that the British factory laws were an example of the internal changes occurring in the capitalist regime, due to its own embedded logic. The tone of the workers became threatening, and in this atmosphere the factory owners acknowledged the need for compromise. Marx described how capital's powers of resistance gradually weakened, and simultaneously the offensive powers of the workers grew as they gained more allies in the classes of society not immediately interested in the question.⁹ The conclusion that can be drawn is that the degree of revolutionary violence will stand in inverse relation to the presence of a developed working class.

Similarly in 1871, following publicity Marx attained during the days of the Paris Commune, he repeated this same reasoning in an interview to a radical American newspaper, arguing that the English working class required no violent revolution in order to gain power. That same year Marx clarified to the bourgeois government that, in time of need, the proletariat would take arms to remove them from their seat of tyranny by saying:

We must make clear to the governments: we know that you are the

armed power that is directed against the proletariat; we will proceed against you by peaceful means where that is possible and with arms when it is necessary.¹⁰

Marx explained that revolution was necessary, not just as a means to overthrow the ruling class, but also because only through the process of revolution combining consciousness and political struggle, could the uprising class rid itself of all the old trash, product of its being sunk in brutal existence, and prepare itself to found a new society. People build themselves anew, change themselves through social change, because 'the human material has been corrupted by hundreds of thousands of years of slavery, serfdom, capitalism, and the war of every man against his neighbour', explained Marx.¹¹ This radical point of view, which assigns violence a function of purifying the souls of the workers, is very difficult to reconcile with his argument for revolution by peaceful means.

In the years preceding 1850 Marx was what might have been termed a Jacobean democrat; he saw the approaching revolution as a gigantic popular uprising from below. However, during the following decades – the 1850s and the 1860s – Marx revised his strategic thinking. The working class was undergoing a process of change, being organized in unions, and there were opportunities for political activity that had been unimaginable previously.¹² At this juncture Marx's outlook became more democratic in the modern sense of the term. He began increasingly to express himself in terms of conquering power by peaceful means, via elections. In 1879 he wrote:

A historical development can only remain 'peaceful' so long as it is not opposed by the violence of those who wield power in society at that time. If in England or in the USA, for example, the working class were to gain a majority in Parliament or Congress, then it could, by legal means, set aside the laws and structures that stood in its way.¹³

At the same time, in later writings, Marx was far from the viewpoint of peaceful transition to socialism, resulting from capitalist maturity. Thus in his essay 'The Civil War in France'¹⁴ he wrote that repression and toughness were an outcome of economic prosperity in France; saying that the more modern society's industrial progress led to development, intensifying and depending on the class conflict between capital and labour, the more he found political government taking the character of a public force, for repressing the working class into a machine to serve the needs of class control.

According to Marx's view, under imperial rule the bourgeois society, stripped of all its political concerns, reached the height of its economic development, previously inconceivable. Industry and commerce expanded

immeasurably and financial speculation celebrated its cosmopolitan revels. This at the time when the misery of the masses so glaringly and astoundingly contrasted with the unashamedly luxurious life style of those whose sources were fraud and crime.

The contradictions in Marx's writings led to a great many interpretations regarding his perception of violence, and the degree to which he sanctified it as instrumental for achieving his objectives. Thus, for instance, Miller urges that Marx's statements regarding a revolution by peaceful means in England, America and possibly Holland, were made between 1870 and 1880, in articles written for the public at large, in press interviews or appeals to power and influential politicians and trade-union professionals in England.¹⁵ Therefore, Miller contends that we should observe these statements in their political context. They were made at a time when Marx was extremely concerned about the harassments of his people, and sought to protect the members of the Internationale from extended persecution.¹⁶ Miller maintains that it is important to note Engels' words in the English introduction to *Capital*, in which he said that comprehensive research about England led Marx to conclude that, at least in Europe 'England is the only country where the inevitable social revolution might be effected entirely by peaceful and legal means. He (Marx) certainly never forgot to add that he hardly expected the English ruling classes to submit, without a "pro-slavery rebellion" to this peaceful and legal revolution.'¹⁷

In Miller's opinion, Marx's foremost contention was that organized and large scale violence was necessary to end the bourgeois rule. The possibility of social victory through elections is secondary, and depends on the right timing. The road to social change, as Marx saw it, was via organized power, enabling persuasion to be undertaken via violent class struggle. Electoral victory could be attained by that same violent class, but could never replace it.

These sharp and definite claims contain some logic in them but they lack support from Marx's writings, which are much more equivocal. A close study of Marx's writings shows justification for contradictory positions, thus one may refrain from being dragged into such statements. Pressing on Miller's own contention that we should observe Marx's statements in their political context, I would suggest first that emphasis should be put on circumstances, rather than on character of audiences; and when circumstances allow social transition without resorting to violence, then there is nothing wrong in revolution by peaceful means. Even if we rely in the main on Marx's assertion about the revolution as a purifying force of the old trash of capitalism, still it does not rule out the possibility of a peaceful revolution. Violence may help to refine the souls of the workers, but it is not necessarily an *indispensable* function.

Furthermore, attention should be drawn to developments and changes in

the contents of Marx's words over the years. Some scholars proclaim that in his earlier works Marx was more obliged to sustain an outlook asserting that violence was the engine of social change. But subsequently he altered his viewpoint, and considered violence little more than a necessary evil, a means only and certainly not an end.¹⁸ Indeed, in his earlier and more sanguine years, Marx stood for violence, contending that violence was necessary for changing the nature of the proletariat, and that it would psychologically renovate the working class, so that it would be fit to rule. Then Marx had no expectations as to that the proletariat would be able to shape the structure of society, as he envisioned it, in any way other than by a violent uprising. Force and violence were conceived not as good in themselves, but as necessary means to bring about a more equal, more democratic society, more human than the exploitative capitalist society. His arguments concerning the need for violence in shaping social change were based on understanding the reactions of the ruling classes, which would leave no other choice to the proletariat challenging them. Nevertheless, in his later works Marx was more flexible in his opinions, asserting that in states like England it was possible to attain a social revolution by legal and peaceful means. Violence would henceforth be justified only in dealing with absolutist regimes, in which democratic procedures were unrealistic for the workers. Only in such states would force (*Gewalt*) be the revolution's lever, the instrument necessary to enforce the reign of labour.

II. Engels: Violence is almost always indispensable

Just as it is difficult to credit Marx with a uniform line of thought opposing violence and terror, so it is with Engels. After his army service in 1842, Engels travelled to England. In the industrial city of Manchester, he learned about the proletariat's misery, linked up with the left wing of the Chartist Movement, and developed a communist outlook. Viewing the cruel repression of the workers' uprising, Engels asserted that the police was an agent of the bourgeoisie, and that only a violent change in the unnatural conditions of England and other industrialized countries would lead to the downfall of the industrial aristocracy and improve the proletariat's material position. Engels argued that even in republican regimes, where universal voting rights led to achievements for the proletariat, violent revolution was practically certain.

In 1878, in one of his most important essays, *Anti-Dühring: Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science*, Engels attacked Dühring for saying to Berlin socialists that power was potentially corrupting, and that the proletariat must be cautious in using its power, since it could corrupt the new society the workers wished to establish. Dühring saw force as an absolute evil; for him the first act of force is the original sin. That

force, Engels proclaimed, apart from its being the 'source of evil', plays yet another role in history, a veritable revolutionary role. In the words of Marx, it is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one.¹⁹ Engels maintained by saying 'that [force] is the instrument by means of which social movement forces its way through and shatters the dead, fossilized political forms – of this there is not a word in Herr Dühring.'²⁰

Engels concluded that force is the instrument whereby the social movement fulfils itself, and breaks down the rigid political forms during their process of demise. He wrote that aggression is simply a means, while the essence is economic advantage. The more the essence is a 'super-structure' over and above the means used to acquire it, so in history one may find a sort of super-structure regarding the economic aspect of social relations, far more than in their political aspect.

The choice of the words 'midwife' and 'instrument' shows that Marx and Engels considered that violence was required, but assigned it secondary importance. They simply declared that it is a fact that violence accompanies revolutionary changes; that the old order, and those who benefit from it, oppose change, and that violence has its own value as a principle. Violence is not a sanctified principle, but at most, a necessary means, without which the revolution cannot possibly occur. Force and violence are appropriate and rational means to be utilized in given circumstances to change society in a revolutionary manner.

In 1891 new, moderate notions can be found in Engels's polemics, commenting on the Erfurt Program.²¹ Engels followed Marx and saw prospects of peaceful development towards socialism in democratic countries like the USA, and in monarchies like England – but not in Germany. Engels wrote that one could imagine that the old society would grow peacefully into the new in countries where the people's representatives held the power, and in which one could, by constitutional means, do everything one wanted with the support of the majority, and where despotism is powerless against the people's will.²²

III. Lenin: The Use of Violence and Terror

In Lenin's writings, it is also impossible to discern a uniform approach to violence, but rather a progressive development that begins with opposition to its use, and ends at the opposite extreme unadulterated support for violence, and contrary to Marx and Engels, its application by all possible means at his disposal. Moreover, Lenin affirmed not only the use of violence but also the resort to terroristic activities. That is, he allowed the use of acts intended to arouse panic and fear amongst specific target groups.²³

At the outset of his career, Lenin had doubts and hesitations about the use of terror as a means for building a communist society. Apparently, Lenin was greatly influenced by his family's personal tragedy. His eldest brother, Alexander, was one of the terrorists who tried to assassinate Tsar Alexander III. He was executed aged 19, and Lenin, very close to him, was deeply shocked by his death and told associates that this was the wrong way to proceed. He rejected terror used by small groups, like those affiliated to his brother Alexander, and argued that individualistic terror was bankrupt in Russia. His view was that one should not regard terror as a series of individual unrelated cases, but as a mass action, well coordinated by a central revolutionary authority which issues orders from the top. He opposed spontaneous use of terror and wrote that

. . . individual terroristic acts are impractical as a means of political strife. It is only a mass movement that can be considered to be a real political struggle. Individual terroristic acts can, and must be, helpful only when they are directly linked with the mass movement.²⁴

At the same time, Lenin admired violent acts of conspiracy from the school of Nechayev and Tkachov. These two figures who were active in the 1860s and 1870s called for immediate measures, immorality and murder of opponents. They justified every action contributing to the revolution's success, claiming that the revolutionary leader must have complete control over his supporters and admirers.²⁵

In 1889 Lenin wrote that he thought that the use of terror at the time was an ineffective form of struggle. In his 'A Draft Programme of Our Party', Lenin said that political struggle must be conducted by means of propaganda, revolutionary organization, and a switch at a suitable time for decisive attack which does not, on principle, rule out terror, but leaves the question of means open, allowing the organizations and party meetings to determine party tactics.²⁶

Nevertheless, Lenin added that it would be highly doubtful for the program to include tactical questions. These, if they arise, must be discussed in the party newspaper, and finally be settled at its congresses. The same applies to matters which concern means in general, including violent activities. To clarify matters, Lenin added, one must disapprove and say that terror is inappropriate to the struggle, at this stage, and the party must concentrate all its forces in strengthening the organization and supplying guided revolutionary literature in a systematic and proper manner. There is no advantage in using terror against the Tsar at a time when revolutionaries lack a strong central organization, and when revolutionary units are still weak. Terror at inappropriate times draws attention, and sidetracks important tasks. Instead of causing disarray and chaos in the Tsar's ranks, it disorganizes the revolutionary forces.

Therefore, Lenin warned against the charm of terror and opposed it, regarding it as an unsuitable means of struggle.

However, Lenin's rejection of terror was tactical. Thus, in 1901 he explicitly wrote in the newspaper *Iskra* (The Spark) that he never rejected terror on principle, for the simple reason that terror was a type of military activity which could be effective, and even essential, in certain moments of battle.²⁷ A year later, in 1902, Lenin argued in his essay 'What Is to Be Done?'²⁸ that terror as a substitute for political propaganda was in retreat. He regarded the terrorist policy of the Socialist Revolutionaries as dubious and discredited by historical experience. Lenin emphasized the educational effects on workers' meetings which yield greater advantages in bringing the revolution nearer than individual terrorist actions.²⁹

When the stirring of revolution in Russia increased in 1904, out-of-the-ordinary considerations which condoned the use of terror joined up. Lenin declared that there are times when killing hostile elements is an absolute necessity, but that it would be a mistake to apply this method indiscriminately to all cases. Instead, a new, special organization had to be formed, whose role would be to expose infiltrators and stool-pigeons, without, however, resorting to terror at all times and without regarding it as an unambiguous measure.

A year later, when the first modern revolution took place in Russia, Lenin was in exile in western Europe, and heard about increasing murders of Tsarist officials by revolutionaries. Lenin still stuck to his assertion that this type of terror was immature and unfruitful, but with less determination than at the outset. Slowly, information filtered through that led him to modify and to change his mind. Lenin was a down-to-earth revolutionary, who believed in actions and facts and not in the intentions of the heart; in real achievements, and not in popular trends of opinion. Reality, he thought, must be judged by realistic and solid criteria, that is by their contribution to the revolutionary act, and not by abstract ideals divorced from actuality. In a letter to party leaders in Russia, he wrote that he was 'filled with apprehension' due to people talking of bombs for more than half a year without ever making a single bomb.

In September 1905, a group of 70 revolutionaries attacked the Riga prison, and released two of their members, who had been sentenced to death. During this action, the group sustained losses and managed to maim and kill a number of policemen. Lenin commented that only in a group approach of this sort could violence be justified. The struggle does include the killing of officers in the military and the police.³⁰ That same year Lenin drew up a series of directives in which he upheld and praised the murder of spies, policemen, gendarmes; encouraged planting of bombs in police stations; and agitated for a forceful seizure of government resources to be used in the revolution.³¹ Less than three years later, in March 1908, Lenin

was willing to approve of the assassination of King of Portugal, seeing this as the proper step wherewith to trigger off widespread social upheaval in Portugal.³² At the same time he emphasized that popular terror should aspire to be carried out with large-scale participation of the populace, and not just by a group of bomb-throwers. In an earlier essay, 'The Urgent Tasks of Our Movement', Lenin summarized his position:

Social democracy does not tie its hands, it does not restrict its activities to some one preconceived plan or method of political struggle; it recognises all methods of struggle, provided they correspond to the forces at the disposal of the Party and facilitate the achievement of the best results possible under the given conditions . . . We must bear in mind that the struggles with the government for partial demands and the gain of certain concessions are merely light skirmishes with the enemy, encounters between outposts, whereas the decisive battle is still to come. Before us, in all its strength, towers the enemy fortress which is raining shot and shell upon us, mowing down our best fighters. We must capture this fortress, and we will capture it . . . Only then will the great prophecy of the Russian worker-revolutionary, Pyotr Alexayev, be fulfilled: 'The muscular arm of the working millions will be lifted, and the yoke of despotism, guarded by the soldiers' bayonets, will be smashed to atoms'.³³

To end the feudal rule in Russia Lenin explained that it is not enough to undermine and constrict the Tsar's rule; it must be destroyed. As long as this rule still exists, all his concessions will be just flimsy ones. The Tsar will only make concessions when faced with the revolution's increasing pressure, and will retract from all his concessions if this pressure is relented. Therefore, excessive emphasis has to be placed on the power factor and the importance of violence. Only by conquering the 'Democratic Republic', by overpowering the Tsar's rule and placing the government in the hands of the people will they be able to extricate Russia from the omnipotent rule of landlords and the bourgeoisie, claimed Lenin.³⁴

The Attitude Towards the Phenomena of War

I. Marx and Engels: the end justifies the means

The concept of war in the Marxian view has to be understood within the historical context of the developments and actions that were taking place, and in conjunction with the ideological framework that guided Marx and Engels, which directed their attitudes toward every single sphere of life. According to Marx, the development of the antagonistic society that is divided into classes, demands a sharp and uncompromising struggle between the most advanced powers and the obsolete ones. War is one

of the accompanying shadows of the capitalist system, and the former would be abolished together with the abolition of the latter. There is no need to apply morality and similar irrelevant, hypothetical questions to this issue, since wars are facts which one has to live with, and do one's best to manipulate to one's own advantage. If Marx and Engels had rejected war, it was not because of its brutality, because of the killing and bloodshed that are necessarily connected with its implementation, or because of its immorality; rather, if they rejected one war or another, it was only because the time was not suitable, in their opinion, or because it did not bear any significance on the advancement of the revolution.

Marx and Engels did not agree with those who maintained that all wars were similar to one another, a claim which they regarded as essentially a-historical. Instead, they took an active stand in respect to every war in their time which contributed to the knock-out of the power of wealth. They realized that the workers must be interested in the victory of the side that safeguards the ongoing progress of human society. They were not discouraged by the idea of regarding war, under certain circumstances, as the future power for shaking the structure of capitalist society and preparing the ground for the social revolution.

Marx's and Engels' conception was rooted in their dialectic understanding of history. Their evaluation of wars was dynamic, pragmatic, and opportunistic; changing according to the circumstances which triggered the war, and its seeming results. When the Congress of the First International (held in Brussels in 1866), warned against war in principle, demanded the workers to fight against it, and to react against any declaration of war with a counter declaration of a general strike, Marx strongly opposed this proposal of the Belgium representatives, denouncing it as 'Belgian idiotism'. He saw this proposition as a dangerous illusion, as an utopian pacifism aloof from reality.

Since reality changes, ideas have to be accommodated to the flux of circumstances. Marx and Engels definitely cannot be blamed for being dogmatic. They did not hesitate to change their stand if new factors and situations were introduced. They were willing to approve any war that created new facts, facts which they viewed as positive for the revolution, even if at the beginning they rejected that same war. They did not demand re-introduction of the *status quo ante*, and did not continue preaching against it if the results seemed to be attractive. The tactics which guided the two thinkers was to consider each and every case for itself, determining if the involving powers acted for or against the proletariat's ends. According to their conclusion, they chose which side to support, or decided that the war in question yielded no good in advancing the proletariat's ends. Thus, for example, in his article 'The Revolutionary Movement in Italy' of 30 November 1848, Marx praised the uprisings

in Leghorn, Rome, Milan, and Piedmont, since he regarded them as positive efforts that advanced the revolution in Europe.³⁵ When he was attacked for changing his mind on this issue of the independence of Italy, Marx asserted that people cannot expect him to stick to ideas which he had pronounced in other circumstances, which now bear no relevance to reality. History teaches us to be pragmatic, and to adjust ourselves to reality.

Both philosophers supported the German war against the Danish people, on the question of the future sovereignty of Schleswig-Holstein, since they regarded Germany as a progressive power, contributing to the development of civilization. Denmark, on the other hand, was viewed as a dependent, undeveloped country, that its centre was in Hamburg, and not in Copenhagen: 'Denmark obtains all her literary as well as material substance via Germany'.³⁶ Therefore, their support was naturally given to the former, to the advanced force. Engels maintained:

This is just the kind of war that the flagging German movement needs – a war against the three great counter-revolutionary powers [Russia, England, and the Prussian Government], a war which would *really* cause Prussia to merge into Germany, which would make an alliance with Poland an indispensable necessity and would lead to the immediate liberation of Italy.³⁷

Every move that seemed to Marx and Engels as one which could have a positive effect towards the unification of Europe, and which could bring about faster development for the workers, was desirable, and all other questions were considered secondary. To realize both ends, they saw the war against Russia as a necessity, as the very pivot of the problems. In Russia Marx and Engels saw the real terrible enemy of the revolution, who would not refrain from starting war when the Socialist movement would spread all over Europe. They believed that the German Revolution could not win without breaking first the regime of the Tsar. Thus, when establishing the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, both philosophers considered the war against Russia so important as to be one of the two major aims of the newspaper. In his 1884 article 'Marx and the Neue Rheinische Zeitung' Engels asserted:

The political programme of the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* consisted of two main points: a single, indivisible, democratic German republic, and war with Russia, which included the restoration of Poland.³⁸

Marx and Engels wished to unite all the great powers in Europe against Russia, and they publicly called to fight against this reactionary regime. The big opportunity came in 1854, and indeed, during the Crimean War, they both stood firm to the side of France and England, preaching war

against the reactionary Eastern enemy. In one of their articles entitled 'That Bore of a War' they expressed their dissatisfaction at the slow progress of the war, calling the allies to wake up, to stimulate their healthy foundations, and to uncover their hidden powers in the fighting against Russia.³⁹

Engels and Marx also devoutly advocated a pitiless war against Slavicism, in which they saw a worthless culture betraying the revolution. Engels distinguished between nations and ethnic minorities. Only the first are, in his opinion, the historical nations of Europe, hence their need of autonomy. The Slavonic race, on the other hand, is comprised of remnants of nations; residues which appear on the stage of history for some period of time, and after a while, its end is to be assimilated among the nations. The Slavs lacked the primary requisites needed for independence and survival. Furthermore, whether intentionally or without knowing it, they worked in the direct interest of Russia, and consequently against the revolution.⁴⁰

Hence, Engels did not recognize the right of the Slavs – except the Poles, the Russians, and perhaps the Slavs of Turkey – to an historical future. Fighting for their independence, in Engels' opinion, would only transform these people into instruments in the hands of the Tsar and his rotten regime. For this reason, their historical role is a negative one. Their sin is Russian Panslavism; their destiny is to be deprived and exploited by Russia, so there is no reason for anyone to fight for their independence. The other nations should not bother themselves with the Slavic future, for their end is much more important – to bring about the revolution. This is the true end on which socialism must be concentrated, and 'we, Socialists' must not deviate from it, even if during this process, some 'nation flour' is to be crushed, declared Engels. Thus, on 15 February 1849, he wrote in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*:

Then we shall fight 'an implacable life-and-death struggle' with Slavdom, which has betrayed the revolution; a war of annihilation and ruthless terrorism, not in the interests of Germany but in the interests of the revolution.⁴¹

For the same reasons – the unification of Europe, and the development of the proletariat – Marx demanded the liberation of oppressed nations, and first and foremost, the liberation of the western part of Poland, which Germany had annexed. The reason was his belief that as long as Poland was enslaved, Germany would be enslaved too by feudal-patriarchal absolutism; thus, the liberation of the proletariat would be postponed to an unidentified point in the future. As Marx said in London in 1864: 'No nation could be freed as long as it suppresses other nations'; meaning that the establishment of free Poland is a pre-requisite for the establishment of

free, democratic Germany, which could lead and carry the revolutionary flag.⁴²

It has to be pointed out, then, that the liberation of an oppressed nation was not a demand as such, without qualifications. Only if its freedom contributes to the revolution, then its liberation, by means of war or others, was desirable. Indeed, Engels argued that the existence of national oppression does not commit others to support the oppressed nation. This obligation stands only if the liberation would contribute to their desired end.

II. Lenin: Defensive and Offensive wars

Lenin, like Engels and Marx, did not reject war. Like them, he stood far from pacifism. In his article 'Socialism and War' of July 1915, Lenin claimed categorically that 'Marxism is not pacifism', and that without a series of revolutions, the peace which is called 'democratic' is nothing but an utopia.⁴³ He condemned the pacifists, considering them blind for refusing to admit substantive situations and wishing to turn the ideal into reality. Lenin maintained that socialists always denounced wars between nations, viewing them as a barbaric acts which only animals can implement. Nevertheless, the attitude towards wars is not similar to the attitude of the bourgeoisie, the pacifists or the anarchists. Lenin explained that from the first Marxists differ 'in that we understand the inevitable connection between wars and the class struggle within a country'. We understand, Lenin asserted, that it is not possible to suspend wars without the abolition of classes. He maintained:

We also differ in that we regard civil wars, i.e., wars waged by an oppressed class against the oppressor class, by slaves against slave-owners, by serfs against landowners, and by wage-workers against the bourgeoisie, as fully legitimate, progressive and necessary.⁴⁴

Lenin went on to maintain that from the pacifists and anarchists 'we Marxists differ' in that Marxists acknowledged the need for an historical investigation of every single war. History shows that there were wars, which, despite their inherent atrocities and brutality, were still wars of progress; meaning that they contributed to the development of humanity, helped to destroy the 'most barbaric despotism in Europe'.

Lenin had repeated his position in another article⁴⁵, arguing that instead of allowing pacifists to cheat the people by promising them a democratic peace, the socialists must explain to the masses that without a revolutionary struggle in every country against their government, no peace could come into existence. Lenin applied the same line of argument to the question of disarmament, saying:

... in the twentieth century ... violence means neither a fist nor a club, but *troops*. To put 'disarmament' in the programme is tantamount to making the general declaration: We are opposed to the use of arms. There is as little Marxism in this as there would be if we were to say: We are opposed to violence!⁴⁶

Lenin emphasized the productive results arising from wars, arguing that 'war is no accident and no sin', and that 'the strikes of conscientious objectors and similar opposition to war are but pitiful, cowardly, idle dreams'.⁴⁷ He even went so far as to praise the importance of the task of war in the life of a nation. In June 1915 Lenin advocated:

Wars, with all their horrors and calamities, are of a certain usefulness, mercilessly exposing and destroying as they do much that is rotten, outlived, moribund in human institutions.⁴⁸

Lenin maintained that the experience of war 'stuns and shatters some, but it enlightens and hardens others'.⁴⁹ Like his ideological forefathers, Lenin made a distinction between defensive and offensive wars, between just and unjust wars. The just wars served a progressive purpose in human history, whereas the unjust wars brought damage to the peoples, hindered society's development and destroyed cultural and material values. Lenin explained that if Morocco would declare war on France, or India on England, China on Russia, and so on, then all of these wars would be just wars, defensive wars, without paying attention to the question of who made the first move.⁵⁰ On the other hand, when a slave owner who has hundred slaves is fighting against another who has two hundred slaves, demanding an equal distribution, then it is obvious that using the term 'defensive war' in such a case is completely misleading and false. Lenin wrote that Engels was right in admitting, in his letter to Kautsky of 12 September 1882, the possibility of 'defensive wars' by victorious socialism.⁵¹ Lenin read this statement as an argument for the necessity of defending a victorious proletariat in one country from the bourgeoisie of other countries. Only after the proletariat scored a decisive victory and confiscated all of the bourgeoisie assets in the world, and not only in one single country, then and only then, argued Lenin, wars would become impossible.

Lenin urged opposition to all national-capitalist wars and colonial wars to turn them into civil wars. All wars of liberation against world capitalism must be supported. He denounced the exploitation of nations of Asia, Africa and America, and regarded those people who struggled for their national freedom as important allies of the proletariat in their war against capitalist exploitation.⁵²

Summary

Marx, Engels and Lenin were undoubtedly aware of the role assigned to violence in the history of mankind. They were conscious of the potential embodied in violent means as an instrument wherewith to make changes in the world, to increase new forces and reduce old forces, which they considered rotten. In no way whatsoever can we say that these three figures adopted pacifist attitudes or professed moral values regarding the use of force, but rather the other way round. They condemned the pacifists, considering them blind for refusing to admit substantive situations and wishing to turn the ideal into reality. The same realistic attitude guided their thoughts in relation to the question of fighting wars. Marx, Engels, and Lenin did not agree with those who maintained that all wars were similar to one another, a view which they regarded as essentially a-historical. Instead, they took an active stand in respect of each and every one of the wars in their lives, which contributed to reduce the power of wealth. They realized that in a capitalist society there is no escape from wars, and that the workers must be interested in the victory of the side that safeguards the ongoing progress of human society. They were not frightened by the idea of regarding war, under certain circumstances, as the future means with which to shake the structure of capitalist society, and prepare the ground for the social revolution.

All three philosophers were interested in reality. They did not hesitate to modify their ideological system and change their guidelines with the aim of overthrowing the corrupt capitalists. Thus, it is impossible to characterize their thoughts about the use of political violence unequivocally. We can only examine the evolution that took place in their minds over the course of years, an evolution caused by constant feedbacks and reactions to the changes which took place on a realistic level in different countries. Thus, we witness different expressions of Marx regarding the passage to socialism. In each country, one should adopt a suitable method according to the type of government and the type of regime therein, without pretending to achieve a single formula appropriate for every circumstance and condition.

If asked to draw an imaginary line, which at one end (A) tends to approve of violence, and at the other end (B) tends to avoid it, then in the course of years, Marx and Engels shifted from A to B, while Lenin shifted exactly in the opposite direction (B to A). An examination of the statements and writings of the philosophers may lead us to agree with Mayo (1955), Wesson (1976), and Wardlaw (1982) who claimed that at the very beginning Marx and Engels tended to see violence as the engine of social change, while in the later writings they were more flexible, and considered the possibility of a social revolution by peaceful means in democratic countries, where the proletariat which is the majority of the population can win over the

capitalists through the ballot. Furthermore, in 1895 Engels claimed that there is no point in having a violent revolution, not even in Germany, and that legitimate means would serve better than illegitimate ones for revolutionary purposes.⁵³

Regarding Lenin, one tends, to agree with Moss (1972), Parry (1976), and Loewenstein⁵⁴ (1980), who brought evidence showing that at the beginning Lenin rejected the use of terror, while after the 1905 revolution he increasingly became an enthusiastic supporter of all types of terror. Unlike Marx and Engels, Lenin's position had hardened over the years, as he came to justify the most ruthless terrorist means. This change of attitude was not the result of a radical change in his views. For we may recall that in 1901 Lenin himself stated in the newspaper *Iskra* that he had never rejected terror in principle, but considered it unsuitable given the circumstances. When Lenin thought that circumstances justified the use of violent and bloody means, he became an ardent supporter of these means and practised them without much ado. He considered terror to be a legitimate means of self-defense in times of revolutionary need and even raised terror to the level of prime revolutionary importance, both from a theoretical and a practical point of view. In doing so he assigned to terror a Marxist ideology, using the notions of 'suppression of the governing bourgeoisie' and 'proletarian dictatorship' for this purpose. In Lenin's view, whatever factors which could bring forward the final goal were necessarily desirable and positive. The end justifies the means.

Many interpreters who study the importance of violence and terror in the Marxist and Leninist thought show a unified point of view regarding Lenin, for there is categorical proof that he adopted terror, supported violence, and largely paved the way for his diligent pupil Stalin, who went much further than his master. We have seen that the facts are much more obscure when dealing with Marx and Engels, for they never even got to the threshold of action. Hence, there is no unified and concrete line capable of characterizing these interpretations. Instead, three main schools can be discerned:

(a) *The Radical School*. This school claims that for Marx and Engels, organized and far-reaching violence is compulsory and essential in order to put an end to bourgeois rule. The road towards internal social change is through an offensive and violent class struggle; a revolution through peaceful means, through a democratic victory at the polls, can come in the wake of the same violent struggle, but without being ever able to replace it. Wesson (1976), Parry (1976), Gilbert (1981)⁵⁵, and Miller (1984) can be regarded as members of this school.

(b) *The Instrumental School*. According to this school Marx and Engels considered violence as an instrument only of secondary importance and desirable insofar as there is no other alternative, and only if it can change

the system. The common argument is that Marx and Engels regarded violent actions as desirable only if capable of changing society, where they had the potential and real ability to change the system. The Marxist view spoke of violence in instrumental terms, but did not emphasize killing or the causing of suffering and pain. At the same time it should be said that Marx did emphasize the necessity of conflict to overcome the bourgeois enemy in certain, but not in all circumstances. The school includes among its supporters Von der Mehden⁵⁶ (1973), Wilkinson⁵⁷ (1977), Laqueur⁵⁸ (1977), McMurtry⁵⁹ (1978), and Brenkert⁶⁰ (1983).

(c) *The Moderate School*. This school holds that for Marx and Engels the use of violence and terror as political means constitutes an admission of the fact that the circumstances are not yet ripe, since there is a deviation from the social ideologies which they set for themselves; and that they never believed in the efficiency of terror as a means. Notice that here terror is in the foci, rather than political violence. Thus, for instance, Greene (1974) argues that Marx, and even Lenin have admitted that terror alone could never bring about revolutionary change; and that primary reliance on the terror factor reflects inability to achieve revolutionary objectives in given circumstances.⁶¹ Avineri⁶² (1970), Morgan⁶³ (1971), McLellan⁶⁴ (1980), and to a certain extent Hunt⁶⁵ (1984) figure prominently in this school.

I tend to agree with the Instrumental School. The Marxist perspective on the role of violence during the process of social change stems from a rationalistic approach to political activity. Marx and Engels preached revolution and set its realization and its success as their first priority. For this reason, they could not come and claim categorically that violence and terror are never ever justified. On the other hand, Marx and Engels did not reach such extremes as demanding violence under any conditions and at any time. Violence is only but a means, sometimes necessary and sometimes dispensable, but for them, it was never the final goal.

While making this argument, it is of importance to deal with Avineri's claims on this issue. Avineri believes that for Marx, the use of power as a political means signifies an admission of the fact that circumstances are still unripe, that there are no changes in the making, and that physical force is either destined to failure or proven to be unnecessary.⁶⁶ Parry (1976), Brenkert (1983), and Miller (1984), among others, are right in contending that this interpretation of Marx concerning revolution and violence cannot be defended, and that Avineri created a new Marx in his mind's eye, preferring to ignore the myriad contradictions colliding with this view. Indeed, it is true that Marx and Engels actually opposed some of the groups wanting to wage war against the bourgeoisie, for they considered that the time was not yet ripe for revolution. Yet it would be far-reaching to claim on the basis of this point that in their opinion, even when conditions are ripe for revolutionary action, violence and even terror will never ever be necessary.

For Marx and Engels the main thing was the revolution, which constituted the centre of their world; and for this realization and achievement of a new mode of life for the proletariat they were ready to accept any means.

To emphasize this point, it is in order to say something about the ideologists' standpoint regarding exploitation. For, indeed, the same realistic argument guided Marx, Engels and Lenin regarding this phenomenon. Despite the fact that Marx and Engels opposed exploitation and perceived it as a major social evil, they made it compulsory when they thought it could support social progress, modernization, and the creation of pre-conditions that would finally bring about the liberation of the workers. For the right consciousness does not develop without exploitation, exactly as there cannot be a development of class consciousness without exploitation of the proletariat by the bourgeoisie. Marx and Engels considered social progress as the basic development, because they thought it would bring about – through the dialectics of history – the proletarian revolution and the victory of socialism. Thus, if capitalism and colonialism bring progress along with them, then they unknowingly serve their worst enemy, that is the proletarian revolution.⁶⁷ The basic questions that should be asked are, does exploitation serve and assist the revolution? And could the revolution have happened without exploitation? If the answer to the first question is positive, and to the latter negative, then the most terrible deeds are only instruments in the hands of history, only a stage in the road towards revolution.

From this point of view, one could imagine that morality was not essential in the eyes of Marx and Engels. They perceived morality, just as they perceived ideology, namely as slaves to interest. Morality is the consequence of social conditions of the human being, and it changes along with circumstances. There is no way whatsoever in which one could speak of a 'general person' and similarly, one cannot find a 'general morality'. There are specific kinds of morality which reflect specific interests of specific social classes. It is not an abstract, objective justice that determines the relationship between the classes but the process of ripening, which goes hand in hand with revolutionary praxis.⁶⁸

That is to say that morality and humanitarianism are neglected foundations in the Marxist outlook. Marx was basically concerned with the results, with the solutions, with the implementation of the revolution. He did not devote much attention to the problem of means and their moral aspect. Marx, Engels and Lenin did not think that there must be any hindrances in the revolutionary process. Those hindrances merely represent the exploiting subjectivity which has to be removed without delay in order to fill and exhaust self-realization. Then the world will necessarily become ideal and, at the same time, a frame of moral completeness.

NOTES

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1. The term 'force' is used here in a broad fashion, as Marx used it in *Capital*. Thus, it may include all varieties of political violence.
2. Similar line of reasoning is taken by Erich Fromm, see his *Marx Concept of Man* (New York.: Frederick Ungar, 1983), pp.23-24.
3. Robert Ted Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 1974, 4th printing), p.3.
4. Ted Honderich, *Three Essays on Political Violence* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1976), p.9. See also his *Violence for Equality* (Harmondsworth: Penguin 1980), p.23.
5. David McLellan, *The Thought of Karl Marx* (London & Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1980), p.236.
6. Marx and Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol.11 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1979), pp.333-341.
7. Karl Marx, *Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1967), p.206.
8. Marx welcomed the struggle in England to limit legally the working day to ten hours, considering this law to be a great practical achievement and a victory of principle. He condemned the economist Nassau Senior who fought against shortening the working day, arguing that this would mean the demise of English industry. Nevertheless, some years earlier, Marx and Engels took the opposite stand, resembling Senior's. In March 1850 Engels wrote that the ten-hour law was a mistaken step, an un-political, even a reactionary regulation, and that a shorter working day would harm the regime's effectiveness.
This criticism was in line with the stand taken by Marx in 1850. For those convinced that a revolution was imminent, reforms moderating the regime's contradictions instead of intensifying them to a maximum, were an obstacle to any uprising. But in 1864 both Marx and Engels understood that an uprising of the sort that took place in 1848 was no longer possible.
9. Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol.I, (London: J.M. Dent, 1933), Part 3, Ch.8, pp.283-311.
10. McLellan, pp.228-229.
11. Quoted by John Lewis, *Marxism and the Open Mind* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976), p.159.
12. Marx saw in non-revolutionary unions set up in the 1850s and the early 1860s the seeds of future revolution. For this he was strongly attacked by the extreme left, and in particular by Bakunin. But Marx rejected Bakunin's vision of 'constructive destruction' and emphasized the role of a class-conscious working class.
13. McLellan, p.228.
14. Marx and Engels, *Selected Writings*, Vol.I (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1951.), pp.429-494.
15. Miller overlooked the article published by Marx in *The People's Paper* on 9 October 1852, much earlier than the period he mentions.
16. Richard W. Miller, *Analyzing Marx: Morality, Power and History*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), p.124. This point of view is quite similar to the one introduced by Alan Gilbert (*Marx's Politics*, Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981, p.244) who asserted that Marx held that communists should not settle accounts with reactionaries through the use of their voting rights. Instead, they should encourage the democratic movement to act forcefully, and to terrorize the counter-revolutionaries from the beginning.
17. Cf. *Capital* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), p.6.
18. G. Wardlaw, *Political Terrorism* (Cambridge University Press, 1982), p.23. See also Robert G. Wesson, *Why Marxism?* (London: Temple Smith, 1976), p.214) and H.B. Mayo, *Democracy and Marxism*, NY: Oxford University Press, (1955), p.114 who hold

- that in their youth, Marx and Engels were ardent believers in violence, but subsequently they altered their viewpoint to hold a more moderate position.
19. Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol.II, Part 7, Ch.24 (6), p.833.
 20. Frederick Engels, *Anti-Dühring* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1976), Ch.4 ('The Force Theory Concluded'), pp.235-236.
 21. The program adopted at the Erfurt Congress of the Social Democratic Party of Germany in 1891.
 22. Cf. Lenin's comments on these opinions in 'The State and Revolution', in *Selected Works*, Vol.II (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1947), pp.187-188.
 23. Cf. Rejai's definition of terror as any act that aims to influence political behavior by abnormal means, i.e. the imposition of fear, uncertainty and insecurity (Mostafa Rejai, *The Strategy of Political Revolution*, Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1973, p.37). Similarly, Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism and the Liberal State* (London & Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1977), p.49 sees political terrorism as the systematic use of destruction and murder and the threat of such acts so as to arouse panic in individuals, groups, societies or regimes, to the point where they succumb to the terrorists' political demands.
 24. Cf. Robert Moss, *The War for the Cities* (NY: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1972), p.45.
 25. Lenin regarded Nechayev as an organizational genius, and admired his coolness and courage. His friend, V.B. Bruyevich gives evidence of Lenin's admiration for Nechayev, by relating in 1934 - ten years after Lenin's death - that the latter told him that 'we must publish all of Nechayev's works. He must be researched and studied. We must find all his writings, decode his pseudonyms, collect it all and print it.' Quoted by Albert Parry, *Terrorism: From Robespierre to Arafat*, (NY: The Vanguard Press, 1976), p.136.
 26. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol.4, (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1960), pp.227-254.
 27. Lenin, 'Where To Begin', in *Collected Works*, Vol.5 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1961), pp.17-24.
 28. *What Is To Be Done?* (London: Penguin, 1988).
 29. That same year, in April 1902, a student named Stefan Balmashov assassinated one of the ministers. A month later, the authorities repaid the student terrorist in the same coin, and hanged him in the city of St. Petersburg. Lenin regarded this act and its punishment with great regret, and commented on the uselessness of having one nasty minister replaced by another, very much alive and kicking. He postulated: 'Single combat however, inasmuch as it remains single combat waged by the Balmashovs, has the immediate effect of simply creating a short-lived sensation, while indirectly it even leads to apathy and passive waiting for the next bout'. Cf. 'Revolutionary Adventurism', in *Collected Works*, Vol.6 (1961), p.193.
 30. Lenin, 'Partisan Warfare', in *Marx, Engels - Marxism* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1951), pp.189-191.
 31. Lenin, 'Tasks of Revolutionary Army Contingents' from October 1905. In *Collected Works*, Vol.9 (1962), pp.420-424.
 32. Lenin, 'The Happening to the King of Portugal'. *Collected Works*, Vol.13 (1962), pp.470-474.
 33. *Collected Works*, Vol.4 (1960), p.371. See also Lenin's article 'Two Utopias' from October 1912 (*Collected Works*, Vol.18 1963, pp.355-359), where he wrote that Marxists hate all sorts of utopias: they are interested in acts, in an unflinching struggle against feudalism.
 34. See his 'Marxism and Revisionism', in *Collected Works*, Vol.15 (1963), pp.31-39.
 35. Marx and Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol.7 (1977), pp.101-105.
 36. 'The Danish-Prussian Armistice', from 9 September 1848, in *Collected Works*, Vol.7 (1977), pp.421-425.
 37. *Ibid.* p.425.
 38. Karl Marx, *The Revolutions of 1848* (London: The Pelican Marx Library, 1973), p.42.
 39. *Collected Works*, Vol.13 (1980), pp.334-339.
 40. 'Panslavism. The Schleswig-Holstein War', (February 1852). *Collected Works*, Vol.11 (1979), pp.46-50.
 41. *The Revolutions of 1848*, p.245.

42. Marx and Engels were also willing to advocate war even for the interests of one nation, i.e., Germany, believing that everything is welcome if it could contribute to the unification of Germany, a unification which they considered to be a necessary precondition for the victory of the revolution there, and afterwards in the Continent.
43. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol.21 (Moscow: Progress Publications, 1964), pp.295–338.
44. *Ibid.*
45. Lenin, 'The Question of Peace' (July–August 1915), in *Collected Works*, Vol.21 (1964), pp.290–294.
46. Lenin, 'The "Disarmament" Slogan', in *Collected Works*, Vol.23 (1964), p.95. See also 'The Military Programme of Proletariat Revolution'. *Ibid.*, esp. pp.80–81; and 'The Collapse of the Second International'. *Ibid.*, Vol.21 (1964), esp. Ch.5, pp.227–233.
47. Parry, p.145.
48. *Ibid.*
49. B.D. Wolfe, *Three Who Made A Revolution*. (London: Thames & Hudson, 1956), p.620.
50. 'Socialism and War', op. cit. p.300. See also 'An Open Letter to Boris Souvarine', *Collected Works*, Vol.23 (1964), pp.195–204.
51. Lenin, 'The Military Program of the Proletarian Revolution' (September 1916) *Collected Works*, Vol.23, pp.77–87.
52. *Ibid.*
53. See, for instance, Engels's letter to his friend Paul Le-Farge (1895), in which he asserted that 'the era of war by barricades is extinct; if the army retaliates – then resistance is insane'.
54. Julius I. Loewenstein, *Marx against Marxism* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), esp. p.101.
55. Gilbert (op. cit. p.75) says that for Marx, unification of theory with workers' self-emancipation could arise only out of a real class war, to justify violent revolution. Marx confirmed that the objective was to create a society which would eliminate exploitation and create flourishing and prosperous human activity. Gilbert added: 'Yet Marx protected himself against the negative, perhaps terrorist or conspiratorial consequences of an "end-justifies-the-means" view by emphasizing the necessary role of the masses. No revolution could occur without their participation.'
56. Fred. R. Von-Der-Mehden, *Comparative Political Violence* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1973).
57. Wilkinson, p.76.
58. Walter Laqueur, *Terrorism* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1977).
59. John Mcmurtry, *The Structure of Marx's World View* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978).
60. George G. Brenkert, *Marx's Ethics of Freedom* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983).
61. Thomas H. Greene, *Comparative Revolutionary Movements* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1974), p.77.
62. Shlomo Avineri, *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx* (Cambridge University Press, 1970).
63. M.C. Morgan, *Lenin* (London: Edward Arnold Publishers, 1971).
64. Mclellan, Ch.8, esp. pp.226–229.
65. Richard N. Hunt, *The Political Ideas of Marx and Engels* (London & Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1984), p.365 asserts that Marx and Engels never believed in the effectiveness of what we call 'political terrorism' and never showed sympathy for radicals who made use of violence in democratic countries. He maintains that they always reacted strongly against acts of sabotage, never saw any need for organizing guerrilla activities, and never advocated political assassinations.
I must demur and recall that after the assassination of Tsar Alexander III in Russia in 1881 by the *Narodnaya Volya* ('People's Freedom'), Marx expressed satisfaction and termed the terrorists 'splendid fellows', describing them as 'brave people', without melodramatic acts, honest, sincere, realistic and heroic. Cf., Richard Pipes, 'The Roots of the Involvement', in Benjamin Nathanyahu (ed.), *International Terrorism: Challenge and Response* (New Brunswick & London: Transaction Books, 1981), p.60.
66. Shlomo Avineri, esp. p.188, 217.
67. These arguments clearly come into expression in the following essays: K. Marx,

- 'Parliamentary Debate on India' in S. Avineri, (ed.), *Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968), pp.76-82; F. Engels, 'French Rule in Algeria', *Ibid.* p.63; and F. Engels, 'Persia-China.' *Ibid.* pp.174-180. See also K. Marx and F. Engels, *Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy* (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1959), p.480.
68. For further discussion see William Leon McBride, 'The Concept of Justice in Marx, Engels and Others', *Ethics*, Vol.85 (1974-75), pp.204-218; and Steven Lukes, *Marxism and Morality* (Oxford University Press, 1987).