April 2005

Gaza, Ezer Weizman (1924-2005), Recognition of Reform and Conservative Conversions, Jibril al-Rajoub, Sharon and the Settlers, Poll Among Israelis and Palestinians, Tourism, Iran, New Report on Iraq's WMDs, End-of-Life Conference, Terri Schiavo and Pain, Media Ethics, The University of Haifa Response to the AUT Boycott Decision, Arthur Rubinstein Competition, Maccabi Tel Aviv, International Football and Racism, Saul Bellow, Books, Mar Adentro, Whose Life Is It Anyway, Photos

Dear friends and colleagues,

Attached to this Newsletter some incredible photos that I wished to share with you. However, some of you had complained about this habit of mine, saying photos take too much of the disk space. Thus, those of you who do NOT wish to receive photos and other attachments in the future are invited to alert me and I promise not to send you anything but text from now on.

Gaza

Were I in power-position, I would prohibit arrival of citizens who do no reside in Gaza into the territory. There are now more than 8,000 people in the Gaza Strip, the highest number I recall in years, and more people are coming to strengthen the Jewish hold over the Strip. People are building houses. I look at this with dismay. It is beyond my understanding why the government allows all this to take place, one hundred days prior the evacuation.

Ezer Weizman (1924-2005)

On April 26, 2005 former president Ezer Weizman, who played a key role in establishing the Israel Air Force and in forging peace with Egypt, died at his home in Caesarea, at the age of 80. Weizman was born in Tel Aviv in 1924, and his family moved to Haifa shortly after. His father, Yehiel, was the brother of Chaim Weizmann.

Weizman, who learned to fly at 16 and volunteered to serve in Great Britain's Royal Air Force at age 18, was one of the founders of the Israel Air Force and undertook daring missions during the 1948 War of Independence.

In 1958, Weizman was appointed commander of the Israel Air Force, a post he subsequently served in for eight years. A year after he left the post, while he was serving as the head of the IDF Operations Branch, the 1967 war broke out. Israel's air force played a crucial role in that war.

The shift from the military to politics came naturally. In three decades in political life, he made a highly public transition from hawk to dove, saying the Jews had to learn to "share this part of the world" with the Arabs.

Immediately after retiring from the IDF, Weizman joined Golda Meir's government. Over the years, he resigned from his position in the Herut party due to differences of opinion with Menachem Begin, set up a new party, joined Labor, and later resigned from the party.

In the late 1980s, Weizman met with Palestine Liberation Organization officials in Europe, at a time when such activities were illegal. The prime minister at the time, Yitzhak Shamir, threatened to dismiss him.

Weizman served as Israel's seventh president from 1993-2000. As president, he invited Palestinian Authority chairman Yasser Arafat to his house, in an effort to advance the peace process. His casual style breathed life into the largely ceremonial office and endeared him to many Israelis. Weizman was forced to resign as president over a police probe into allegations of bribery while he had served as a lawmaker and cabinet minister. Charges were never pressed as the statute of limitations had expired.

Weizman was part of the Israeli aristocracy but was one of the people. His uncle was Chaim Weizman, the first State president. When he became President he felt that he closed a certain circle. Through marriage to his loyal wife Ruhama who always stood by him whatever he did or said, Weizman became part of the Dayan clan, described as the Israeli Kennedy family. His major traits were his courage that brought him to be second in command (Weizman believed that during his time it was impossible for an air force commander to become chief of staff), his original thinking, and his genuine warmth and charisma. His tongue was one of his major assets, but also arguably his major obstacle as sometimes it preceded his sharp mind.

Weizman coined the saying "The Best to Fly", the slogan that is still used by the air force to attract the best soldiers to its ranks. It is said that Weizman was also responsible for the addendum to this slogan: "And the Best for the Pilots" (it sounds better in Hebrew, meaning the best girls for the pilots). Even if Weizman did not coin the latter, the attribution correctly represents his chauvinistic attitude towards women. He belonged to generation when generals believed that women (especially soldiers) were their property.

I first met Weizman in 1981. I was a young soldier who attended Dayan's funeral in his kibbutz, Nahallal. Before the funeral I went to the Dayan home, where members of the family, friends and others assembled. In the garden I joined a distinguished circle of people: generals, politicians, and family. I was the youngest of all, and the one who did not belong, still no one had approached me. I said to myself: "If anyone will approach me, it will be Weizman". Indeed, after a few minutes and some staring in me, Weizman came to me with his hand forward, asking "And who are you, young man? Are you a member of the family?" I shook his hand and answered in the negative. I said that I very much appreciated Dayan and wanted to show my respect. Weizman, in his usual style, said something like "This is very nice of you. Welcome. Feel at home".

Five years had passed. I was an MA student at the Department of Political Science, Tel Aviv University. Weizman was a minister without portfolio in the prime minister office. I did a study on the Six Day War and wanted to interview some pertinent people. As Weizman was the Deputy Chief of Staff during the war, I asked him for an interview. Weizman agreed and as he was not terribly busy ("I don't have much to do here", he told me in his candid language. "From time to time I meet with ambassadors") we had two meetings, each lasted almost two hours. We spoke about the war, and also about other issues that came to his mind. He was warm, personal ("call me Ezer"), full of charisma, and remarkably sincere. As a matter of fact, I was surprised that he talked openly about issues that were delicate and sensitive. To give a few examples: Ezer asked me who else did I interview. I answered and then he asked: "What about Rabin?" (Chief-of-Staff in 1967). I said that I wrote to him, however Rabin answered that his busy schedule (he was Minister of Defence in 1986) did not allow him time to grant me an interview. Weizman laughed in his loud voice and said: "Nonsense. Of course he will not grant you an interview. He collapsed on the eve of the war. He could not bear the responsibility. He asked me to take over, but I thought this would be a mistake and refused. I told him (Rabin): Collect yourself. Of course he would not like to see you to speak about this".

I read Ezer Weizman's book, On Eagles' Wings (New York: Macmillan, 1976, pp. 211-212), where Ezer mentions this episode. Still I was amazed that he spoke in such blunt manner to me. You may understand that Rabin and Weizman did not like one another a great deal. Rabin never forgave Ezer for spilling the beans and telling the story in his book.

At one point during the interview, Weizman changed the subject and spoke about current events. At that time there was a dispute between Israel and Egypt over a small piece of territory, not far from Eilat called Taba. Egypt claimed that Taba is theirs, while Israel insisted it should remain Israeli. The issue came before an international tribunal that eventually decided that Egypt was on the right, and Israel gave Taba away. When I interviewed Ezer, the issue was still unresolved. He raised the issue and said: "Taba should and will return to Egypt". I was amazed. I said the issue is under legal proceedings, yet to be decided. Ezer, in his usual passion, jumped from his chair, went to the other side of the room, took out a map (generals always hold maps in their rooms), opened it, and showed me in some detail where exactly the international border had passed, what the Egyptians had argued, what Israel had argued, and why Egypt was right. Ezer said: "Israel can bring its best legal advisers. It is a waste of time. We will lose". I was thinking to myself: What if I will go to the media and tell them about our little chat? Of course I would never do such a thing, betraying his trust. But I thought it was not very prudent on his part to confide in me in such manner. When I submitted my study, I omitted the most sensitive parts of the interview from the transcript. I did not wish to cause Ezer any trouble. I was literally enchanted.

Our next communication was when Weizman was already president. The year was 1994 and I was deeply troubled by the incitement campaign against Yitzhak Rabin. I thought that a person who is well liked and respected by both the political left and the political right in Israel should raise voice of alarm and warn against the consequences of such incitement. I could not think of a better person than Weizman and wrote to him, voicing my concerns. One day, I was at my study at home when the phone rang. It was Weizman. He received my letter and wanted to say that he appreciated my concern, and will find the right opportunity to warn against the incitement against Rabin. To the best of my knowledge, he never found the right opportunity. This is a pity.

The last communication I had with him was in 2002, as I approached him to write the chapter on the Israel Presidency for my edited book, Israeli Institutions at the Crossroads (London: Routledge, forthcoming). Weizman was an obvious choice. However, as much as he wanted to write the chapter, his health was already then not in good shape, and he felt he had to decline. I asked Yitzhak Navon to write the chapter.

Ezer Weizman was a man who was true to his conscience, thus he did not hesitate to leave his party when he felt that his heart was no longer with the Likud. He had an excellent chance to succeed Menachem Begin; still, when he felt that his views and his party's views do not coincide anymore, he was willing to leave his comfortable position in the party's leadership, and establish a new party, Yachad. Just imagine if he would have stayed and compete against Yitzhak Shamir for the Likud leadership. Our history could have been very different.

Weizman was a man of many contradictions: simple in many respects, complicated in others. He did great things, and made stupid slip of the tongue. He was an aristocrat who felt the people, and saw himself as a bridge between those who have to those who don't have. He lived in one of the most affluent places in Israel, in Caesarea, yet loved the neighbouring and impoverished development town of Or Akiva. He was asked to be buried in Or Akiva, next to his beloved son Shauli. Weizman knew how to warm the hearts of thousands in Israel and abroad. He was incredibly brave in time of war, but he dreaded war. He was a passionate warrior, and even more so a passionate man of peace. He was an original thinker, but made foolish mistakes that you did not expect from a man of his qualities, like the mistake that forced him to resign from the presidency. I am sure he never quite understood what was the fuss about him receiving large sums of money from an affluent businessman, also when he was already State president. I can see him in my mind, saying to Ruhama: "This is none of their damn business. Fuck them!" Luckily for Weizman, the Legal Advisor to the Government, Elyakim Rubinstein, was very sympathetic and understanding. Still Weizman was forced to retire, much against his will. Elyakim (Eli) and Ezer knew one another very well, having in their respective rich histories many meeting points. Eli knew that Ezer was like an innocent child who was not aware that he did something wrong (I once asked Rubinstein about this. Eli prudently and politely gave no answer).

I will cherish Ezer Weizman in my mind. Yehi Zichhro Baruch (may his soul rest in peace).

Recognition of Reform and Conservative Conversions

On March 31, 2005 the High Court of Justice ruled in a 7-4 decision that Israeli residents who travel overseas solely for the purpose of undergoing a non-Orthodox conversion are entitled to Israeli citizenship under the Law of Return. The precedent-setting decision was handed down in a petition filed in 1999 by 17 tourists and legal foreign workers who have lived in Israel as temporary residents for many years. All of the petitioners studied for conversion one year in Israel, but underwent the actual conversion overseas.

While overseas residents who underwent non-Orthodox conversions in their own communities have long been eligible for citizenship under the Law of Return, the state has hitherto refused to recognize overseas conversions by Israeli residents unless the convert resided in the community where he converted for at least a year.

"The Jewish nation is one," Supreme Court President Aharon Barak wrote in the verdict. "It is dispersed around the world, in communities. Whoever converted to Judaism in one of these communities overseas has joined the Jewish nation by so doing, and is to be seen as a `Jew' under the Law of Return. This can encourage immigration to Israel and maintain the unity of the Jewish nation in the Diaspora and in Israel."

Barak emphasized that the overseas community must be "recognized," but said the convert should not be required to join the converting community. "Judaic studies are not part of conversion, but preparation for it," he wrote, and the petitioners, who studied in Israel but were converted overseas, should therefore be viewed as having converted overseas. The state had argued that these were effectively not overseas conversions at all.

Several of the justices, however, ruled that since overseas conversion entitles the convert to Israeli citizenship, the state has the right to "set criteria for the recognition of overseas conversions." Lawyers working for the state said that such criteria could include a "minimum time" that the convert must spend in the relevant overseas community overseas - a criterion that, if adopted, would effectively restore the status quo and render yesterday's ruling meaningless.

Since all of the petitioners underwent their formal conversions overseas, the justices were able to avoid the question of whether non-Orthodox conversions performed in Israel should be recognized under the Law of Return. About 10 months ago, the court ruled that the Law of Return applies to people who convert in Israel, but did not specify whether they meant only Orthodox conversion - the only kind recognized by the state - or also non-Orthodox conversion.

The Israel Religious Action Center - the Israeli branch of the Reform movement, and the organization that represented the petitioners in court - was pleased with the verdict, but disappointed that it did not extend to conversions in Israel. The Conservative Movement's response was similar. Yahad leader, Yossi Beilin, said the ruling would "finally break the Orthodox monopoly over conversion."

Israel is on the right track. Maybe one day we will become a nation like all other western nations that put the liberal spirit, and its emphasis on autonomy and individuality before religion. In Beit Daniel, the major reform synagogue in Tel Aviv, where my family and I attend prayers from time to time, some people study for conversion. We attended a ceremony when two gerey zedek (converts) completed their one year of intensive study and were admitted to the community. It was a warm-hearting ceremony.

Jibril al-Rajoub

In January 2005 I wrote: "Don't be too amazed if Abbas would reappoint Rajoub in the near future. He needs him and co-optation is a proved mechanism to bring potential rivals to back your own camp." Less than three months have passed and Rajoub is back as the head of security in the West Bank. This after some shooting incidents outside Abu Mazen's headquarters in Ramala. Abu Mazen is still refusing to fight against the militant militias, each with its own leaders and agenda, some opposed to any negotiations or settlements with Israel. Eventually, if he wishes to lead the Palestinian people to a Palestinian state he will have to do this, especially for his own sake.

Sharon and the Settlers

One of Rabin's gravest mistakes was his refusal to meet with the settlers who were protesting against the Oslo Accords. He said that there was nothing to discus with them, as he was determined to pursue with his plans, and they were obviously against. He felt it was a waste of time, a futile discussion. Not only that he ignored them, but he was also mocking the political right, calling them "rotors", people who were making a lot of noise and wind, but it no productive outcome. And we are talking of people who might need to evacuate their homes. The alienation, frustration and anger led to pulling of the trigger.

Sharon made the very same mistake, ignoring the Gaza settlers. This until April 5, 2005, when he finally met with them. It was a painful but most necessary meeting. Sharon is the prime minister of all people in Israel, the settlers included. They need to vent. He needs to hear. It is always preferable to meet, to discuss, to exchange views, to voice grievances and anger, than to conduct violence. I hope this was only the first meeting of many. There should be a constant exchange of ideas, especially between people who disagree about the fundamental issues of their lives.

On April 10 Sharon met with George W. in his Texan ranch. The reports spoke of "good discussions", "pleasant atmosphere", "exchange of gifts" etc. George W. is not really interested to be firm and bold about the expansion of settlements in the West Bank. Sharon is able to carry out his plan. In the end, after the Gaza dust will settle down and evaporate, the settlers will continue to hold him as their darling. Sharon is giving away Gaza and at the same time building the Jewish hold over the West Bank. This is not the fair bargain the Palestinians are hoping for, which means that we are doomed to have more fighting, more terror, more blood, more tears.

Poll Among Israelis and Palestinians

Nir Boms has referred to me a poll conducted by the Hebrew University and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Polls in Ramalla. Identical questions were posed to both Israelis and Palestinians about current affairs. 85% of the Israelis and 84% of the Palestinians support negotiations. While 57% of the Israelis support interim agreements, 59% of the Palestinians wish to negotiate the final settlement of the crisis, including Jerusalem and the right of return.

60% of both Israelis and Palestinians support the Road Map. 70% of the Israelis and 59% of the Palestinians believe that Sharon and Abu Mazen are able to advance and carry mutual trust-building steps. 41% of the Israelis and 25% of the Palestinians are optimist about the possibility to end the conflict in the near future. Each side tends to blame the other for the rocky and bloody road in which we live. 63% of the Israelis blame the Palestinian terror, whereas 54% of the Palestinians blame the Israeli policy. Only 5% of the Palestinian conceive terror as the main obstacle to peace. Sharon's disengagement plan is conceived by 75% of the Palestinians as a victory of the armed struggle, and some 33% of the Palestinians support the continuation of the armed struggle after the completion of Sharon's plan.

Tourism

As terrorism plays a lesser role in our lives, more and more tourists are coming. In 2004 some 1.5 million tourists visited Israel. This year 2 million tourists are expected. Israel does not yet meet its potential of having between 5 and 6 million tourists each year, but it is on the right track. Israel is blessed with many beautiful spots, with varied nature, plants and animals, comfortable climate, and many holy sites for three major religions. Each tourist spends between $1,500-2,000. Tourism can play a major factor in our economy, as it played in the past. Among the tourists who arrived early this year were 3,000 nice Irish football fans, who filled the Tel Aviv pubs before and after the international game: Israel v. Ireland. The score was, at the end, 1:1, and we enjoyed having the green Irish guests, for my taste (although some may disagree) especially during the rare moments when they were sober. More about this game, later.

Some of you of live abroad have visited Israel and more are soon to come. I always enjoy seeing you and spend time with you. You are all very welcome.

Iran

Iran's nuclear policy continues to worry me a great deal. The free world should not allow the fundamentalists such power, and the Iranian stubbornness to maintain their "sovereignty" and "independency" is a recipe for disaster. Recently MEMRI published a pertinent article:

Head of Iranian Nuclear Negotiating Team Sirus Nasseri: "We Are Walking on a Knife's Edge"; U.S. and EU Should "Get Used to the Idea of a Nuclear Iran", MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis Series, Vol. 218 (April 7, 2005)

By: A. Savyon*

Introduction

At the end of the first three-month period of negotiations stipulated in the November 2004 Paris Agreement signed by Iran and the EU Three (Britain, France, and Germany), a steering committee of representatives of all the parties met for a joint assessment of the situation. It was decided that the negotiations would continue as Iran maintained its suspension of uranium-enrichment activity.(1) At the same time, the commanders of Iran's Revolutionary Guards and armed forces announced that they were prepared for a possible military attack.

Iran's Reaction to the New U.S. Initiative

The international media recently reported a change in U.S. policy toward Iran, citing as evidence the U.S.'s March 11, 2005 statement that it would agree to offer Iran benefits and incentives, such as dropping its veto of Iran's candidacy for the World Trade Organization, and permitting Tehran to purchase spare parts for civilian airplanes. This would be in exchange for Iran's cooperation in the nuclear issue, with the aim of attaining a permanent cessation of Iran's uranium-enrichment activity. It should be noted that the day before the "change" in U.S. policy was reported, U.S. President George W. Bush extended the sanctions on Iran for another year.(2)

Iran rejected the U.S. offer, calling it "ridiculous,"(3) and an Iranian spokesmen claimed that these measures could not be considered "confidence-building" because Iran was in any case entitled to WTO membership, and because there should never have been restrictions on the purchase of spare parts for civilian airplanes in the first place.(4) Supreme National Security Council Secretary Hassan Rowhani explained: "We will make no deal on enrichment. Economic incentives, including purchasing the Airbus and joining the World Trade Organization, will not compensate for giving up enrichment."(5)

The U.S.'s willingness to correct its past errors and lift the sanctions it had imposed on Iran would not be considered incentives according to Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi: "No economic incentive is equal to Iran's right [to develop nuclear energy]."(6)

Furthermore, Iranian spokesmen noted that they were expecting genuine confidence-building measures on the part of the U.S.: removing the freeze on the billions of dollars in Iranian assets in U.S. banks, lifting U.S. sanctions on Iran, and reversing the hostile U.S. policy towards Iran. Only then would Iran reconsider its policy toward the U.S. - but no matter what, uranium enrichment and the development of nuclear energy would remain Iran's right as a sovereign state, and would remain non-negotiable.(7)

The Iranian-European Deadlock

The Iran-EU Three negotiations currently underway are at a deadlock. According to reports, the EU Three have demanded that Iran permanently suspend all uranium-enrichment activity, while Iran remains uncompromising in its insistence that there be no permanent suspension of such activity and that as a sovereign nation signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty it is entitled to enrich uranium.(8)

In his recent visit to Paris, Iranian President Mohammad Khatami explained the Iranian position: "Our basis for discussions [with the EU Three] is the November 2004 Paris Agreement, which recognizes Iran's right to peaceful use of nuclear technology." "Iran has provided a comprehensive proposal for continuation of the talks, which has been received positively by the Europeans, notably France."(9)

Iranian officials called the EU Three demand for a permanent suspension "a blatant breach of the [Paris] Agreement" (in which the Europeans agreed to recognize Iran's right to develop nuclear energy).(10) It should be mentioned that the EU Three did indeed recognize this right in principle because Iran is an NPT member, but still did not agree to Iran enriching uranium in high percentages that would allow the development of nuclear weapons.(11)

According to an official Iranian spokesman, Iran's Supreme National Security Council Secretary Hassan Rowhani said in a meeting between the Council of Experts with Former President and Expediency Council Chairman Hashemi Rafsanjani, "At no price will Iran consent to a permanent suspension of its uranium-enrichment activity."(12)

Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi was resolute on the issue: "Iran is determined to pursue the enrichment process, and others cannot stop [its] uranium-enrichment program."(13)

Head of the Iranian negotiating team in the nuclear committee in the EU Three-Iran talks, Sirus Nasseri, recently stated that there is no possibility of Iran permanently relinquishing its uranium enrichment: "This is something we are not willing to consider."(14) The U.S. and the EU should "get used to the idea of a nuclear Iran."(15)

French ambassador to Tehran François Nicoullaud made it clear that the referral of the Iranian dossier to the U.N. Security Council was "a real danger," even though the parties have decided to continue negotiations. He made it clear that the European considerations transcend the Iranian issue, saying: "...The decision that will be made regarding the [Iranian] dossier will constitute a model for other countries in the world."(16)

Iran's Negotiating Positions

Iranian spokesmen said that the negotiations are currently focusing on the issue of "objective guarantees" that Iran is to give the EU Three to assure them that it is enriching uranium strictly for civilian, not military purposes - and not on the EU demand that Iran permanently suspend uranium enrichment.(17)

Referring to the guarantees offered by Iran during the negotiations, Iranian President Khatami said that his country "presented to Europe five detailed proposals, and they [the Europeans] should provide us with solid security guarantees."(18)

On another occasion, Khatami added: "Iran is ready to give formal guarantees that it will never produce nuclear arms in return for respect for its legitimate right to possess fuel cycle plants under IAEA safeguards." He also said that Iran wanted nothing more than what the international conventions had authorized.(19)

Also stating that Iran is ready to give assurances that it will not produce bomb-grade uranium, Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi added: "We do not intend to enrich to the level that is needed to make atomic bombs and have imposed a limit ... that we enrich [uranium only] to the level we need for nuclear (reactor) fuel."(20)

According to reports, Iran has proposed a limited uranium-enrichment project, under which it would keep 500 centrifuge sets to enrich uranium up to 5.3%, under close IAEA monitoring. The EU Three has rejected this proposal and demanded a permanent suspension of uranium enrichment, arguing that this plan for a pilot centrifuge project for uranium enrichment could be diverted by Iranian scientists to gather findings for military use.(21)

It should be noted, however, that international treaties and regulations permit NPT member states to produce low-enriched uranium (LEU) solely for civilian purposes. The level of enrichment permitted for these purposes is 3%-7%, and it is subject to IAEA inspection and must follow IAEA notification. In contrast, high-enriched uranium (HEU), necessary for military purposes, is between 20%-90%.

In an extensive interview, Sirus Nasseri discussed Iran's position in the negotiations with the EU Three: "Iran will soon present its final proposal and will set a target date for the EU to either accept or reject it. We do not want confrontation, but if they cannot respond to what we believe to be rational, they can choose their own path because we are ready to flex our muscles..."

"It is clear to me that we are walking on a knife's edge. There is no guarantee that we will reach an agreement. What I can say with certainty is that during the negotiations we witnessed, step by step, more willingness to be flexible on the part of the Europeans. At the same time, this does not mean that they have the ability to reach an agreement with us. The EU must accept Iran's uranium-enrichment program..."(22)

"For the Europeans, success in these talks - at least at this stage - is vital. For us, it is [merely] an advantage. We'd prefer to reach an agreement and go about our business, because it would improve our relations, but it is not imperative. It is up to the Europeans to choose their path... If these talks fail, and [Europe] is not able to advance them, it would find it difficult to play a major role in any important global political issue. This is a crucial point. This also gives us room to maneuver vis-à-vis Europe and to use it as a buffer - not a mediator - between us and [the U.S.], with which we are in conflict.

"...We truly want to produce fuel. Why should we care that technically speaking, this enrichment-based fuel production can also be used for something else?... What is important is our intention... Moreover, we allow supervision.

"...One thing worries us, and because of it, we told the Europeans that their time is running out. We said: 'We don't know what deal you made with the Americans, and your denial of such a deal is unclear to us.' There is a danger that their offer will improve to a point that if we reject it, they could claim that they made Iran an excellent offer and that its rejection indicates a desire for nuclear weapons. This is indeed a danger. Therefore, the negotiations have become much more difficult, the pressure has increased, there is more tension, and we are getting to a point when we might take the final step."(23)

Additional Iranian Threats

Alongside the negotiations, threats have also been made by several top Iranian officials.(24) Iranian President Mohammad Khatami told a press conference: "The Europeans will suffer more than Iran if they decide to capitulate to U.S. pressure" and that "The enemies will be damaged more if they decide to do something against Iran."(25)

Khatami said that the EU Three's demand that Iran commit to a permanent halt of its uranium-enrichment activity was "a blatant breach of the Paris Agreement." He added, "The

Europeans will bear the responsibility for what might happen."(26)

Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Hassan Rowhani told a press conference that Iran would "halt all its confidence-building measures" if its dossier was transferred to the U.N. Security Council. "If Europe refuses to accept [the formula Iran has suggested to the EU], it will face problems..."(27)

At a recent international nuclear technology conference in Tehran, Rowhani added: "If [Iran-EU] negotiations fail because of the U.S. pressure and the Iranian nuclear dossier is referred to the U.N. Security Council, the region will come up against serious problems, and regional security will be jeopardized."(28)

Former representative to the IAEA, Dr. Ali Akbar Salehi was even more blunt, telling the Iranian daily Kayhan: "Europe should understand that its security is closely linked to Iran's security."(29)

Iran Declares Its Military Preparedness

In recent months, commanders of Iran's Revolutionary Guards and armed forces have announced their complete preparedness for a possible military attack on Iran's nuclear installations and other sensitive sites. Iranian spokesmen have declared that Iran's response would be formidable. Recently, the London daily Al-Hayat published a report on Iran's preparedness for an American or Israeli attack. The following are excerpts:(30)

"Iranian military sources say that the armed forces and the Revolutionary Guards have made all the field preparations for handling a surprise attack on targets within Iran. [These preparations] are not limited to the nuclear installations, which are dispersed among the cities and various locations - Bushehr, Isfahan, Arak, Natanz, Tehran, Yazd, and others - but also include military and industrial plants and dams.

"...Iran's military command has taken into account the possibility of a disruption of [communications] between military posts and the central command... As a precautionary measure, the command has ordered all military and Revolutionary Guards sectors to respond swiftly - within no more than an hour and without waiting for orders - against pre-selected targets, [in light of anticipated] international political pressures that might force Iran to not respond.

"The objective is to deliver a harsh blow to the U.S. and its ally Israel at the outset, and then to expand the arena, in light of international efforts to contain the crisis and limit its scope and intensity, so as to ignite the whole region. This way Iran will assure its right to respond.

"...All the countries that host U.S. military forces - particularly Iraq, CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] in Al-Siliya [Qatar], the Al-'Odeid base in Qatar, and the Fifth Fleet command in Bahrain - are among the sites Iran might consider as targets. However, the biggest fish of all is Israel, which is likely to suffer 'hellfire' - particularly when the Iranian response 'will use [varied] weapons and reach other targets that the aggressors are not expecting them [to reach].'

"These sources added that although Iran anticipates a devastating attack that will destroy a significant part of its economic and industrial achievements of the past 26 years, it is now pondering an issue that seems to it to be justified: Can the Bush administration grasp that it will have to send home at least five [dead] American soldiers per day? And how will the administration respond to the [American] people, who will question the benefit of the attack on Iran..."

According to Al-Hayat, Iranian military sources had reported that during a meeting between a French diplomat and Expediency Council Chairman Rafsanjani, the diplomat asked Rafsanjani whether Iran would relinquish its nuclear program, and was answered with an unequivocal "no." When the diplomat said that the U.S. had selected 325 targets within Iran as the first targets in any possible American attack, Rafsanjani explained to his guest that the Iranian counter-attack would be just as powerful and devastating.

The report continued, "When the Western diplomat asked, 'What if the place in which you are convening (the Marble Palace, a few dozen meters from the Islamic Republic's Presidential Building and the residence of Iranian Leader Ali Khamenei) is also among the targets?' Rafsanjani answered succinctly, 'Even if I am the target, [Iran will not relinquish its nuclear program].'"

*Ayelet Savyon is Director of MEMRI's Iranian Media Project.

Endnotes:

(1) See MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No. 209, "Iran seeks E.U. Consent for Modeling Its Nuclear Program on the Japanese-German Model - i.e. Nuclear Fuel Cycle Capabilities - Three Months Short of a Bomb," February 23, 2005, http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=countries&Area=iran&ID=IA20905 .
MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No. 200, "The Iran-EU Agreement on Iran's Nuclear Activity," December 21, 2004, http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=countries&Area=iran&ID=IA20004 .
Sirus Nasseri announced that the negotiations had ended without a final accord and that each side remained steadfast in its position. IRNA (Iran), March 24, 2005.
(2) Iran Daily (Iran), March 12, 2005. President Bush noted that Iran constitutes "an unusual and extraordinary threat." Bush accused Iran of "support for international terrorism, efforts to undermine the Middle East peace process, and acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them."

(3) Iranian Intelligence Minister Ali Younesi, ISNA (Iran), March 13, 2005.

(4) Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi, Aftab-e Yazd (Iran), March 7, 2005; IRNA (Iran), March 13, 2005.

(5) IRNA (Iran), March 5, 2005.

(6) IRNA (Iran), March 15, 2005. Similar statements were made by Iranian President Khatami, IRNA (Iran), March 31, 2005; Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Rowhani, IRNA (Iran), March 5, 6, 2005. Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Asefi said, "Correction of some mistakes and removal of a few unjustifiable restrictions will never persuade Iran to give up its legitimate rights." IRNA (Iran), March 12, 2005.
(7) Supreme National Security Council Foreign Relations Committee Secretary Hossein Mussavian, Aftab-e Yazd (Iran), March 15, 2005. Iran rejected U.S. participation in the negotiations. Rowhani said: "We still doubt America's goodwill. They are not fair in negotiations and they use threats against Iran. They intend to transfer the Iranian nuclear file to the Security Council." IRNA (Iran), March 5, 2005. Foreign Ministry Spokesman Asefi also said that U.S. participation would be "destructive." IRNA (Iran), March 13, 14, 2005.
(8) See Rowhani's statements at a press conference, Kayhan (Iran),IRNA (Iran), March 5, 2005; Khatami during a visit to Venezuela, IRNA (Iran), March 13, 2005.

(9) IRNA (Iran), April 6, 2005.

(10) Statements by Iranian President Khatami, Kayhan (Iran), March 15, 2005, IRNA (Iran), March 16, 2005. Sirus Nasseri stated that the E.U. Three demand for a permanent suspension of Iran's enrichment activities was not included in the Paris Agreement and that the E.U. Three should accept Iran's uranium-enrichment activity. Sharq, Tehran Times (Iran), March 15, 2005. See MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No. 200 on the Paris Agreement, "The Iran-E.U. Agreement on Iran's Nuclear Activity," December 21, 2004, http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=countries&Area=iran&ID=IA20004.
(11) International treaties and regulations permit the production of low-enriched uranium (LEU), at 3%-7%, for civilian purposes, and require prior notification to the IAEA and full IAEA inspection. For military purposes, high-enriched uranium (HEU), at 20%-90%, is required.
(12) IRNA (Iran), March 15, 2005, Jomhouri-e Eslami (Iran), March 17, 2005.

(13) Kayhan (Iran), February 24, 2005.

(14) IRNA (Iran), March 24, 2005.

(15) Aftab-e Yazd (Iran), March 1, 2005.

(16) Aftab-e Yazd (Iran), April 5, 2005.

(17) Rowhani at a press conference, Tehran Times (Iran), February 27, 2005.

(18) Aftab-e Yazd (Iran), March 16, 2005, IRNA (Iran), March 15, 2005.

(19) IRNA (Iran), April 4, 2005.

(20) IRNA (Iran), March 15, 2005.

(21) Sharq (Iran), March 16, 2005; Jomhouri-ye Eslami (Iran), April 3, 2005, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Germany), April 1, 2005.

(22) Sharq, Tehran Times, (Iran) March 15, 2005.

(23) Sirus Nasseri in an interview with Iranian TV 2. See MEMRI-TV Clip 609, http://memritv.org/Search.asp?ACT=S9&P1=609.
(24) For previous threats see MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No. 189, "Iran's Nuclear Policy Crisis," September 21, 2004,
http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=countries&Area=iran&ID=IA18904.
MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 743, "Iran Threatens the West," July 13, 2004,
http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=countries&Area=iran&ID=SP74304.
(25) Kayhan (Iran), Aftab-e Yazd (Iran), February 24, 2005.

(26) Kayhan (Iran), March 15, 2005, IRNA, March 16, 2005.

(27) IRNA (Iran), March 5, 2005. Rowhani was referring to the model proposed by Iran and based on the Japanese/German model. See MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No. 209, "Iran seeks E.U. Consent for Modeling its Nuclear Program on the Japanese-German Model - i.e. Nuclear Fuel Cycle Capabilities - Three Months Short of a Bomb," February 23, 2005, http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=countries&Area=iran&ID=IA20905.
(28) IRNA (Iran), March 5, 2005.

(29) Kayhan (Iran), March 9, 2005.

(30) Al-Hayat (London), March 29, 2005.

New Report on Iraq's WMDs

On March 30, 2005, an American presidential commission reported that U.S. intelligence agencies were "dead wrong" in their pre-war assessments of Iraq's nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and today know "disturbingly little" about the capabilities and intentions of other potential adversaries such as Iran and North Korea.

While praising intelligence successes in Libya and Pakistan, the commission's report criticized the government's collection of information leading to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, calling its data "either worthless or misleading" and its analysis "riddled with errors." That resulted in one of the "most damaging intelligence failures in recent American history."

According to the Washington Post, the 692-page report to President Bush determined that many of the problems that led to the Iraq breakdown have not been fixed, and warned that they may be undercutting the quality of current U.S. evaluations of Iranian and North Korean nuclear weapons development. To avoid a repeat performance, the commission produced a set of 74 recommendations intended to "transform" a sprawling intelligence bureaucracy that it described as "fragmented, loosely managed and poorly coordinated."

The report presents the most extensive examination to date of how the United States came to believe that Saddam Hussein was harboring secret weapons of mass destruction, leading to a war that toppled a dictator but turned up no such weapons. The report depicted an intelligence apparatus plagued by turf battles, wedded to old assumptions and mired in unimaginative thinking.

Yet while unstinting in its appraisal of intelligence agencies, the panel that Bush appointed under pressure in February 2004 said it was "not authorized" to explore the question of how the commander in chief used the faulty information to make perhaps the most critical decision of his presidency. As he accepted the report yesterday, Bush offered no thoughts about relying on flawed intelligence to launch a war and took no questions from reporters.

Instead, he focused on the proposals to revamp the intelligence agencies further after their post-Sept. 11 reorganization. "The central conclusion is one that I share," Bush said, flanked by the commission's co-chairmen, retired judge Laurence H. Silberman and former senator Charles S. Robb (D-Val.). "America's intelligence community needs fundamental change to enable us to successfully confront the threats of the 21st century."

Some Democrats complained that the commission effectively ducked the central issue of how Bush decided to go to war in Iraq to eliminate weapons that were not there. Senate Minority Leader Harry M. Reid (Nev.) said the report "fails to review an equally important aspect of our national security policymaking process -- how policymakers use the intelligence they are provided."

House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (Calif.) was even sharper. "The president's decision to go to war in Iraq was also dead wrong," she said, adding, "The investigation will not be complete unless we know how the Bush administration may have used or misused intelligence to pursue its own agenda."

The nine-member panel, officially called the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, blamed intelligence agencies for overselling their knowledge and not disclosing conflicting information to policymakers. At the same time, it exonerated Bush and Vice President Cheney from allegations of pressuring analysts to conclude that Iraq was developing weapons of mass destruction.

"The analysts who worked Iraqi weapons issues universally agreed that in no instance did political pressure cause them to skew or alter any of their analytical judgments," the commission said. "That said, it is hard to deny the conclusion that intelligence analysts worked in an environment that did not encourage skepticism about the conventional wisdom."

In fact, the commission concluded that policymakers should in the future challenge analysts harder to justify their conclusions, even at the risk of being accused of politicizing intelligence. "It's very important for policymakers to question and push hard on the intelligence community to explore and to fill gaps," Silberman said.

The report expressed particular concern that the nation's intelligence agencies are not adequately focusing on biological weapons. It said U.S. forces in Afghanistan discovered that al Qaeda's bioweapons research was "further along" than U.S. intelligence had known, particularly involving a pathogen the commission referred to only as "Agent X."

"The program was extensive, well-organized, and operated for two years before September 11" at sites containing commercial equipment and run by "individuals with special training," the report noted. Based on what they found in Afghanistan, U.S. intelligence theorized that al Qaeda "had acquired several biological agents possibly as early as 1999, and had the necessary equipment to enable limited, basic production of Agent X."

The commission expressed concern that intelligence agencies may still be misjudging situations in North Korea and Iran; however, the section of the report dealing with those countries remained classified. "The bad news is that we still know disturbingly little about the weapons programs and even less about the intentions of many of our most dangerous adversaries," the panel said in a cover letter to Bush.

The panel proposed empowering the new director of national intelligence, a position created by legislation last year, to better integrate the collection efforts of the government's 15 intelligence agencies at the CIA, Pentagon, State Department, Energy Department and FBI. But it also urged that analysts remain diversified at those agencies so they can carry on what the commission hopes will be a more lively debate about interpretations.

The panel suggested a variety of reorganizations, including the creation of a Human Intelligence Directorate within the CIA to oversee increased overseas spying by the agency's Directorate of Operations as well as the Pentagon and FBI. It also proposed merging the FBI's counterintelligence and counterterrorism divisions with its new intelligence division into a new National Security Service within the bureau. The new service would report to both the FBI director and the national intelligence director.

The report suggested several other new institutions as well, including a National Counter Proliferation Center to coordinate the fight against weapons of mass destruction; a National Intelligence University to enhance tradecraft training; a long-term analysis unit to escape the pressures of day-to-day intelligence collection; an Open Source Directorate to focus on finding publicly available information, particularly on the Internet; and a nonprofit research institute outside the intelligence community to encourage dissenting views.

The panel also recommended changes to the intelligence reports Bush gets that are known as the presidential daily briefing. Leading up to the Iraq war, the panel found, the briefings were "disastrously one-sided" and "more alarmist and less nuanced" than longer studies, such as the National Intelligence Estimates. The daily briefings never cast doubt on prior information provided to Bush and thus "seemed to be 'selling' intelligence in order to keep its customers, or at least the First Customer, interested."

End-of-Life Conference

On May 25, 2005 the University of Haifa will hold a one-day conference on end-of-life issues, dedicated to my latest book, Euthanasia in the Netherlands. The conference will be held in Hebrew at the Hecht Auditorium. Here is the program:

University of Haifa

The Center for Democratic Studies

Supported by the

President of the University

Rector of the University

Dean of Faculty of Humanities

Dean of Faculty of Social Sciences

The Israel Cancer Association

Conference on

Treating the Dying Patient

On the occasion of the publication of Euthanasia in the Netherlands

By Raphael Cohen‑Almagor

25 May 2005

The Hecht Museum Auditorium, University of Haifa

(The conference will be in Hebrew)

9:00-9:20 Gathering

9:20-9:40

Chair: Prof. Ora Gilbar, Head, School of Social Work, University of Haifa

Greetings:

Prof. Aaron Ben-Ze’ev, President, University of Haifa

Prof. Yossi Ben-Artzi, Rector, University of Haifa

9:40-11:20 First Session

Chairperson: Mrs. Rebecca Hochhoyzer, Lilach Association-The Right to Die With Dignity

Opening Lecture

Prof. Rafi Cohen-Almagor, Director, Center for Democratic Studies, University of Haifa

“Euthanasia in the Netherlands”

Respondents:

Prof. Shimshon Rubin, Department of Psychology, University of Haifa

Dr. Israel Doron, Faculty of Social Welfare and Health Studies, University of Haifa

11:20-13:00 Second Session

Chair and Respondent: Prof. Danny Statman, Department of Philosophy, University of Haifa

Prof. Asa Kasher, Department of Philosophy, Tel-Aviv University

“Principles of General Consensus”

Prof. Avinoam Reches, Chairperson of the Ethics Board, Israel Medical Association

Neurology Department, Hadassah Ein Kerem Hospital, Jerusalem

“Natural Death or Technological Death“

Prof. Ora Gilbar, Head, School of Social Work, University of Haifa

“Cancer Patients and Palliative Care: Psycho-Social Aspects”

Dr. Nathan Cherny, Director of Cancer Pain and Palliative Medicine Service, Shaare Zedek Medical Center, Jerusalem

“Directives on How to Protect Patients from Terminal Sedation“

13:00-14:20 Lunch Break

14:20-16:15 Third Session

Chair and Respondent: Dr. Sylviane Colombo, Faculty of Law, University of Haifa

Prof. Danny Statman, Department of Philosophy, University of Haifa

“Two Concepts of Dignity and the Dying Patient”

Dr. Netta Bentur, The Myers-JDC-Brookdale Institute, & Dr. Eyal Goldberger, Galil-Elion Hospice

“The Set of Services for the Dying Patients: Comparative and Experiential Views“

Prof. Jonathan Halevy, Director-General, Shaare Zedek Medical Center, Jerusalem

“The Dying Patient – Israeli Contemporary Situation and Expected Changes As A Result of the Steinberg Committee”

Dr. Shai Lavi, Faculty of Law, Tel-Aviv University

“The Power of the Law and It’s Limitations: Lessons from the History of Euthanasia in the United States”

Coffee Break

16:40-18:00 Fourth Session

Chair and Respondent: Prof. Eliezer Robinson, Chairperson of The Israel Cancer Association

Prof. Ehud Zmora, Director of the Department of Pediatrics & Preterm, Soroka University Medical Center, Beer-Sheba

“Decision-Making in Uncertain Situations on the Verge of life”

Prof. Arthur Eidelman, Director of the Department of Pediatrics, Shaare Zedek Medical Center, Jerusalem

“The Uniqueness of the Newborn and the Consequences of Critical Clinical Decisions”

Dr. Leonid Eidelman, Director of the Anesthesiology Department, Rabin Medical Center, Beilinson, and Vice Chairperson, Israel Medical Association

“The Impact of Palliative Care on Decisions at the End of His Life”

Dr. Avi Lazari, Reut Medical Center, Tel-Aviv

“Clinical Aspects in Treating Patients in Low Consciousness”

18:00-19:30 Round Table

Chair and Discussant: Prof. Emanuel Gross, Faculty of Law, University of Haifa

Prof. Ehud Zmora, Director of the Department of Pediatrics & Preterm, Soroka University Medical Center, Beer-Sheba

Prof. Jonathan Halevy, Director-General, Shaare Zedek Medical Center, Jerusalem

Prof. Rafi Cohen-Almagor, Director, Center for Democratic Studies, University of Haifa

Prof. Asa Kasher, Department of Philosophy, Tel-Aviv University

Please see this as a personal invitation. I'd love to see you all in this book celebration.

Terri Schiavo and Pain

In the end, Terri Schiavo was starved to death. This opened a new debate, whether patients in her condition are capable to experience pain. If we could prove that Post-Coma-Unawareness patients suffer, then we might think they are better off dead. We would not like to think that these patients would be sustained for months and years while suffering great pain. We would not starve such patients to death and may seek a more humane way to end life.

Disagreement exists regarding the question of whether Post-Coma-Unawareness (PCU) patients have the capacity to experience pain or suffering. The American Academy of Neurology’s opinion is that these patients do not. In their position paper, members of the Executive Board wrote that “Pain and suffering are attributes of consciousness requiring cerebral cortical functioning, and patients who are permanently and completely unconscious cannot experience these symptoms.” But then a question arises as to how one could safely conclude that the patient, indeed, is in a state of permanent (to be distinguished from prolonged or persistent) unawareness. In a similar vein, Cranford and Smith also argue conclusively that “Persistent vegetative state patients do not have the capacity to experience pain or suffering.”

However, reviewing the literature and discussing the matter with experts reveal that our knowledge is still very limited. Professor Martin Tweeddale, Director of the Critical Care Unit at the Vancouver Hospital, said that he simply does not know whether or not PCU patients suffer. In his opinion, we are in a position to say something in this regard when patients respond to certain stimuli, but when patients do not respond we are in no position to determine anything with regard to pain. Professor Tweeddale reiterates that because PCU patients (unlike coma patients) make some response to external stimuli, it is impossible to say they are unresponsive. On the other hand, because pain is totally subjective, we have no way of determining whether or not such sensations are present or whether there is any perception of them at all. Tweeddale concludes: “My own feeling is that these patients demonstrate complex, high level reflex activity only, but I am in no better position to defend that statement than are those who say there is no possibility of awareness, or those… who argue for some potential conscious activity, however rudimentary.”

Tweeddale admits he does not know the answer, but Joseph Alpert believes that PCU patients must be suffering at some level. He asks rhetorically: How could suffering not be present if any awareness exists of the extraordinary level of disability present?

Kirk Payne and his associates surveyed physicians’ attitudes about the care of patients in PCU. A substantial number of the medical doctors and neurologists who participated in the survey believed that these patients experienced pain, thirst and hunger, are aware of self and environment, and are made more comfortable by intravenous fluids and tube feedings. Stephen Ashwal and his colleagues reported that 20 percent of child neurologists in their survey believed that children in PCU experience pain and suffering, and 75 percent of the sample stated that they used medications to alleviate such symptoms. There is a spectrum of views on this most crucial issue, which again shows that we are still in the learning process and, hence, need to be extra careful in making decisions with regard to the patients in concern. Evidently, PCU patients do not give any indication that they experience the cognitive and emotional concomitants of pain and suffering.

But we cannot safely say that their inability to give any indication, or alternatively our inability to find any indication, may serve as sufficient grounds to conclude that these patients do not feel pain. It should be further noted that I am not aware of any study in which patients who emerged from PCU were asked whether or not they felt pain while in this condition.

In Israel doctors who treat patients in prolonged unawareness refrain from using the term PVS, considering to dehumanize patients. I recently learned that in Reut Medical Center they refer to these patients as patients in low consciousness.

Media Ethics

I was invited to take part in a workshop of media ethicists in London. We were some thirty people, mostly British (one Dutch, one Spanish and me), discussing ways to promote social dialogue and ethics in class and in the media. We discussed issues like objectivity, professionalism, the usefulness of codes of ethics, and responsibility.

After this workshop I was invited to give the Inaugural Lecture of the School of Applied Global Ethics at Leeds Metropolitan University. I spoke of Incitement, Hate Speech, and Freedom of Speech, warning against the voice that are heard today to kill Prime Minister Sharon.

I thank my kind hosts during this short trip: Alan Roth, Valerie Alia, Idit and Mike Goodisman, Meri and Ray Spier, and Brian Winston.

Upon my return to Israel I learnt that the British Association of University Teachers decided to boycott two universities in Israel: Bar-Ilan and Haifa. Below is my university's response to this contemptuous decision.

The University of Haifa Response to the AUT Boycott Decision

The University of Haifa is saddened and not a little outraged by the utterly unjust and unjustifiable decision of the British Association of University Teachers and by its attempt to erect barriers and obstruct the flow of ideas within the international academic community.

In lieu of evidence to support the singling out of Israeli academia, the authors of this campaign have chosen to adopt a three-year old urban legend.
We are astounded by the fact that the AUT never requested our response prior to adopting their resolution, and did not allow our position to be presented by members of the AUT who are familiar with the facts. The case against Israeli academia, in general, and the University of Haifa in particular, is devoid of empirical evidence and violates the principle of due process. Driven by a prior and prejudicial assumption of guilt, the AUT has refused to confuse itself with facts.

In actual fact, during the past few years, Dr. Pappe has transgressed all common ethical standards of academic life. Yet, despite his conduct, the University of Haifa has demonstrated extraordinary tolerance. One of his colleagues did indeed lodge a complaint with the internal faculty disciplinary committee. The complaint focused on Dr. Pappe's unethical behavior towards his peers and his efforts to disbar them from international forums for daring to contradict his views. Contrary to Dr. Pappe's claim, the university made no attempt to expel him.

As to the now too famous thesis that provoked this altercation, an independent committee was asked to examine the validity of the quotes that were used as the "scientific basis" for the highly controversial charges proffered in this thesis, authored by Mr. Teddy Katz.  After a thorough examination, the committee members concluded that, in fact, the quotes in the written text did not match the taped comments of the interviews and that the text was grossly distorted. Therefore, they disqualified this MA thesis. This decision, it is important to note, matched a court decision given on the same matter. As Dr. Pappe did not like the committee decision, despite the undeniable discrepancies between the text and the taped interviews, he reacted by calling the academic community to boycott the members of this committee and the University of Haifa.  Despite these violations of academic collegiality and ethics, Dr. Pappe was never summoned by the disciplinary committee as the committee's chairperson decided not to pursue the complaint that had been filed against him.

Although there is always more work to do, the University of Haifa is proud of its record of Arab-Jewish cooperation and reconciliation, both on campus and in the community. Twenty percent of our student body are Arab citizens of the State of Israel, and the many Arab faculty members at Haifa include departmental chairs and a Dean.  We will continue our efforts to further Jewish-Arab reconciliation, despite politically motivated initiatives to muzzle free speech and the academic discourse.

We are puzzled by the fact that despite the deluge of abuses of academic freedom throughout the world, the AUT has chosen to focus upon a politically spurious charge and, on the basis of false allegations, single out the University of Haifa for condemnation.  The University of Haifa calls upon the AUT to rescind its resolution, one that represents a complete distortion of facts far more embarrassing to the AUT than to the University. We call upon the academic community throughout the free world to reject this politically motivated abuse of academic discourse.

Many people have asked me what I think of Ilan Pappe, a person I used to appreciate. This was long before he passed the fine line between being a researcher to being an ideologue. I think the University of Haifa is most unfortunate to have Ilan among us. On the other hand, we are most fortunate not to have ten like him in our midst. Then the Rector and President of the university will have the time to do nothing else but to deal with all the fires the Pappes would have generated. I am sorry that Ilan does not invest the incredible energies he has in prudent and productive ways but mostly in ways that provoke hatred, malice and bad blood. Just imagine what a fine researcher Ilan could have been were he to devote his time to research. I also think that if Ilan were true to himself he would have left our university a long time ago. Why should he associate himself, a fine and decent man, to such an awful institution that exploits and discriminates against Arabs, that betrays academic freedom, and allows people like him to go around the world and smear its name and reputation? Instead, Pappe prefers to sit inside the well and piss into it. The result might be warm for him and his family but the smell, Oh the smell. He feeds himself and his family by working in the institution that he makes infamous. He calls to ban its scientists in forums to which he is invited knowingly and purposely in order to spread his hatred. Pappe is using academic freedom, tolerance, and free speech to ask others to ban all other teachers at the University of Haifa. Only he deserves the right to enjoy this freedom and tolerance. In short, he is giving hypocrisy a bad name, and reaches new horizons in setting standards for comradeship, for honesty, for academic freedom, for free expression. We need people like him to test our capacity to endure. But despite him and his ilk, we will go from strength to strength and continue to be the most pluralistic university in Israel, a truly multicultural university, the only university whose student body comprises some twenty percent Israeli-Palestinians.

Arthur Rubinstein Competition

The 11th Arthur Rubinstein International Piano Master Competition was held in Tel Aviv and Eilat. This is always a great celebration for music lovers, a place where the new piano masters of the world may be discovered. I went to two sessions, and if I could I would spend most of my time listening to the performances. All the finalists has wonderful technique and play beautifully. The winner, Alexander Gavrylyuk, also has charisma. You could feel that he has the ability to inspire the symphony, and that the musicians play better due to him. Gavrylyuk, originally from Ukraine, currently lives in Australia and I imagine that we will hear more from him, and of him.

Israel should strive to have more competitions of this sort, to bring some of the talents of this planet to our troubled land, be it musicians, writers, painters, scientists and scholars. At present, the majority of the audience is Israeli. Maybe in the future, tourists will have incentive to come also to watch such competitions.

Maccabi Tel Aviv

The basketball team looks very good. It seems that only CSKA Moscow will stand between Maccabi and winning the European Championship. It has been a great joy to watch them this year, enjoying the remarkable atmosphere in the Nokia stadium. The challenge is great. The Final Four will be held in Moscow. In previous years, the teams that hosted the games and reached the Final Four almost always went all the way to win the Cup. Last year it was Maccabi in Tel Aviv. It will be a surprise if CSKA will not win.

The football team has a terrible year. Recently the team acquired Eyal Berkowitz who returned to Israel after a decade in England. It is intended to build the team next year around him. The big question is whether Eyal is still capable to deliver and to show the same notable football standards he exhibited in England. He did not play much last year, and is beyond the age of 30. Maccabi does not think it invests a great deal sum of money for nothing, and have high expectations. Next year we'll know whether the media boom announcing Eyal's expensive signing was justified.

International Football and Racism

After years in which football teams refused to come to Israel, and Israeli teams needed to host clubs and nations in Cyprus and in other countries, international football has returned. First against the "friendly" Irish, and after four days against the "unpleasant" French (the adjectives were used by the Israeli media). On paper, both teams are much stronger than their Israeli counterpart. The Irish led 1:0 from the 4^th moment until the very last moment of the game. Then, Abas Suan scored a wonderful goal from 20 meters that made justice as the Israeli team attacked most of the game. Similar thing happened against the French. They led 1:0 but then, in the 84 minutes of the game, Walid Badir equalized and did some justice, as Israel attacked the French team most of the second period.

Both scorers are Israeli Arabs. They saved the games and our chances to reach the Mondeal in Germany. I cheered the Israeli team in the national stadium, not far from my home in Ramat Gan, in both games. Next to me was a supported who voiced his loud dissent when Abbas Suan was introduced into the game as a sub. He was very happy when Suan equalized the score, without noticing the identity of the scorer. Once the announcer declared the minute and the scorer, his quick reaction was: "Suan, the Arab?" He could not believe that the person who saved Israel in the 90^th minute was an Arab. Many reacted in the same manner. When the same scenario reoccurred against France, those racists almost chocked. Some of them might have preferred Israel to lose rather to see Israel saved by Arabs.

Israel has tough games ahead against Ireland and Switzerland abroad. We need to win or draw if we wish to stand a chance to finish first in our table. Only the first team will automatically reach the Mondeal. The team in the second place will need to compete against other teams, ranked second, in the other seven tables. Israel will make a significant step in international football if we finish third, before one of the teams that are ranked above us: France, Ireland and Switzerland. The Mondeal is a sweet dream. Israel reached the Mondeal only once in its history: Mexico 1970. We had two draws (v. Sweden and the great Italian team) and one loss (Uruguay) at the first and for us final stage of the games.

Saul Bellow

On April 6, 2005 the Nobel Prize Laureate Saul Bellow died. The very first book I have ever read in English was Herzog. I was a high school student and had to write my first English book report. It was not easy. It was a challenging and inspiring book and since then I have followed him in my thoughts and looked for him on the media.

Herzog, I think, was published in 1964. Bellow published several other books, among them The Adventures of Augie March, To Jerusalem and Back, Ravelstein and Humboldt's Gift, the latter an especially intriguing and challenging book earned him the Pulitzer prize. When I was about to complete my MA and applied for doctoral grants and places in England and the USA, the best offer came from the University of Chicago and I intended to get myself involved with the Committee on Social Thought, in which Bellow was active. The thought of finally meeting him was exhilarating. Then came the offer from Oxford, and I assume I made the first person on the waiting list very happy when I gave up the generous offer made by the Dept. of Political Science. The next miss was in Oxford, when Bellow came to deliver a lecture at the Sheldonian. Alas, I arrived some twenty minutes before the talk, and the gates were closed. The hall was packed. I pleaded to the gate keeper who showed no mercy or understanding; instead he showed me the way to my bike.

The New York Times wrote on April 7, 2005:

Bellow's books were divined at yet another level in the beer-soaked precincts of the student bar in Hyde Park. We ransacked them for stories from the local streets and inside stuff from Mr. Bellow's divorces and his feuds with other intellectuals. It was through these exercises that some of us learned how books were put together. Colleagues and acquaintances sometimes flew into rages about their unflattering cameos in the novels. Most people kept quiet, though, secretly flattered that those hungry eyes had settled even briefly upon them.

Yehi Zichro Baruch (May his soul rest in peace).

Books

Neil L. Whitehead (ed.), Violence (SAR Press, 2004). Cloth, ISBN 1-930618-51-4, $60.00
Paper, ISBN 1-930618-52-2, $24.95.

http://sarweb.org/press/books/seminars/violence.htm

Mar Adentro (The Sea Inside)

The big winner of the Oscar ceremony was "Million Dollar Baby". The Oscar for best foreign film went to the Spanish "Mar Adentro". Both films deal with medical ethics, specifically with the right to die with dignity. While the first is a moderate film that will not make an impression on the film industry, Alejandro Amenabar's "Mar Adentro" is the best film I have seen this year. Javier Bardem gives a remarkable performance as Ramon - a 55-year-old former sailor who broke his neck as a young man and has spent 25 years as a quadriplegic. Based on a real life case that engrossed Spain, Ramon’s desire to end his own life makes a gripping and absorbing drama about dying with dignity. This is a powerful and emotional film that makes a significant plea for physician-assisted suicide. Can be used also for educational purposes in bioethics classes. I highly recommend.

Whose Life Is It Anyway

Kim Cattrall is playing the role of a woman paralyzed from neck to toes following a car accident. She wishes to discharge herself from hospital, which means to die. The hospital refuses to grant this and the issue is brought before a judge who is finally persuaded to grant the request. In the end the patient is allowed to remain in hospital without receiving any medical treatment, food or fluids. She is starved to death. Unlike Schiavo, Cattrall in this theatre production in London, a new version to the 1981 Richard Dreyfuss' film, is competent and alert. This is a painful and disturbing death. Physician-assisted suicide is a much preferred solution. Surprisingly, it is not considered in this drama. I imagine PAS was unthinkable in the 1970s, when the play was originally written (the original was a play by Brian Clark, which was produced by the BBC in 1972 and on Broadway in 1978).

Photos

Enjoy the attached. These photos are simply beautiful.

With my very best wishes for a Happy Passover, as ever,

Rafi

My last communications are available on http://almagor.blogspot.com
Earlier posts at my home page: http://lib-stu.haifa.ac.il/staff/rcohen-Almagor

Books archived at http://almagor.fetchauthor.info

March 24, 2005

Horror in Tel-Aviv, Mass Murder in Darfur, Incitement, Talia Sasson's Report on the Illegal Outposts in the West Bank, Racism, Center for Democratic Studies, Crisis in High Education, Maale Edumim, Separating State from Religion, Poll among Youth on Serving in the Territories, Israel Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 2 (April 2005), Lebanon, Hizballah and Amal, Terri Schiavo, Earth and Moon Viewer, Books

Dear friends and colleagues,

Horror in Tel-Aviv

On Friday, February 25, the horror returned to Tel Aviv. A suicide bomber wanted to enter a dancing club, the guards inspected him and when he realized he will not be able to enter he exploded at the entrance. Five people killed, and more than fifty injured. My wife and I were fifteen minutes away from the place as we returned from the theatre.

This was a sad reminder that some Palestinian organizations will continue to attack at the heart of Israel, that talks about "new paths" for peace failed to convince them, that there is still great necessity for guards in every public place in Israel (the industry was shrinking as some relaxed to think that with Abu Mazen the horror is behind us), and that the Palestinian Authority cannot avoid confronting the terror organizations, disarming them, and sending their leaders to spend the next years of the lives behind bars. The "politics of numbers" comes into play yet again. If the next explosion will be too painful for Israel to bear, we will enter the Palestinian cities with great force and then the result would be yet another major setback for tranquility.

Mass Murder in Darfur

The Sudanese Government, using Arab "Janjaweed" militias, its air force, and organized starvation, is deliberately and systematically killing the black Sudanese of Darfur. Over a million people, driven from their homes, now face death from starvation and disease as the Government and militias attempt to prevent humanitarian aid from reaching them. The same forces have destroyed the people of Darfur's villages and crops, and poisoned their water supplies, and they continue to murder, rape and terrorise.

The International Community has tough words for Sudan but threats to act are mild, with the strongest suggestions being economic sanctions on Sudan. But the Sudanese are accustomed to sanctions, and even the toughest sanctions take months to have any impact. The Khartoum government is skilled at using negotiations to delay. They know all they need is another few weeks and their terrible work will be done.

Of all things we must not allow in Darfur, it is delay. Only one thing will stop the killing in Sudan: an immediate international intervention to protect the people of Darfur and deliver aid to them. I call upon governments and the United Nations to intervene immediately to protect civilians and guarantee the delivery of humanitarian aid in Darfur, Sudan. I call on the UN Security Council to mandate the International Criminal Court to investigate those responsible for the Darfur genocide. Sign a petition on http://www.darfurgenocide.org/action.htm

Incitement

The incitement continues. On February 27, 2005 head of SHABAC Avi Dichter presented the cabinet with a selection of letters sent to senior figures that included extremist statements. One of the letters read: "A din rodef has been placed on the prime minister and he must be murdered." To recall, din rodef was instrumental in the incitement campaign against Yitzhak Rabin leading to his assassination on November 4, 1995. "Din rodef" is an ancient rabbinical decree that allows Jews to kill other Jews who worked for an enemy.

The letters also read "Yigal Amir lives, Rabin is dead, Sharon will die" and "Sharon will meet Arafat in hell." Justice Minister Tzipi Livni told the cabinet that preparations for the disengagement include the creation of dedicated units whose sole job will be to combat incitement and those causing disorder. Minister Haim Ramon attacked the justice system saying it was unacceptable that blatantly inciteful statements can be made against Sharon and other senior figures without any response from the legal system. He rightly asked for practical law enforcement steps be taken.

Talia Sasson's Report on the Illegal Outposts in the West Bank

On March 8, 2005 attorney Talia Sasson submitted her report on West Bank outposts to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. There were no great revelations, just systematic data that confirmed what we already know. Some of the illegal settlement outposts in the West Bank were both planned and funded by the Housing Ministry, including a number of those built on private Palestinian land. The report essentially confirms longstanding complaints by Palestinians and activist groups like Peace Now that successive Israeli governments, including those in power after the signing of the Oslo Accords in the early 1990s, approved and financed for decades the establishment of outpost settlements on privately-owned Palestinian land.

In light of the harsh accusations, Sasson recommended that the Housing Ministry be stripped of authority over construction of settlements in the West Bank, and that this power be transferred to the cabinet. Housing Minister Isaac Herzog (Labour) said following the release of the report that every expense earmarked for the settlements will now need the approval of the ministry's director-general. Up until now, the heads of each department at the ministry have been able to sign off on expenses for various construction and infrastructure matters at the settlements.

Sasson reported that a number of government ministries had failed to hand over some of the information she requested. Therefore, the list of outposts that appears in the report is not a complete one. "I do not have a full picture of all the outposts," she said. The report names "only" 105 illegal outposts in the West Bank. Of them twenty four were established after March 2001, in blunt violation of the Israeli government's promise to the Bush administration. Of the twenty four, 15 were built on private Palestinian land.

Sasson also called on Attorney General Menachem Mazuz to look into the involvement of government employees in the establishment of illegal outposts, and prosecute the offenders.

Talia Sasson said the complacency over unauthorized settlement outpost construction was not limited to the Housing Ministry alone, accusing the IDF Civil Administration and the Defense Ministry of involvement. According to Sasson, the Defense Ministry must approve any trailers being placed in the West Bank - which in fact it did, in contradiction of the defense minister's instructions.

Sasson said she does not know whether the ministers themselves knew what their ministries were doing, and that it is possible other ministries were also involved in the outpost construction.

Following the report's publication, Yahad-Meretz Chairman Yossi Beilin called for a formal government investigation into the matter, with ministries legally compelled to provide all relevant information. Infrastructure Minister Benjamin Ben-Eliezer called on the government to take "clear and drastic" action against the outposts. Generally speaking, while the Labour ministers voiced alarm and wished to take immediate steps against the outsposts, the Likud ministers were far more moderate in their reaction. After all, the report is hardly news to them.

The U.S. administration warned Israel that its failure to keep its promise to remove all outposts established in the West Bank since March 2001 will harm relations between the countries, and could have an impact on American aid to Israel. At their last meeting, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told Dov Weisglass, the prime minister's adviser, that President Bush expects Jerusalem to take immediate action based on the conclusions and recommendations in Sasson's report on the outposts.

Talia Sasson had worked in the Attorney General's office. Inter alia, she headed the small unit that tracked down incitements and decided whether to press charges against inciters. Recently she retired and now works as an independent lawyer.

A few years ago I hosted her on one of my TV talk shows (Academic Channel), together with the former Attorney General Michael Ben-Yair. The tension between the two was noticeable. The "Incitement Unit" was established immediately after the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, under the leadership of Ben-Yair. I was surprised to know that the Unit was established more or less without the blessing of Ben-Yair. I found this most interesting, especially given the special circumstances that brought about the decision.

I had talks with a few former attorney generals in Israel in which I raised the issues that Sasson reported now, with particular alarm that some of the legal outposts serve as hotbeds for political extremism, operating outside the confines of the law, using the weapons supplied by the IDF against Palestinians without too much interest of law enforcement authorities. There was, still is, a common saying among radical settlers: The law stops at the Tapuach Junction (Kfar Tapuach is settled by Kach followers, Meir Kahane's banned party). They never seemed too surprised, going into lengthy explanations how difficult it is to infiltrate those settlements and obtain the proof needed for prosecution, the reluctance of the security forces to challenge those settlers, their fear of the zealots, etc. This reminded me of South Africa: first you supply radicals with weapons; then surprisingly the weapon is used against whoever is described as an "enemy"; and it is too risky for the security forces to intervene, thus turning a blind eye to what is going on. When you plant seeds of hatred, you will reap blood.

Racism

A new poll, published by Yedioth Ahronoth ("Racist? Me?") on March 22, 2005, p. 8 (24 Hours section) among Jews in Israel testifies about the seriousness of racism in our society. Here are some of the findings:

23% would not marry religious people, nor would like their children to marry religious people;

15% would not marry people of Middle-Eastern origins, nor would like their children to marry people of Middle Eastern origins;

21% would not marry people of Russian origins, nor would like their children to marry people of Russian origins;

79% would not marry Arab people, nor would like their children to marry Arab people;

53% are not willing to live next to an Arab family;

22% are not willing to live next to an Ethiopian family;

38% would not buy a used car from an Arab;

22% believe that religious people get too many rights.

I reiterate the importance of education in primary and high schools. Grass root work is of immense importance. Alas it is not within the priorities of the present Minister of Education. The Center of Democratic Studies at the University of Haifa could do the job, if only we had the resources to tackle the problem.

Center for Democratic Studies

I still have not nominated Chairperson of the Governing Board of the Center as I did not find the right person to fill the position. I am looking for an affluent Israeli, with connections in business and/or high tech, access to financial resources who is committed to the ideas and principles of democracy, and would be willing to dedicate time and energy to mobilize the funds necessary for the multiple projects the Center would like to pursue. If you have any ideas and suggestions regarding the appropriate such person, please let me know. Your advice is highly appreciated.

Crisis in High Education

During the past few years the Ministry of Education had cut the budgets of all universities in Israel by some 40 (forty) percent! Each year a 10% cut was declared. All the fat in the universities evaporated in 2001. Then the meat was eaten. Now they are hurting the bones. The skeleton is fighting to remain alive against all odds. All universities went into a severe crisis. Working conditions have become difficult, very difficult. Photocopying papers became a luxury. The sad thing is that no one cared. The presidents of all universities wanted a meeting with Prime Minister Sharon. For two years they were begging to see him. However, Sharon's busy schedule did not allow such opportunity. Israeli government has other priorities. Money was funneled to colleges, yeshivas, revising high school teaching. The government is not interested in providing quality education. It is interested in providing popular education: granting degrees without much efforts, to enable people to ask for an increase in their salaries. This way everyone is happy, and the voices of alarm raised by the academia were lonely cries in the wilderness. Scholarship, merit, excellence – all became obsolete. Instant education, this is what the people want, or, better still, like coffee without coffee, soap without soap, why not education without education? Degrees from tenth-rate institutions are bought with money. One MP obtained degrees without attending the college in which he was supposed to enroll, submitting papers of other students. He was caught with hard evidence. No one knows how many do the same and complete their degrees in such dishonest ways.

As said, no one cared until Tel Aviv University, arguably in the worse condition of all universities, all rely on public funding, decided to unify some departments and to close others. Last week Tel Aviv students raised their outcry, and suddenly people begin to notice the crisis. The universities are fighting for their lives. On March 28, 2005 a general strike is declared in all universities. I hope this will be the first step in a long battle against the "anti-elite" government to change its agenda and thinking. Maybe Labour ministers will take issue and join our struggle. We need to do something now in order to change the government's priorities, or else we will witness the day when the first Israeli university will be required to close its gates and declare bankruptcy.

Maale Edumim

On March 21, 2005 Israel publicly confirmed plans to build 3,500 new housing units in the largest Jewish settlement in the West Bank, Maale Adumim. At present some 30,000 people live in Maale Adumim. The government often describe Maale Adumim as part of "greater Jerusalem" that will be part of Israel in any future peace agreement. Palestinians angrily responded that such an action would violate the Middle East peace plan and would be a major obstacle to resolving bitter disputes over nearby Jerusalem.

In practical terms, the expansion of Maale Adumim creates two major problems. First, Palestinians living in East Jerusalem and nearby areas will be effectively boxed in, with no room to grow. "This project may be one of the biggest obstacles to reaching a two-state solution," said Yariv Oppenheimer of Peace Now, an Israeli group that monitors settlements. "This will cut off Jerusalem to the east with Jewish settlements."

Also, an expanded Maale Adumim would serve as a barrier between the northern and southern parts of the West Bank. Palestinians traveling between the two parts would face a lengthy detour, though Israeli officials have hinted that they may build a bypass road.

Critics also called the expansion a violation of Israel's pledge under the road map, which calls for a freeze of all settlement activity. Israel has interpreted that to mean that it can continue building in existing settlements. Israel also says the peace plan is not currently being carried out because the Palestinian leadership has yet to act against Palestinian factions responsible for attacks on Israelis, as the plan requires.

About 230,000 Jewish settlers live in the West Bank, and the number is increasing by at least 10,000 each year. In addition, more than 200,000 Israelis live in East Jerusalem, which Israel annexed after capturing it in the Arab-Israeli war of 1967.

The same day of the Maale Adumim decision, March 21, Israel handed over security control to the Palestinians in the West Bank town of Tulkarm, a hotbed of Palestinian militants. Last month Israel agreed to transfer security control of five Palestinian towns in the West Bank, and Tulkarm is the second one to be handed over, after Jericho last week.

Another recent positive development: Egypt sent a new ambassador to Tel Aviv after a few years of a vacant position.

Separating State from Religion

Further testimony of the need to separate between state and religion is evident from reading the latest report of the Central Bureau of Statistics. 7.089 Israelis, 8.2% of the total number of citizens that married in 2002, chose to marry abroad. The report also shows that 74% of those marrying abroad are Israeli Jews.

The Israel Religious Action Center (IRAC) sent an urgent letter to the Prime Minister, demanding that the work of the government committee aimed at solving the plight of those "unable to marry" (minuei-chitun) be renewed. In this way, according to the Reform Movement, the continuing harm to the fundamental rights of hundreds of thousands of Israelis unable to marry in Israel according to their conscience or are unable to marry at all -- can come to an end.

"The fact that thousands of Israelis go abroad each year, and are ready to present themselves before a foreign authority as a result of no choice, testifies to the feeble policy of Israel", states (IRAC's) letter, quite rightly. The situation needs to be changed, sooner the better, or more and more Israelis will fell alienated from the state in which they live.

Poll among Youth on Serving in the Territories

A poll conducted in February 2005 by Bar Ilan University among 508 people, aged 16-18 (published by Maariv, March 9, 2005, pp. 12-13), about their willingness to serve in the army, and in what capacity, shows that 76% of the secular youth wishes to serve (83% among religious youth); 43% want to do combat service (62% among religious youth); 13% refuse to evacuate settlements (36% among the religious youth); 42% refuse to serve in the territories (29% of the religious youth). Slowly but surely the occupied territories are conceived as a liability by a growing number of people. Slowly but surely the settlements are loosing their legitimacy in the public eye. Common sense does prevail. Sometimes it hesitates, but at the end it will win its way. Israel is on the right track, after so many years of empowering the occupation and deligetimizing the Palestinians. More and more people believe that two-state solution is the only viable solution to end the bloodshed in our troubled region. Hallelujah.

Israel Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 2 (April 2005)

I am the editor of special issue of this journal that appears in London. This volume is quite special. Usually when academics edit books we invite fellow academics to write the chapters. However, decision makers are often critical of this practice, especially when academics reflect on their doing. They argue, quite rightly, that it is very simple to sit outside the tent and to piss inside, that the academics' outlook would have been quite different were they the bearers of responsibility. With responsibility comes a very different perspective that could not comfortably accommodate the moral outlook that academics advocate.

For these reasons, I decided that a volume on Israeli institutions should be written by people who served in power positions. Most of the articles were written by decision makers, and they are fascinating. When you read, note not only the content but also what they decided not to address. Of all my edited volumes, I am particularly proud of this one. Hereby the table of contents:

Introduction

Raphael Cohen-Almagor

General

The Crisis of Governance: Government Instability and the Civil Service

David Nachmias and Ori Arbel-Ganz

Citizenship Education in Israel – A Jewish-Democratic State

Orit Ichilov, Gavriel Salomon and Dan Inbar

The Military-Political Complex: The IDF’s Influence over Policy towards the Palestinians Since 1987

Yoram Peri

On the Need for A Constitution

Meir Shamgar

Institutions

Presidency in Israel: Formal Authority and Personal Experience

Yitzhak Navon

The Government

Gad Yaakobi

The Knesset

Naomi Chazan

The Attorney General in Israel – A Delicate Balance of Powers and Responsibilities in a Jewish and Democratic State

Elyakim Rubinstein

Particularistic Considerations and the Absence of Strategic Assessment in the Israeli Public Administration: The Role of the State Comptroller

Eliezer Goldberg

The Press Council

Raphael Cohen-Almagor

Final Word

Israeli Institutions at the Crossroads

Raphael Cohen-Almagor

I thank the Journal's chief editor, Prof. Efraim Karsh, for his thoughtful cooperation. This volume will also appear as a book by Routledge later this year. Notification will be announced in due course.

Lebanon, Hizballah and Amal

Infra excerpts of a recent article published by the GLORIA Center, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol.9, No.1 (March 2005). The author is Dr. Rodger Shanahan, a Visiting Fellow at the Research Institute for Asia and the Pacific, University of Sydney, who teaches in the university's Department of Arabic and Islamic Studies.  The author shows the extent of Syria's involvement in Lebanon's internal politics, and emphasizes the rise of the Hizballah. Israel is investing lot of efforts in convincing Europe to include the Hizballah in its black list of terrorist organizations. For many European countries the Hizballah is considered as political organization that was involved in a just guerrilla warfare against the IDF in Lebanon. Not much attention was given to its launching of rockets on Israeli towns across the border, although I should say that since the American presence in Iraq those incidents became rare.

 Hizballah Rising: The Political Battle for the Loyalty of the Shi'a of Lebanon

By Rodger Shanahan

While the future political direction taken by the Shi'a majority in Iraq is of immense interest to U.S. policy makers, a longer-running political contest is still being played out in another part of the Arab world for the political loyalty of the same community. Since the re-emergence of elections following the end of the civil war in Lebanon, where the Shi'a represent the largest of the communal groups,[1] both Amal and Hizballah have been forced to run on joint electoral tickets for the national elections. Running on joint lists thus allowed the two Shi'a political parties represented in parliament to avoid a direct electoral showdown. In the local government elections held in May and June 2004, however, candidates ran on separate electoral tickets, giving a better indication of each party's popularity. On the face of it, the results indicate that Hizballah has moved well ahead of Amal as the preferred political representative of the Shi'a community. However, as is the case with anything related to Lebanese politics, the results not only reflect the local political popularity of the two parties, but were also heavily influenced by the broader strategic desires of the dominant foreign force in Lebanon: Syria.

The contest between Hizballah and Amal for the position of pre-eminent representative of the Shi'a community has, at times, been a heated one. Although Amal had its genesis in the Movement of the Dispossessed (Harakat al-Mahrumin), founded by the charismatic scholar ('alim) Musa as-Sadr, it turned briefly to the secular leadership of Husayn Husayni in 1979, and since 1980, Nabih Berri. Hizballah, on the other hand, has retained the leadership of the party in the hands of the scholars, in line with its ideological linkage with, and jurisprudential loyalty to, the Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamene'i. Indeed, many of Hizballah's early founders came from the ranks of disaffected Amal members who were disillusioned with the party's embrace of the secular political system. Both Islamic Amal members and members of the Da'wa who had joined Amal were prominent in the establishment of Hizballah. Like all groups vying for the political loyalty of the same constituency, however, the two groups developed into fierce rivals, and conflict between the two groups has generally existed right below the surface. Between 1985 and 1988, at the height of the intra-communal dispute, Hizballah and Amal militia members fought a series of bloody engagements in the south of the country. More recently though, any violence between the two parties has been small scale and very localized, and is normally centered over local electoral disputes.

Because of the complex nature of Lebanese politics, and the use by Syria of the Lebanese political process in pursuit of its own foreign political objectives, it is difficult to draw clear conclusions from events such as elections. In the case of the 2004 municipal elections, however, it is clear that Hizballah emerged as a much stronger party than its rival Amal. In the south of the country, Hizballah emerged victorious in over 60 percent of municipalities (compared with 55 percent in 1998), while Amal captured only 30 percent of municipalities (down from 45 percent in 1998). Hizballah also did very well in southern Beirut and the Biqa', particularly in Ba'albak, where it had taken its support for granted in 1998 and been dealt a heavy blow, winning only a few of the municipalities. With the benefit of a well-organized campaign in the region, Hizballah gained control in 27 of the 30 municipalities that it contested in the Biqa'.[2]

Hizballah's relative success can be put down to a number of factors, some of which emanate from purely domestic politics, and others that are of longer-term strategic importance. As far as Syria was concerned, the dynamics of this municipal election were different from others, in that Damascus was happy for a more realistic reflection of local political attitudes towards Hizballah and Amal to be displayed. Whereas it has been Syria's wish for the two parties to maintain a balance during national elections in order to ensure that no one communal group becomes dominant enough to challenge Syrian primacy, in the case of the Shi'a parties there was a relatively low-key approach taken to these local elections. As a consequence, Hizballah was able to display its strength in the heartlands of the Lebanese Shi'a: the Biqa', the southern suburbs (dahiyya) of Beirut, and South Lebanon. That is not to say that there was no action on the part of the Syrians to influence the outcomes. In the Biqa' for example, Hizballah formed an electoral alliance with the pro-Syrian Ba'th party, which made it difficult for Amal to form an effective, politically popular counter-alliance.

Syria's decision to ultimately allow both parties to contest the elections without being forced into an electoral alliance with each other was motivated in part by external considerations. No doubt realizing the level of popular support that Hizballah possessed, Syria realized that the elections would provide the United States, in particular, with a public example of how genuinely popular the party was politically. Following the late 2001 proscription of Hizballah as a terrorist organization by the United States, the Syrian government wished to signal to Washington the reality of the situation on the ground in Lebanon. By association, Syria, as the hegemon within Lebanon, was also signaling to the United States its own continuing relevance within the region. This was particularly important following the passing of the Syria Accountability Act and the Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act in October 2003 by the U.S. House of Representatives. The Syria Accountability Act, for example, stated that "...the Government of Syria should immediately and unconditionally halt support for terrorism, permanently and openly declare its total renunciation of all forms of terrorism, and close all terrorist offices and facilities in Syria, including the offices of Hizballah."[3] By illustrating to the world the political popularity of Hizballah within Lebanon, Syria hoped to dilute the impact of the bill and show the United States that Hizballah was a legitimate political reality within Lebanon. Such was the intent of the statement by Syrian president Bashar Assad when he claimed that the elections "defined the true political sizes" in Lebanon.[4]

Of course, more than just Syrian political considerations account for Hizballah's success. The party is genuinely popular, both as a consequence of its resistance activities that prompted the 2000 withdrawal of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) from the country's south, as well as its ability to achieve the return of prisoners from Israeli jails in return for the remains of IDF soldiers. There were concerns in some quarters that Hizballah's popularity was rooted too deeply in support for its resistance against the Israelis occupying South Lebanon. For Hizballah, the withdrawal of the Israelis in 2000 provided a great fillip to the organization, and gave it the ability to announce both its Lebanese nationalist credentials, as well as its wider authority as the only Arab group to defeat Israel militarily. In the immediate aftermath of the perceived victory, it has also given the party's machinery the ability to cement its southern support. The party was instrumental in repairing village housing and some infrastructure damaged during years of resistance, while at the same time the creation of the dispute surrounding the ownership of the Sheba'a farms area allowed Hizballah to maintain its armed militias and to undertake military operations against Israel. The refusal of the Lebanese government to use its military to control the border region also allows Hizballah a free hand. Without the resistance, Hizballah fears becoming a sectarian form of the emasculated Amal. With its military wing however, the party has a regional relevance that its opposition is denied.

While its success against the IDF gained it great kudos, the military wing of Hizballah these days must be managed far more judiciously by Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah than in the pre-2000 period. While Israel remains an unpopular neighbor amongst the Lebanese (particularly amongst those from the south), the United Nations' rejection of Lebanon's (Syrian-inspired) claims to the Sheba'a Farms has presented the Islamic Resistance with a conundrum. With no unfulfilled UN Resolution behind its military operations, Hizballah's military actions in the south are carried out without the full support of the local population, especially given the Israeli reactions which follow. The more that Hizballah carries out military action in the Sheba'a farms for its own and others' strategic purposes, the more it risks alienating the Lebanese polity, the majority of whom lack any affinity with the Sheba'a farms issue.

Hizballah appears to understand the limitations of relying too heavily on its military component, however, and the party planned for the period following the withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon. It has always been active within the Lebanese Shi'a community as a significant provider of social services, and has been careful in maintaining a reputation for probity that eludes Amal. Of particular note is its ability to mobilize its supporters to achieve both its strategic and local political purposes. This is one aspect that will be of the utmost importance to the party in the long term as it continues to establish itself as a major player in the Lebanese political scene. In May 2004, the party was able to stage a mass rally of over 250,000 people in Beirut to protest at U.S. military incursions into the Iraqi holy sites at Karbala and Najaf, indicating its mass appeal.[6] Illustrative of the ability of the party to mobilize its support base at the local level was the fact that voter turnout was particularly good in the regions where Hizballah was strong. In Ba'albak, for example, over 70 percent of registered voters participated, while the figure for Nabatiyyah in the South was approximately 65 percent of voters. This compares with a figure of just over 20 percent for Beirut, and 30 percent for Sunni-dominated Tripoli.

While there is little doubt that Hizballah has become a well-organized, unified and multi-faceted organization, its rival for the loyalty of the Shi'a community has suffered in comparison. The municipal election results capped several bad years for Amal since their performance in the 1998 municipal elections. Amal's standing as a representative political party has fallen significantly since that time, particularly at the local level. Originally founded as a party designed to represent the interests of the economically and politically disenfranchised Shi'a population, its establishment heralded the emergence of a sectarian-led attempt to alter the political status quo that had for centuries deprived the community of a political voice. The early years of the party were full of promise, but more recently the very same party has lost much of its moral authority as its closeness with the government has led to charges of corruption against it. Amal is battling to stay level with Hizballah, whose members are meticulous about maintaining a public reputation for financial probity and an active opposition stance within government.

One of the consequences of this fall in popularity of the Amal movement is the emergence of internal disputes within the party. This was illustrated in March 2003, when Nabih Berri expelled six members from the party, including three members of parliament, two of whom were ministers.[7]

The future for Amal appears uncertain. The party is dominated by Nabih Berri, who has proven to be a staunch supporter of Syria. Although a dominant force, the recent expulsion from the party of several high-powered members attests to the fact that Berri, not for the first time, faces challenges to his authority from within the party. At the same time, the willingness of Amal's Central Council to unanimously confirm his decision to expel members attests to the fact that Berri is still very much in control of the party. While national parliamentary elections are due to be held in 2005, the nature of the Lebanese political system and Syria's place in it should guarantee parity between Amal and Hizballah. Syria has always been careful to maintain a degree of balance between the two parties, and while it was willing to send a message by allowing Hizballah to flex its muscles during the local government elections, its desire for balance will likely see it force the two parties into running joint electoral tickets again in 2005. Similarly, having seen Hizballah's political strength demonstrated, Syria is likely to continue backing Berri, both because he has been a loyal ally and because they fear tilting the Shi'a political balance towards Hizballah.

While Hizballah is also dependent on both Syria and Iran to varying degrees, the party has earned a reputation for integrity that eludes Amal. That having been said, neither party attracts many active supporters outside the Shi'a community, limiting either's claims to be truly national parties.

Hizballah has a long-term political strategy regarding its role within Lebanon. While it long ago acquiesced to the realities of multi-confessional Lebanon by rejecting its revolutionary strategy for the achievement of an Islamic state, it has never rejected the desire to see Lebanon ruled in accordance with Islamic precepts as its ultimate objective.[9] While this continues to mean that it is viewed with suspicion by many Lebanese, the party has saved its fiery rhetoric for external issues, such as United States intervention in Iraq and the continued Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory. Domestically, it has taken a strategic decision to act as the responsible political opposition, while pushing for electoral reforms that would ensure the Shi'a's numerical power is translated into political power. Both Amal and Hizballah have as one of their major aims to cease the sectarian basis of parliamentary representation that guarantees a political over-representation of the non-Shi'a population.[10] The parties have also sought to change the electoral law to lower the voting age from 21 to 18, which would similarly strengthen the hand of the Shi'a, given that this demographic is dominated by the Shi'a.

Hizballah understands that its political strategy within Lebanon must take into account three groups. First and foremost, it needs to gain the loyalty of a majority of the Shi'a community, as it is this group that will provide it with victory at the ballot box, and ensure its longevity as a political movement. Secondly, it needs to be accepted as a legitimate and responsible political party by the broader Lebanese polity. While the ultimate aims of Hizballah in terms of the Islamization of society mean that it will not be politically supported by many, if any, of the non-Shi'a Lebanese (particularly the Christian and Druze minorities), it aspires to be regarded as a responsible political player so that it can eventually achieve major leadership positions within the Lebanese political system that will allow it to achieve its goal. This is evident in Hizballah's successful attempts to position itself as the party representing the economically disadvantaged, regardless of communal identity. To that end it has an active involvement in the Lebanese trade union movement, while Hassan Nasrallah's held a meeting with then-Prime Minister Hariri in June 2004 to discuss the socio-economic impact of Lebanon's $34 billion debt (representing 185 per cent of Lebanon's GDP).[11] In addition to the balancing act it must undergo to navigate the difficult shoals of Lebanese domestic politics, it must also deal with Syria. As a party that portrays itself as a champion of Lebanese nationalism, exemplified by its militia's victory over the IDF, it must play a game of realpolitik with Syria. Support for Hizballah by Syria is dependent on Damascus's own interests. For that reason, Hizballah maintains good relations with Syria (a move at odds with its nationalist credentials) while building itself up politically for the day when Hizballah's resistance is of no use for the advancement of Syria's regional interests. While these three lines of strategy are difficult to achieve simultaneously, the 2004 local government success over Amal illustrates that the strategy is paying dividends within the community.

Terri Schiavo

On March 21, 2005 American Congress gave jurisdiction over Terri Schiavo to federal courts, an extraordinary legislative move that could empower a U.S. judge to order the reinsertion of a feeding tube that a state court allowed to be removed.

Voting 203 to 58, the House joined the Senate in approving the measure and rushing it to President Bush. He signed the bill into law, saying, "I will continue to stand on the side of those defending life for all Americans, including those with disabilities."

This statement, like many others, manifest the level of ignorance of people who speak about the case, and contribute to its being one of the loudest medical ethics dramas in history. Terri Schiavo is a peon in the hands of partisan people, with partisan agendas. However, I don't think anyone is capable of helping her.

When I embarked on my research on the right to die with dignity back in 1991, it was clear to me that I will not be able to study all the horrible diseases that exist on this planet. I decided to study one hopeless medical condition that I thought was the worse, and I thought that if I would be able to make intelligible conclusions about this condition then ipso facto the conclusions could relate to other medical conditions down the scale. At that time I thought the state of Post-Coma Unawareness, known in the medical circles as Persistent Vegetative State (a term I resent as I think it is unethical and does not serve the patient's best interests), is the worse medical condition. Since then I changed my mind and now I think locked-in syndrome is arguably worse, but I dedicated some years of my life to study PCU patients, reading every article I could reach, and visiting relevant departments in medical centers in Israel, Canada, the USA and the United Kingdom. In my research conclusions (The Right to Die with Dignity: An Argument in Ethics, Medicine, and Law, Piscataway, NJ.: Rutgers University Press, 2001) I urged hospitals as a policy not to cease treatment of post-traumatic PCU patients younger than 50 year-old within a period of less than two years. The two-year waiting period should be regarded as the minimum period of evaluation before forgoing hopes for patients’ rehabilitation and return to some form of cognition.

Terri Schiavo was born on December 3, 1963. She is younger than 50. However, the cause of condition was not traumatic. In February 1990 she suffered cardiac arrest; doctors believe a potassium imbalance caused her heart attack, which led to brain damage due to lack of oxygen, and she has been in this condition for more than fifteen years. There are a very few recorded patients in history who woke up after such a long period of time. All of them suffered irreparable brain damage and remained helpless and absolutely dependent on others until their very last day. I don't know what motives drive the Schindler family but I don't think their tireless efforts serve Terri Schiavo's best interests. One positive development that may result of this tragic controversy is that maybe more efforts and funding will be directed to study PCU, and the brain in general. Possibly PCU patients in the US will be better treated and maintained. Terri, I am afraid, is beyond all this.

Earth and Moon Viewer

See http://www.fourmilab.ch/earthview/vplanet.html

http://www.fourmilab.ch/cgi-bin/uncgi/Earth?imgsize=1024=/FONT>&opt

We need to invest more in protecting our planet. It is beautiful.

Viewing the Earth

You can view either a map of the Earth showing the day and night regions at this moment, or view the Earth from the Sun, the Moon, the night side of the Earth, above any location on the planet specified by latitude, longitude and altitude, from a satellite in Earth orbit, or above various cities around the globe.

Images can be generated based on a full-colour image of the Earth by day and night, a topographical map of the Earth, up-to-date weather satellite imagery, or a composite image of cloud cover superimposed on a map of the Earth, a colour composite which shows clouds, land and sea temperatures, and ice, or the global distribution of water vapour. Expert mode allows you additional control over the generation of the image. You can compose a custom request with frequently-used parameters and save it as a hotlist or bookmark item in your browser. Please consult the Details for additional information and answers to frequently-asked questions.

Viewing the Moon

In addition to the Earth, you can also view the Moon from the Earth, Sun, night side, above named formations on the lunar surface. or as a map showing day and night. You can also make expert and custom images of the Moon. A related document compares the appearance of the Moon at perigee and apogee, including an interactive Perigee and Apogee Calculator.

Books

Idith Zertal and Akiva Eldar, Lords of the Land (Or Yehuda: Kinneret, Zmora-Bitan, Dvir, 2004) (Hebrew). The book provides a detailed review of the history of settlements since 1967. I expect an English translation soon.

With my very best wishes, as ever,

Rafi

My last communications are available on http://almagor.blogspot.com
Earlier posts at my home page: http://lib-stu.haifa.ac.il/staff/rcohen-Almagor

Books archived at http://almagor.fetchauthor.info

February 2005

Comment on Prince Harry, Israel’s Punitive House Demolitions Since 2000, Human Rights in Israel, Peace Index, Syria, Dan Halutz, Excessive Media Ownership and Its Potential Threats to Democracy, Research and Lecture Tour to Holland and Belgium, Interview to Volkskrant, International Raoul Wallenberg Foundation's Campaign, Israel Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 1 (January 2005), Books, Photos

Dear friends and colleagues,

Comment on Prince Harry

SBK from Washington commented on Prince Harry:

No one has pointed out that, added to his evident ignorance and immaturity, the British press has implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, compared Israeli actions in the territories to that of the Nazis.  Same among leftist politicians, and polls showed (at least before this incident) that a sizable portion of the British population (40% or so) do equate Israel with Nazi Germany.  So why should he have any more reverance for Nazi symbolism that the British press, parliament and citizenry ??  Like any adolescent of average intelligence, Harry can presumably sense hypocrisy a mile away.  Perhaps he's learned enough to know that the swastika is a symbolic toy and weapon, to be used for whatever purposes -- demonizing opponents, or amusing friends -- may be convenient.

Israel’s Punitive House Demolitions Since 2000

B’Tselem, the Israeli Human Rights organization, has issued its report on this issue. Its principle findings are:

· Since the beginning of the al-Aqsa intifada, the IDF has demolished 628 housing units, which were home to 3,983 persons.

· These homes were demolished because of the acts of 333 Palestinians. On average, 12 innocent people lost their home for every person suspected of participation in attacks against Israelis.

· Almost half of the homes demolished (295, or 47 percent) were never home to anyone suspected of involvement in attacks against Israelis. As a result of these demolitions, 1,286 persons lost their homes even though according to Israeli officials they should not have been punished.

· Contrary to its argument before the High Court of Justice that prior warning is given except in extraordinary cases, B’Tselem’s figures indicate that in only three percent of the cases were occupants given prior notification of the IDF’s intention to demolish their home.

· Extensive destruction of property in occupied territories, without military necessity, constitutes a war crime.

Three Different Kinds of House Demolitions

Over the last four years, Israel has demolished some 4,100 Palestinian homes in the Occupied Territories. About sixty percent of the demolitions were carried out in the framework of what Israel calls “clearing operations.” Some twenty-five percent were destroyed because Israel claims they were built without permit. The remaining fifteen percent were demolished as a means to punish the families and neighbors of Palestinians suspected of involvement in carrying out attacks against Israelis. These punitive demolitions are the focus of this report.

Punitive Demolitions Over the Years

Israel has demolished Palestinian houses as a punitive measure since the beginning of the occupation in 1967. The extent of such demolitions has varied over the years:

· From 1967 to the outbreak of the first intifada, in December 1987, Israel demolished or sealed at least 1,387 housing units, most in the first few years following occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

· Following the outbreak of the first intifada, Israel dramatically increased its use of house demolitions as a punishment. From 1988-1992, Israel completely demolished 431 housing units and partially demolished fifty-nine.

· From 1993 to 1997, Israel completely demolished eighteen housing units and partially demolished three units.

· From 1998 to October 2001, Israel did not demolish or seal any houses as punishment.

· In the course of the al-Aqsa intifada, Israel renewed with increased vigor its use of punitive house demolitions. As part of this policy, Israel demolished 628 homes from October 2001 to 20 September 2004. The official decision to renew the policy of punitive demolitions was made at a meeting of the Political-Security Cabinet on 31 July 2002, about nine months after the policy began in practice. This report analyzes Israel’s policy during this period.

Punishing the Innocent as Official Policy

The declared purpose of the punitive house demolitions is to deter potential attackers, by harming the relatives of Palestinians suspected of attacks against Israelis. Testimonies given to B’Tselem indicate that security forces occasionally use the threat of demolition to convince relatives of wanted persons to cooperate and turn over their relatives. Israel’s policy has left 3,983 Palestinians homeless since the beginning of the current intifada.

This measure does not directly harm the suspects themselves, who at the time of the demolition are not living in the house. According to B’Tselem’s statistics, thirty-two percent of the suspected offenders were in detention at the time of demolition, twenty-one percent were “wanted,” and forty-seven percent were dead. In addition, in many instances the IDF also destroyed houses adjacent to the house that was the target for demolition. These cases involved both apartments in the same building as the suspect’s apartment, and adjacent buildings. B’Tselem’s research indicates that in some cases the IDF explicitly intended to destroy the nearby houses. Yet, even if the IDF did not intend to damage nearby houses, the fact that there have been many such cases makes the lack of intention irrelevant. Since the beginning of the al-Aqsa intifada, the IDF demolished 295 such adjacent homes (about one-half of all homes demolished), in which 1,286 persons lived. However, statements made by the IDF Spokesperson’s Office following demolitions always mention one house, that in which the relevant individual lived, as the residence that was demolished.

Reason for Demolition: Not Just Suicide Bombings

The text of the decision made by the Political-Security Cabinet and reports in the media give the impression that Israel’s policy is directed only against Palestinians who were directly involved in attacks that caused many Israeli casualties. Yet in practice, Israel demolishes houses in response to involvement in any attempted violent act against Israelis, regardless of the results: from suicide bombings that leave many casualties to “failed” attacks against soldiers. Furthermore, the demolitions are aimed not only at the perpetrators, but also against the homes of individuals with any level of involvement in such attacks, either in the planning, the dispatching of the persons who carried out the attacks, or by providing assistance of some kind. According to B’Tselem’s figures, sixty-six percent of the demolitions were directed at the families of suspects who carried out attacks, while the remaining thirty-four percent were directed at those involved in other ways. In forty percent of the Palestinian attacks because of which the suspects’ homes were destroyed, no Israeli was killed.

No Prior Warning

Contrary to prior practice, since the policy was renewed in 2001, the IDF has generally not issued a demolition order, and has not given prior warning to the occupants before demolishing their home. The IDF gave prior warning in only seventeen cases, representing three percent of the total. Most of the demolitions take place at night, and the occupants are given only a few minutes to remove their possessions from the house.

Causing Severe Physical and Mental Harm

Testimonies given to B’Tselem indicate that the harm suffered by families affects almost all aspects of life: disruption of the family unit, as some families are forced to split up and live separately; sharp decline in the standard of living, as a result of the loss of property, even after the family finds substitute housing; and feelings of dependence and instability as a result of the loss of their home, which is more than just a place to provide shelter. Research on the psychological effects indicates that house demolitions have a substantial post-traumatic effect, primarily on children.

Violation of the Right to Housing

The right to adequate housing is well enshrined in international law. The right to housing is important because it is a prerequisite for the exercise of other rights, among them the right to an adequate standard of living, the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, and the right to family life. The right to housing is a vital component of the protection of the rights of children, who are entitled to special protection in international law. As the force in control in the Occupied Territories, Israel is required to respect the Palestinians’ right to housing.

Collective Punishment

Israel’s policy not only infringes the right to housing, it also breaches one of the most fundamental principles of justice: the prohibition on punishing a person for acts committed by another. The prohibition of collective punishment is especially stringent when the victims are children. The Fourth Geneva absolutely prohibits collective punishment without exception.

The Hague Regulations, on the other hand, recognize a narrow exception to this prohibition. The exception applies when occupants of the house intended for demolition knew or could foresee the act for which the army intends to demolish the house, and had the opportunity to prevent it. Despite this, state officials have often declared that prior knowledge or responsibility is not a precondition for the legality of the demolition. In the few cases in which the High Court addressed the question of indirect responsibility of family members for failing to prevent an attack, the justices relied on baseless assumptions to determine that the relatives knew about the attack during the planning stage. This approach is completely inconsistent with the High Court’s handling of the identical offense known in Israeli law as “failure to prevent a felony,” which calls for an extremely heavy burden of proof, in which the prosecution must prove that the defendant had positive, concrete, immediate, and significant information that a felony was about to occur.

Israel further argues that house demolitions are not punishment, but rather a means of deterrence. Therefore, the state contends, the act does not comprise collective punishment and thus does not violate international humanitarian law. The High Court accepted the state’s argument by making an analogy between house demolition and incarceration of the head of a family, which also harms the family. However, the comparison is flawed. The purpose of imprisonment is to deny certain rights to the offender. The suffering of his family is only a by-product which is not necessary to achieve the objective of the imprisonment.

Denying the Right to Due Process

Finally, demolition of houses is an administrative procedure based solely on suspicion, in which the occupants are denied the right to due process of law. Since the policy was renewed in 2001, Israeli has further denied due process by denying victims of the policy the fundamental right to plead their case to the authorities before the demolition is carried out. Israel justifies its failure to give prior warning on the grounds that the warning is “liable to endanger our forces, and cause the action to fail, because warning will enable the enemy to booby-trap the houses scheduled to be demolished, ambush our troops taking part in the action, and the like.” This justification is baseless. At least as far as the West Bank is concerned, the IDF has effective control throughout the area, and is constantly present in almost all the cities, villages, and refugee camps. Also, making demolitions an openly declared policy enables some families to anticipate the demolition of their home. Following recent suicide attacks, the Israeli media reported that the IDF intended to demolish the houses of the persons who carried out the attacks. Thus, the state can no longer justify denial of the right to be heard on the need to preserve the element of surprise.

In perfect timing, after the publication of this report the Ministry of Defence announced earlier this week that it no longer supports demolition of houses as a punitive measure, arguing that it does not really serve as deterrence and only increases hostility and hatred by Palestinian families who were affected by this draconic measure. Prudence does prevail. Sometimes it hesitates, sometimes it takes time, more than necessary.

Human Rights in Israel:

An Overview with Special Reference to Administrative Detention

Just published a short piece of mine: News and Journal 2004, The 21^st Century Trust, London. I am thankful to the Trust (Paul and John) for permission to publish it in this forum.

Introduction

Israel is a young democracy under constant stress. It is situated within a hostile environment. Since its establishment in 1948 it experienced six wars (the 1948 Independence War; the 1956 Suez War; the 1967 Six Day War; the 1969-1970 War of Attrition; the 1973 Yom Kippur War; the 1982 Lebanon War), a Palestinian uprising (Intifada) that lasted six years (1987-1993), and since September 2000 it has been under constant terror attacks. Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. Israel has been facing terrorism since its inception but the last four years have been particularly harsh. In such a strenuous and abnormal reality respect for human and civic rights is held secondary to security considerations.

Israel is a land of immigrants. The Law of Return, passed on 5 July 1950, gives the Zionist doctrine its most forceful legal expression. It accords every Jew who decides to make aliya (immigrate) and to settle in Israel an automatic citizenship. Effectively, the Law of Return is a nationality law, granting only Jews nationality status in the state of Israel. There are still schisms between different immigrant groups as well as between these groups and people who were born in Israel. Generally speaking, three groups of people are being discerned in the Jewish population in Israel: Sephardim whose origins lie in Asia and Africa; Ashkenazim whose origins lie in Europe and America; and Sabras, native born Israelis. The large Sephardi sector holds justified grievances against the Ashkenazi elite, speaking of systematic discrimination and violation of basic civic rights during the formative years of the state and arguing that some residuals of this discriminatory attitude continued to linger for decades, some say until today.[1]

In this short piece I chose to reflect on the status of Arab-Palestinian citizens in Israel, on some of the problems that the Jewish character of the State present, especially to women, and then on the occupation, specifically on the administrative detention mechanism employed in the occupied territories and sporadically also in Israel.

Israeli-Palestinians

Twenty percent of Israel's population consists of Palestinian-Arabs who do not share the raison d'etre of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. They often claim, quite rightly, that they are being discriminated against and do not enjoy the same rights as Jews. The Orr Inquiry Report about the circumstances leading to the killing of 13 Arab citizens by the Israeli security forces in October 2000, issued in September 2003, sheds light on this continued discrimination in all spheres of life. Formally all Israeli citizens are equal before the law, regardless of national affiliation, religious beliefs, and political stands. I say 'formally' because in this connection an important distinction has to be made between formal citizenship and full citizenship. Israeli Jews can be said to enjoy full citizenship: they enjoy equal respect as individuals, and they are entitled to equal treatment by law and in its administration. The situation is different with regard to the Israeli-Palestinians, the Bedouin and the Druze. Although they are formally considered to enjoy liberties equally with the Jewish community, in practice they do not share and enjoy the same rights and burdens.[2] For example, Israeli-Palestinians pay more income tax than Jews since they do not enjoy discounts given to those who serve in the army. Arabs will find it more difficult than Jews to receive licences for extending their flats, or for building new ones. They also find it difficult to buy, or even to rent a flat in a Jewish neighbourhood. Furthermore, budgets of Arab municipalities stand in no comparison to those of Jewish municipalities. There are not enough classes in Arab towns and villages. Arabs who graduate find it difficult to get a job in government offices. In addition, being a Palestinian-Arab in many cases 'guarantees' that a worker's salary would be lower than that of a Jew who is doing the same work. The Oslo peace process, which started in September 1993, has reinforced the status of the Palestinians in Israel as a “double periphery”: being placed at one and the same time at the margins of Israeli society and at the margins of Palestinian National Movement.[3]

State and Religion

Further twenty percent of the population are orthodox and ultra-orthodox who will be happy to transform Israel into theocracy. They also complain about prolonged discrimination and denial of basic civic rights, although in recent years there are also complaints from the secular majority about reverse discrimination that bluntly favours the religious minority. In Israel there is no division between state and religion. The concept of a Jewish state has been imbued with religious values, and gender equality rights clash with religious norms. Jewish women are subject to male pre-dominance under Jewish Law, the halakha. Women in Jewish (and also Moslem and some Christian denominations) are subject to discrimination in property and inheritance laws. At present, some religious practices are offensive to the sensibilities of women, and involve coercion, which conflicts with the liberal elements of democracy that vouchsafes the rights of individuals. One of these is the right to follow one’s conscience and to practice one's beliefs as one sees fit, as long as this practice does not entail harm to others.

There is no civil marriage in Israel and persons must be married according to the law of their religious communities. Divorce is also regulated by such law and generally speaking constitutes the jurisdiction of the religious courts. Requiring all who wish to marry to do so by religious law is a serious incursion on the fundamental right to marry. Furthermore, there is a large population of people in Israel who cannot marry at all under Israeli law, either because they belong to different religious communities or to non-recognized religious communities, or because they are not allowed to marry under the law of their community. These incursions on the right to marry are compounded by the fact that both Jewish and Muslim law discriminate between men and women, in the laws of marriage and divorce themselves, as well as in the laws of evidence. Women cannot be judges in the courts in which they comprise half the parties to the disputes.[4]

The system of marriage and divorce is not the only sphere in which religion has an effect on individual rights. Sabbath observance laws, which may potentially impose unacceptable limitations on such rights, have in practice been relaxed in recent years. Their existence and level of enforcement now vary from town to town. Thus, in many towns cinemas and other places of entertainment are open on the Sabbath and some shopping centers operate too. However, in most towns, and in interurban routes, public transport does not operate on the sabbath, a restriction that obviously has an inordinate impact on the poorer sections of the population who do not have their own cars, and curtails exercise of their right to freedom of movement.[5]

Democracy is supposed to allow each and every individual the opportunity to follow her or his conception of the good without coercion. Israel today gives precedence to Judaism over liberalism. I submit that on issues such as this one, the reverse should be the case.[6]

Occupation

In addition, there are noticeable tensions between left and right: while people associated with the left concede of the necessity to make grave territorial concessions and end the occupation, the people who associate themselves with the right wish to retain the settlements and maintain control over "Greater Israel", i.e., Israel including the territories that were occupied during the Six Day War. Certainly occupation qua occupation is inconsistent with a human rights regime. Ending the occupation and the establishment of a viable Palestinian state alongside Israel is the key for promoting basic human rights in Israel.

In this short survey it will be impossible to cover all aspects of negation of human rights in the occupied territories. They are numerous. The reader is advised to consult the reports of B'tselem and other human rights organizations that monitor human rights in the occupied territories.[7] The remainder of the article addresses one concern: administrative detention, a procedure that is frequent in the territories and infrequent inside the Green Line. This procedure enables the State to detain a person without trial for six months and, if needed, to prolong the denial of freedom further because of "state security considerations". Since the outbreak of the 1987 Palestinian Intifada in December 1987 until today Israel has detained thousands of people. In 2003, 1007 Palestinians were detained. As of 1 August 2004, the Israel Defence Force (IDF) has detained 731 Palestinians.[8] Some detainees remained in jail for years.[9]

Administrative detention

Administrative detention is widely used in many countries. According to the International Commission of Jurists, at least 85 countries have legislation permitting this practice.[10] Israel made use of administrative detention from its first days as an independent state. This measure has been used both in the occupied territories and in Israel within its Green Line borders. While the military govern and adjudicate the detention procedures in the territories, the civilian executive and judicial authorities govern these procedures inside the Green Line and in East Jerusalem, which was officially annexed to Israel.

The power to implement administrative detention was created at the time of the British Mandate by the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945.[11] When Israel declared its independence in 1948, a state of emergency was announced and the Defence Regulations became part of Israeli law. After the Six Day War, military orders were issued that enabled the use of Defence Regulations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. From the first year of occupation, Israel resorted to administrative detention as a security measure against the Palestinian population and, on occasion, against Jews involved in espionage and similar activities believed to endanger state security. In 1979 and 1980, it was decided to change the existing procedures relating to administrative detention in the Green Line borders and subsequently in the occupied territories. First, the Defence Regulations were replaced with an Israeli law through the enactment of The Emergency Powers (Detention) Law, 5739-1979.[12] Section 2 of this law provides: ‘Where the Minister of Defence has reasonable cause to believe that reasons of state security or public security require that a particular person be detained, he may, by order under his hand, direct that such person be detained for a period, not exceeding six months, stated in the order’.[13] Israeli courts rely heavily on the statements of the Defence Minister who is not obliged to produce substantial evidence, as is required in an ordinary court of law, to justify the detention.

The issue of administrative detention should be viewed, especially in the occupied territories, within the general framework of security considerations that justify the demolition of houses, deportations, controversial instructions for the opening of fire, methods of interrogation that some may regard as torture, closure of newspapers, and the like.[14] Israel does not hesitate to endorse illiberal methods when it comes to defending its security. Those illiberal patterns of ‘militant Zionism’ are being advocated, legalised, implemented, and justified by the legislature, the government, and the court of justice.[15]

Administrative detention is one of the most anti-democratic procedures that exist in Israel. It has severe consequences for the persons concerned, and it contravenes some of the most important documents in international law. Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights postulates: ‘No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile’. And Article 9(1) of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights reiterates that ‘Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention’. The right to due process of law grossly infringed by resorting to administrative detentions is protected in Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[16]

The reader should not infer from this discussion that democracies should stand idle in the face of grave threats to their security and/or their very existence. Democracies have every right to defend themselves against such threats. I object only to the implementation of what I conceive as an unjust procedure that denies basic rights and liberties and infringes on due process of law at times other than those of real emergency. Obviously, security considerations necessitate taking some restrictive measures such as questioning, detention for 48 hours, house arrest, and the initiation of criminal proceedings, but they do not justify brute denial of rights in the form of administrative detention. This act should not be considered as just another preventive measure to be selected from the arsenal of preventive measures. During normal times, it should not be contemplated at all. It should not be a substitute for criminal proceedings. The courts hold that administrative detention is justified as a last resort, but I have serious doubts as to whether this is, indeed, the case.[17]

Administrative detention is manifestly unjust. It is contrary to the democratic spirit and to liberal reason that proscribes arbitrary arrests. This procedure is the kind of instrument despots use to suppress opposition. In contrast, democracies require that all legal procedures be exhausted before putting individuals behind bars. In a court of law, the prosecution must prove that criminal offences have been committed that justify penalties. Defendants have the right to be represented by lawyers, to summon witnesses and to cross-examine them. The administrative detention procedure omits these rights and, therefore, is contrary to the notion of justice. My contention is simple: if the detainees have committed criminal offences (sedition, incitement, violent or terrorist acts, etc.), they should stand trial, and it is for the prosecution to show why they should be kept out of society. Let the prosecution prosecute, the defendants defend themselves, and the court of justice mete out justice in accordance with material evidence. And if there is not sufficient evidence to prosecute, or if the prosecution is unable to produce relevant material, the defendants should retain their freedom. No procedure should exist to override the administration of justice.[18]

Conclusion

Israel is saturated with schisms. Those schisms challenge the foundations of liberal democracy (liberty, equality, tolerance, justice) and the ability to maintain human rights.

After the Holocaust, the goal was to found a safe haven for Jews all over the world so as to avoid the possibility of another horrific experience of that nature. Indeed, the United Nations acknowledged the need of establishing a Jewish state. This creation, however, based on a Jewish conception of the good, discriminates against the Israeli Arabs. Israel acknowledges the problems involved in the introduction of this perfectionist element in its framework of ruling. To assure an equal status for the Arab minority, the Declaration of Independence holds that Israel will foster the development of the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants; that it will be based on the foundations of liberty, justice and peace; that it will uphold complete equality of social and political rights to all of its citizens irrespective of religion, race or sex, and that it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture. It is time to translate these words into deeds and to strive to achieve real equality between Arabs and Jews, and to secure civic and human rights for all.

Israel, being the only Jewish state in the world, should endeavor to retain its Jewish character. The symbols should remain Jewish with some accommodations in order to make the state a home for its Palestinian citizens as well. Shabbat should remain the official day of rest. Palestinian villages and towns may make Friday their day of rest. Hopefully, one day, when security considerations would become less dominant and pressing, and the Israeli economy could afford two days of rest, as is the case in many parts of the world, then Friday and Shabbat will become the two official days of rest.

The preservation of the Jewish character of the state should not entail coercion of the predominant secular circles of Israel. The guiding principle should be Live and Let Live. We need to differentiate between the symbolic aspects and the modus operandi aspects. As far as the latter are concerned, separation between state and religion should be achieved. People are born free and wish to continue their lives as free citizens in their homeland. Coercion is foreign to our natural sentiments and desires to lead our lives free as possible from alien restraints and impediments. Hence, while Shabbat should be observed, malls and shopping places outside the cities should be available for the many people who work during the week and do their shopping during weekends.

Public transportation should be made available for all people who cannot afford having a car and for those who do not drive. The state should cater for the needs of as many citizens as possible. Kosher shops and restaurants should be available and with them non-Kosher shops and restaurants for the secular, agnostic population.

Most importantly, the significant events in one's life: birth, wedding, divorce and death should be handled in accordance of the people's own choices. If they so desire, people may involve rabbinate and other religious institutions in their private lives. But this option should be left to them. If people wish to have secular ceremonies then they should have the ability to conduct them and not to be forced to undergo practices which mean very little to them, if anything. The state should have as little as possible say in family, intimate affairs.[19]

Israel should end the occupation, the sooner the better. The state of occupation harms primarily the Palestinians but it also damages the civic foundations of democracy. Decision makers thought that it is possible to maintain the duality of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde: being an occupier outside the Green Line, and a citizen inside the Green Line. However, norms of the occupation infiltrate inside Israel and damage the democratic foundations of the State. The Gaza First Plan is a possible route to follow as -- indeed -- the first step in a calculated process designed to evacuate the territories and shifting responsibility to the Palestinian Authority.[20]

As for administrative detention, this measure should be regarded anti-humanitarian and be objected to in the same way we protest against torture, collective punishment, harming children, deportation, and forced transfer of the population. While recognising that security considerations are of paramount importance, and that without security a democratic state would not exist, there is still a limit to what we can do in the name of democracy. As Justice Aharon Barak contended in the Schnitzer case, our strength lies in our moral power and in our adherence to the principles of democracy, especially when we are encompassed by such dangers.[21]

Security is not an end in itself, but a means. We must secure a democratic system, an administration of the people, for the people, by the people, that guarantees individual freedoms and fundamental human rights.

Peace Index

Prof. Ephraim Yaar and Prof. Tamar Hermann published the Peace Index of January 2005. In recent months they found cautious optimism among the Israeli Jewish public about the chances of calming the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, and at present it has grown. Along with overwhelming support for conducting political negotiations with the Palestinian side, along with greater belief that such negotiations could lead to peace in the coming years, the majority also thinks new Palestinian leader Abu Mazen is making sincere efforts to end the terror and has the ability to end or at least reduce it substantially.

In the domestic sphere, despite enhanced fears that the resistance to the disengagement plan could lead to a civil war, and the widespread view that the plan’s opponents have been “marketing” their message more successfully than its supporters and also are prepared to invest more effort in promoting the policy they favor, support for the plan among most of the Jewish public remains stable, with a clear majority also believing the government will eventually be able to implement it. The majority favors taking various measures to make the domestic process easier, including increasing the financial compensation to the evacuated settlers, preventing the transfer to the Palestinians of their homes and infrastructures without suitable compensation, allowing soldiers who oppose the evacuation not to take part in it, and closing the zones of the evacuation to the media. In addition, the Jewish public supports—by a rate of two to one—holding a referendum on the plan and stepped-up civic activity by its supporters.

Seventy-seven percent of the Jewish public currently support or strongly support holding peace negotiations with the Palestinian Authority, and 51% believe strongly or moderately that this will lead to Israeli-Palestinian peace in the coming years (in the Arab sector the optimism is high indeed: 94.5% favor negotiations and 78% believe in their chances of bearing fruit in the coming years).

The broad support for the disengagement plan—59%—remains unchanged, and a segmentation of the rates of support and opposition by voting for the large parties also indicates great stability. However, the Jewish public is split regarding the danger that implementing the plan will ignite a civil war—49% see the danger as very high or high (in September this rate was 40%), 46% as low or very low (interestingly, an overwhelming majority—67%—of the Arab public sees little such danger). Some 56.5% think the disengagement opponents are currently “marketing” their message to the Israeli public more effectively than the supporters, and just about the same total say the opponents—more than the supporters—are prepared to invest effort in advancing the policy they favor. It is not surprising, then, that about 60% of the public—similar to the rate of supporters—see it is desirable that the disengagement supporters express their position more effectively via petitions, demonstrations, and the like. However, despite the assessment of the marketing success and determination of the disengagement opponents, a very large majority—74%—expect the government will ultimately succeed in implementing the plan and evacuating the settlements. This is higher than the public’s evaluation of the plan’s chances of success in December (63%). A cross-section of expectations on this issue with positions on disengagement shows, as expected, that among the plan’s supporters there is unanimity (91%) that the government will be able to carry it out. Interestingly, though, among the opponents as well a majority, albeit not large (52%-41%), holds this view.

Seventy percent support increased compensations to the settlers, 68% favor ensuring that their homes and infrastructures are not transferred to the Palestinians without suitable compensation, 53% believe soldiers who oppose the evacuation should be allowed not to take part in it, and the same rate supports closing the zones of the evacuation to the media. Furthermore, despite the prime minister’s opposition to a referendum on the disengagement plan, most of the Jewish public, at a similar rate to support for the plan (61%), favors a referendum. Indeed, a segmentation of support rates for a referendum by position on the disengagement plan shows that even among the supporters a majority, albeit small (52%-45%), wants one to be held. As expected, the rate of those favoring this is higher among opponents of the plan (79%).

Syria

President Bush declared on January 17 that Syria was "out of step" with democratic trends in the Middle East and that the Syrian government needed to cut off support for Iraqi insurgents and stop interfering in Lebanon to avoid becoming further isolated internationally.

The Bush administration announced the recall of the ambassador, Margaret Scobey, to express American displeasure after the assassination on Monday of Rafik Hariri, a former Lebanese prime minister who was a close ally of the United States and France and also a critic of Syria's involvement in Lebanon.

Frankly, I would not be surprised if Syria was not behind the assassination and if the investigation will reveal that one of the factions who wish the Syrians out of the country committed the murder, knowing that Syria will be the prime suspect. Syria has an interest to calm down the situation at time when the American lion lies at its gate. They would have committed the assassination only if felt that Hariri became too successful in his anti-Syrian activities. I do not have sufficient knowledge about his range of activities and the extent of his success in the Lebanese internal politics. I presume the clouds will clear soon.

Dan Halutz

Maj. Gen. Dan Halutz was named on February 22 by Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz as the next chief of staff, the first ever air force general to reach this position. Halutz, 57, will be the 18th chief of staff. Ariel Sharon was a full partner in the decision to appoint Halutz, who is known to be one of the prime minister's favorite officers.

Halutz is the controversial officer who authorized the "targeted assassination" of Hamas leader Salah Shehadeh by a one-tone bomb dropped by an Air Force bomber on Shehadeh's Gaza home. As a result, 15 civilians, including 11 children, were killed. Quite a collateral way to conduct targeted assassination. Asked how he felt about the death, Halutz said that he "sleeps very well at night." He added that the only thing he felt was "a slight jolt to the airplane - it was gone within a second." Now that this great humanitarian is heading the military pyramid I will not sleep well at night.

Excessive Media Ownership and Its Potential Threats to Democracy

As some of you may know, for the past few years I have conducted research on this issue. The study, which analyses the situation in Canada, Israel and Germany, was just published. The reference is "Excessive Media Ownership and Its Potential Threats to Democracy: A Comparative Analysis", by Raphael Cohen-Almagor with Stefan Seiterle, Annual Rev. of Law and Ethics, Vol. 12 (2004), pp. 437-463. Abstract infra. Those interested are welcome to ask for a copy.

Abstract

The aim of this essay is to examine the issue of media ownership in Canada and Israel, and to reflect on the situation in Germany. In Canada and Israel there is the dual problem of excessive ownership of the media by a small number of people who control the print press and the electronic press. I shall first review the press industry in each country and then reflect on the broadcasting industry. It is argued that the situation of both the Canadian and Israeli markets is alarming because in both societies single individuals have accumulated far too much power. Excessive media ownership threatens diversity of opinions and free journalism and it provides avenues for partisan, partial interests. Germany should learn from the experiences of both countries. Democratic governments should invest efforts to diffuse the power among players with different interests and worldviews.

Research and Lecture Tour to Holland and Belgium

During the first historic meeting between Abu Mazan and Ariel Sharon after the former was elected to succeed Arafat, a meeting that certainly provides fresh and positive wind to our troubled region, I was in Holland and Belgium. I conducted research on euthanasia in the only two countries in the world that legalized euthanasia, research that updates my last book, Euthanasia in the Nethelrands. As ever, a fascinating experience that provides a lot to think and learn about. I need to find the time to sit and analyze the vast material that I have gathered.

I also gave a few lectures on the relationships between media and terror, global terrorism, political extremsism and incitement, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; was interviewed to the written press (one piece infra), and gave a brieifing at the Belgian parliament to some MPs about the heated atmosphere in Israel nowadays. I emphasized that Europe, and also the USA, may have a positive role to play in seeing that the property Israel intends to leave behind will not be demolished and will be transferred to the Palestinan Authority untouched. Both Europe and the USA have the ability to compensate Israel for the lost property. Secondly, I reiterated that Israel will not be able to tolerate the launching of Kassam missiles, and that the onus is on Abu Mazan to halt his extremists. Furthermore, Israel cannot live with the threat of Iranian WMDs and reserves the right to self-defence, including preemtive attacks on such sites in Iran. I expect Bush to increase his involvement in the ME in general, and in Israel-Palestine in particular but said I will be surprised if he will take upon himself to convene a Camp David summit, as Carter and Clinton did. Somehow, Bush does not strike me as a person with an eye on small details, and he lacks the commitment that the two humanitarian presidents had. But, who knows, maybe Bush will surprise me.

I wish to thank my kind hosts that made my visit memorable: Martine Bouman, Eldad Hayet, Sigrid Sterckx, Cas Mudde, Laurent Reichman, Pierre-François Laterre, and Simon Petermann.

Interview to Volkskrant

Mohammed B. is lang geen Osama bin Laden

The Volkskrant

10 February 2005

Interview

Raphael Cohen-Almagor maakt onderscheid tussen lokale terroristen en internationale terreurnetwerken

‘Een aanslag plegen

in Amsterdam zou

een vergissing zijn'

Hoe ver kan een democratie gaan in de strijd tegen het terrorisme zonder op te houden een democratie te zijn? Een Israëlische politicoloog is op zoek naar het antwoord.

Van onze verslaggever

Henk Müller

AMSTERDAM

Europa is vergeven van de terreurnetwerken. Gestaag werken die aan hun groei en hun infrastructuur. Terrorisme staat of valt met de beschikbare infrastructuur en die is volop aanwezig, constateert prof. Raphael Cohen-Almagor.

De Midden-Oosten- en terrorisme-expert van de Universiteit van Haifa in Israël is ervan overtuigd dat Al Qa'ida hard werkt aan een nieuwe grootschalige aanval. Bijvoorbeeld op Londen. ‘Amsterdam aanvallen zou een vergissing zijn in de ogen van Bin Laden. Nederland heeft de infrastructuur voor een grote aanval en is misschien een gemakkelijk doelwit, maar dat zoekt hij niet. Bin Laden wil een belangrijk, symbolisch doelwit. Al Qa'ida kent de geopolitieke verhoudingen.'

Cohen-Almagor heeft in Nederland niet alleen enkele lezingen over terrorisme gegeven, maar ook onderzoek gedaan naar euthanasie. ‘Ik concentreer me in mijn werk op ethiek en ethische grenzen', legt hij uit. ‘Grenzen als die tussen liberalisme en multiculturaliteit, tussen terrorisme en hoe een democratie daarmee omgaat, en de vragen van leven en dood: de holocaust en euthanasie.'

In Israël en de Verenigde Staten doceert Cohen-Almagor de recente geschiedenis van het Midden-Oosten, die deze week een nieuwe fase lijkt te zijn ingegaan met het sluiten van een wapenstilstand.

‘Voetje voor voetje lopen premier Sharon en de Palestijnse leider Abbas door troebel water. Sharon, een zeer voorzichtig man, wil als eerste stap de Israëlische troepen terugtrekken uit Gaza, zien hoe dat uitpakt en wat de Palestijnen gaan doen. Abbas, die nog maar net aan de macht is, probeert de Palestijnse ‘‘legers'' van Hamas en de Islamitische Jihad op één lijn te krijgen om in Gaza zijn gezag te kunnen opbouwen. Hamas en de Jihad willen eerst wel eens zien wat voor vlees ze met Abbas in de kuip hebben. Daarom houden ze zich rustig.'

Cohen-Almagor maakt onderscheid tussen ‘terrorisme op lokaal niveau' in Israël en Europa en wereldwijde netwerken als Al Qa'ida. De moord op Van Gogh is volgens hem gepleegd door lokale terroristen, die niet bij Al Qa'ida horen. ‘Maar je moet oppassen dat je die lokale terreurgroepen geen extra munitie verschaft, en zorgvuldig afwegen waar en wanneer de staat moet ingrijpen. Dat hoeft niet bij alles wat onliberaal is, maar wel als er sprake is van geweld. Wederzijds respect en een ander niet schaden, dat is de basisregel.'

Om te zien waar de grenzen liggen, bestudeerde hij vrouwenbesnijdenis en de rechten van moslimvrouwen. ‘Wat zijn de consequenties van ingrijpen? Stel dat moslimvrouwen binnenshuis moeten blijven. Moet de staat ze dan dwingen de deur uit te gaan? Nee. Als een moslim een vrouw geen hand wil geven, wat dan nog? Maar de staat moet wel ingrijpen als er sprake is van geweld.

‘Of eerwraak terrorisme is? Nee, terrorisme is angst zaaien door willekeur. Eerwraak is geen willekeur. Vrouwenbesnijdenis van Somalische vrouwen bijvoorbeeld is systematisch geweld, daarom moet de staat ingrijpen. Maar vrouwenbesnijdenis onder de bedoeïenen in Israël bleek vooral symbolisch. Niet ingrijpen dus.'

Het gevaar komt niet van lokale terroristen, onderstreept Cohen-Almagor, die Al Qa'ida en Bin Laden ziet ‘als een soort land' dat het verdient harder te worden aangevallen dan Irak. ‘In mijn ogen is dat de belangrijkste prioriteit. De kop van de cobra moet eraf.'

Irak is volgens hem sinds de val van Saddam Hussein geen kweekvijver voor terroristen, zoals Afghanistan destijds. ‘Er is terrorisme, maar de aanwezigheid van de Amerikaanse leeuw voor de poorten van Damascus en Teheran heeft al met al tot minder terrorisme geleid.'

Toen Bush aankondigde het terrorisme wereldwijd te willen aanpakken, vroeg de Israëlische expert zich af of de Amerikaanse president wel wist wat hij zei. ‘Bush is geen Carter of Clinton, die zich intensief met het Midden-Oostenconflict hebben bemoeid. Het zou me verbazen als hij bijvoorbeeld een Camp David-top bijeenroept. Bush is er niet zo persoonlijk bij betrokken. Maar wel bij de bestrijding van terrorisme. Hij wil de geschiedenis ingaan als de man die een einde heeft gemaakt aan het terrorisme.'

Cohen-Almagor is ervan overtuigd dat het Bush menens is als deze zegt het Midden-Oosten te willen democratiseren. ‘Irak was vanaf 11/9 kandidaat nummer één. Het klinkt cynisch, maar het aantal Amerikaanse body bags is niet zo groot dat de regering van mening verandert. Washington moet doorgaan met zijn pogingen van Irak een democratie te maken. Of dat lukt? Ik probeer optimistisch te zijn. Voor hetzelfde geld valt Irak uit elkaar'.

Maar tussen wens en werkelijkheid zit nog wel wat ruimte. Democratisering van de rest van het Midden-Oosten blijft vooralsnog beperkt tot veel geld voor instituten die rapporten schrijven over democratisering in het Midden-Oosten, constateert de Israëlische professor.

‘De regeringen in Egypte, Saudi-Arabië en de Golfstaten blijven zitten, het zijn bondgenoten, ze staan aan de Amerikaanse kant. Kadhafi heeft zijn lesje geleerd, Al-Assad van Syrië weet dat hij de VS nodig heeft om te overleven en Jemen houdt zich koest. Dan houd je alleen Iran over'.

Cohen-Almagor denkt niet dat de VS Iran zullen aanvallen. ‘Dat kunnen zelfs de VS niet aan, twee landen tegelijk aanvallen. Irak is kinderspel vergeleken met Iran. Maar naar Israëlische inschatting kan Teheran over een jaar een atoomwapen hebben. Dat zal Jeruzalem nooit toestaan en als Iran niet alsnog voldoet aan de eisen van het Internationaal Atoomagentschap zal Israël ingrijpen. Al dan niet met expliciete toestemming van Washington. Dat is een van de weinige zekerheden die ik heb inzake het Midden-Oosten'.

International Raoul Wallenberg Foundation's 100,000 Names for 100,000 Lives Campaign

I was asked to post the following. I signed and would appreciate your consideration.

January 17th 2005 marks the 60th anniversary of the disappearance of Raoul Wallenberg, who saved 100,000 lives in Nazi-occupied Hungary during WWII. On January 1945 Wallenberg was captured by the Soviet Army. Since then, his fate remains unknown.

Join the International Raoul Wallenberg Foundation's 100,000 Names for 100,000 Lives Campaign to clear up the final destiny of the Swedish diplomat. It is a great opportunity to repair 60 years of silence, unanswered questions and injustice with the steadfast support of us all.

So please, sign your name and spread the word, invite your family and friends to do the same. Help us reach the goal of at least 100,000 names for the 100,000 lives saved by this "Hero without a Grave". If you prefer so, you can also forward this email to your contacts.

All the collected signatures will be presented to the Secretary General of the United Nations to urge the solution of one of the most controversial cases in history of humankind.

Congressman Tom Lantos and his wife Annette, who were saved by Wallenberg were the first to sign.

Sign your name!

http://www.raoulwallenberg.net/?en/news/2018.htm

The International Raoul Wallenberg Foundation www.raoulwallenberg.net irwf@irwf.org

Israel Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 1 (January 2005)

I am the editor of special issue of this journal that appears in London. For each topic I chose the best person in Israel. Hereby the table of contents:

Introduction

Raphael Cohen-Almagor

General

From Socialism to Free Market – The Israeli Economy: 1948 – 2003

Ben-Zion Zilberfarb

Between Enlightened Authoritarianism and Social Responsibility – On Media and Politics

Dan Caspi

Rights and Schisms

Human Rights

David Kretzmer

Health Rights

Carmel Shalev

Women Rights: Legal Aspects

Frances Raday

Israel as a Multicultural Democracy: Challenges and Obstacles

Yossi Yonah

The Absorbtion of Immigrants from the Former Soviet Union

Tamar Horowitz

Is A Halachic State Possible? The Paradox of Jewish Theocracy

Aviezer Ravitzky

“A Jewish and Democratic State”: Present Navigation in the Map of Interpretations

Asa Kasher

Whither the Green Line? Trends in the Orientation of the Palestinians in Israel and the Territories

Majid Al-Haj

Israel and Its Arab Citizens

Hillel Frisch

Israel Facing Terrorism

Ariel Merari

Final Words

Revisiting the Zionist Dream

Claude Klein

Israeli Democracy at the Crossroads

Raphael Cohen-Almagor

Notes on Contributors

Index

I thank the Journal's chief editor, Prof. Efraim Karsh, for his thoughtful cooperation. This volume will also appear as a book by Routledge later this year. Notification will be announced in due course.

Books

A few years ago I saw the film Captain Corelli's Mandolin with Cruz and Cage. Now had the opportunity to read the book by Louis de Bernieres and enjoyed it tremendously. A very gratifying read indeed and -- as in most cases -- the book excels the film. I highly recommend.

Justine Burley (ed.), Dworkin and His Critics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005).

Paul Schotsmans & Tom Meulenbergs (eds.), Euthanasia and Palliative Care in the Low Countries (Leuven-Paris-Sterling: Peeters Publishers, 2005), ISBN 90-429-1556-0.

Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Speech, Media, and Ethics: The Limits of Free Expression (Houndmills and New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2005), 2^nd edition, paperback.

Please consider ordering the books to your libraries.

Photos

Enjoy!!

With my very best wishes, as ever,

Rafi

My last communications are available on http://almagor.blogspot.com
Earlier posts at my home page: http://lib-stu.haifa.ac.il/staff/rcohen-Almagor

Books archived at http://almagor.fetchauthor.info

January 2005

Comment on Paris, on PA Elections, Kassam Missiles, Civil Disobedience, Center for Democratic Studies, Using the T-Word, Syrian Wins Martin Ennals Award for Human Rights Defenders, Peace One Day, Prince Harry in Nazi Uniform, British Theatre, Photos from Israel

Dear friends and colleagues,

Comment on Paris,

Agnes Lefranc from Paris commented on what I had written on Paris and Parisians:

Dear Rafi,

I have to say, even if it hurts, that I agree with what you write about people living in Paris in your last newsletter: a large proportion of them can be totally awful with everyone they consider as a "foreigner" (their definition of a foreigner sometimes including "someone living on the other side of the city's limits"). As another example of that, there is now a lot of buzz around the application of Paris for the 2012 Olympic Games, and Paris authorities try to give the best "image" of the city... Anyway, some Parisians are already complaining about the "invasion" (visitors, tourists) that is going to happen during summer 2012 if the Olympic Games take place in Paris. It was the same for the 1998 soccer world cup, and finally, people were totally ecstatic during the event (the fact that France won the world cup certainly had something to do with it !!). I think that for most of the people living in Paris, the ungracious, grumbling appearance is more an attitude than their real "nature". And I really can understand that this is not an excuse and that this attitude can be totally offending for people visiting Paris.

Anyway, I hope that this will not prevent you from visiting Paris in the future, and I would be very glad to see you then (and perhaps have you meet some "nice" Parisians, if I can find them !!).

Agnes

PA Elections

The first post-Arafat elections took place on January 9, 2005. As was expected, Mahmoud Abbas won 62.3 percent of the vote for Palestinian Authority chairman. This margin of victory would give Abbas a clear mandate to renew peace talks with Israel, rein in militants and reform the corruption-riddled Palestinian Authority. Abbas' main challenger, independent candidate Mustafa Barghouti, won about 20 percent, and five other chairmanship candidates - ranging from a Marxist ex-guerrilla to an academic under U.S. house arrest on suspicion of funneling funds to Hamas militants - scored in low single digits. Hamas, the largest Palestinian militant opposition group, announced it will work with Abbas. Don't be too impressed with verbal declarations. Abu Mazen's test will be his ability to fight down terrorism and to put a stop to the launching of Kassam missiles. At least, unlike Arafat it seems that Abu Mazen does not lack the will to stop violence. He declared openly that violence did not serve the interest of the Palestinian people, and that there are other, more fruitful ways, to achieve independence and freedom. Israel will evaluate the new leader according to his actions, not necessarily according to his success. We first want to see a genuine attempt to stop violence and terror. I hope the Hamas and Islamic Jihad will also revise their policies and strategy. If not we may expect to see bitter internal clashes, with the IDF doing its share to assassinate militants. Those targeted killings proved useful from Israel's view but at the same time did not relax the atmosphere. Quite the opposite. Targeted killings served as a unified mechanism. Palestinian rivals forget all differences when facing Israel's military retaliation.

Senior Palestinian security official and West Bank strongman Jibril al-Rajoub resigned on January 11, saying he wanted to encourage President-elect Mahmoud Abbas to enact reforms. The resignation of Rajoub, a leading security official and West Bank strongman rival to Gaza's Mohamed Dahlan, suggests that Abbas is at least moving quickly to restructure the PA's notoriously corrupt and fractious security forces. Their reform is essential if Abbas is to have any hope of curbing the likes of Hamas and Fatah's own Al-Aqsa Brigades both of which have dismissed his calls to halt the terrorism of their "armed struggle". Rajoub, one of several security advisers, had been at odds with late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat over calls to slim down the range of separate competing Palestinian security forces. Rajoub has called for the merging of some dozen competing security forces to help end chaos that gripped Palestinian streets in the months before Arafat died in a Paris hospital on Nov 11. "I recommend speeding up the combining of the security forces into three, and making radical, immediate changes in the organisational structure and leaderships," Rajoub said. Abbas is expected to carry out such changes, also wanted by Israel and Western countries.

Indeed, security reform is a key issue for Abbas, who may also need more effective forces to bring militant groups under control. Stirring Israeli concerns, Abbas has said he would rather co-opt militants than use force to rein them in. Don't be too amazed if Abbas would reappoint Rajoub in the near future. He needs him and co-optation is a proved mechanism to bring potential rivals to back your own camp.

Kassam Missiles

Ella Abuksis, age 17, was walking in the street in Sderot together with her little brother Tamir when she heard the frightening noise. She embraced her brother and fell with him on the ground. The missile fell five meters behind her. Tamir came out with small injuries. Ella, on the other hand, is now declared brain-dead.

Every country has the right to defend its sovereignty. It is impossible to continue this way. The people of Sderot cannot continue living in this way. The town is becoming a ghost city. Just imagine missiles on York, Ann Arbor and Windsor. Would the UK, the USA and Canada allow this to continue? There are only two possibilities: either the PA will put a stop to it, and this is certainly the preferable option; or Israel will enter the Gaza Strip yet again. To remind, the last time the IDF went the Gaza the result was dozens of casualties on both sides, especially the Palestinian. There is no third option, i.e. letting the missiles continue falling.

On January 18, Abu Mazen declared that he intends to locate one thousand policemen hoping that their presence will serve as deterrence. He says he needs "time and patience", precious commodities in our region. The people of Sderot have lost their patience and now exert pressure on Sharon to retaliate. Retaliation is not the issue. It is simply not enough. The missiles have to stop.

Civil Disobedience

The past few weeks I had several public appearances in which I was invited to express my views on different topics:

Incitement in Israel, calling upon the Attorney General to be alert and to fight down concrete calls for murder: Incitement is not protected under the Free Speech Principle.

Euthanasia and mercy killings: I was invited to present my new book in various forums, and to speak on the legislation process that is now taking place to settle the issue of medical treatment at the end-of-life. I was a member of a public committee, known as the Steinberg Committee, assigned by the Ministry of Health, to draft a law. After a long process this law is now considered by the Knesset Constitutional, Law and Justice Committee for final shape-up before moving on to legislation.

Payment for interviews: Concerning the case of Azam Azam, recently released from Egyptian jail after eight years of prison. Interesting story this one because Egyptian officials, from Mubarak down claimed that he was an Israeli spy, in service of the MOSSAD, while Israeli officials, from Sharon down, claimed that he was an innocent business man. Someone is not telling the truth. Anyway, Azam decided to take advantage of his release and do for his home, demanding a fee for his exclusive first interview. After a short and extensive race TV Channel 10 won the race by paying him some dozens of thousands of dollars. I was asked to comment on this issue.

Civil disobedience and conscientious objection: tricky and complicated question that has been occupying my mind for many years. Israel is a fascinating country in many respects, including demography. In the 1970s, we were about 3.5 million people. In a period of thirty years we doubled our size. Don't know if any other country in the world has such a record. Anyway, in the 1970s and 1980s I used to think that conscientious objection is a luxury we cannot afford. Morally speaking I felt that we should recognize refusal on such grounds, but practically I felt that as a state we are unable to afford it. Things have changed. The army grew beyond its needs. There are less external threats to wage war on us by one of our neighbours. There is peace (cold, but still peace) with the strongest potential rival, Egypt. The army does not recruit all eligible citizens, young men and women, age 18, for various reasons: religion, marriage (for girls), criminal record, poor health (physical or mental). And Israel had a problematic presence in Lebanon, and still has such presence in the occupied territories.

Thus, in the 1990s I expressed my views that it is a democratic right to declare conscientious objection; that Israel should recognize this right, and as people have the right not to serve due to religious reasons, so people should have the right not to serve on conscientious grounds. I backed the "Four Mothers" Movement which called Israel to pull out from Lebanon. The movement grew and made an impact on our society, more so when Yossi Beilin and others became vocal supporters of this motion, and even more so when Prime Minister Ehud Barak became a supporter and in 2000 had the foresight and courage to take our troops out of Lebanon.

It should be noted that in 1995, in order to determine who is a genuine CO and who is just trying to avoid the military service for reasons of personal comfort, the Minister of Defence set up, within the Israeli Armed Forces (IDF), a Conscientious Objection Committee. This move was considered necessary after the State of Israel adhered to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1991.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights do not explicitly mention the right to conscientious objection to military service. However, in 1993, the Human Rights Committee, the body of experts monitoring the implementation of the Covenant, adopted General Comment N. 22 on the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and affirmed that the right to conscientious objection to military service can be derived from article 18. Paragraph 11 states that :

"Many individuals have claimed the right to refuse to perform

military service (conscientious objection) on the basis that

such right derives from their freedoms under article 18. In

response to such claims, a growing number of States have in

their laws exempted from compulsory military service citizens

who genuinely hold religious or other beliefs that forbid the

performance of military service and replaced it with

alternative national service. The Covenant does not explicitly

refer to a right to conscientious objection, but the Committee

believes that such a right can be derived from article 18,

inasmuch as the obligation to use lethal force may seriously

conflict with the freedom of conscience and the right to

manifest one's religion or belief. When this right is recognized

by law or practice, there shall be no differentiation among

conscientious objectors on the basis of the nature of their

particular beliefs; likewise, there shall be no discrimination

against conscientious objectors because they have failed to

perform military service. The Committee invites States parties

to report on the conditions under which persons can be

exempted from military service on the basis of their rights

under article 18 and on the nature and length of alternative

national service."

As you well know, I oppose occupation and think Israel is mistaken by lasting our presence in Judea, Samaria and Gaza Strip. There should be a two-state solution, and I hope this will materialize in my life time. I said time and again that I hope many soldiers declare conscientious objection and go to jail rather than serve in the occupied territories. In my last Newsletter I praised the four parents of soldiers who sign parents to oppose sending their children to serve in the occupied territories. A few days have passed and I was invited to express my views on TV. There the issue was civil disobedience and conscientious objection in general, including the right of soldiers to refuse evacuating settlers, and the right of settlers to refuse their evacuation. I said that I see conscientious objection as a democratic right; that I hope soldiers will have the decency to tell their commanders, before going on assignment, that they are not willing to abide the order of evacuation, and not to sabotage the activity on the spot; that I respect conscientious objection as long as people are willing to pay the price for their acts, meaning to serve in jail. Regarding the settlers I support their right to object to what they conceive as illegal and immoral order, to leave their homes, but said that the border line is violence: they should not resort to violence. There is a difference between passive resistance, not cooperating with the army and leave the soldiers with no option but grabbing them by their hands and legs out of their homes to the vehicles, and fighting the soldiers with force, feasts and guns. While I condone passive resistance, I condemn any form of force that might lead to bloodshed and civil war.

Within four days I became the darling of YESHA, the Judea, Samaria and Gaza Council. Suddenly, in the first time in my life, I had something in common with the settlers' camp. Strange feeling, I must admit. I don't wish to play into their hands, but at the same time I need to be loyal to my conscience. I believe conscientious objection is not one-sided, serving the interests of one camp only. When it is from the left, it is fine; when it comes from the right it is condemnable. My conscience is not that flexible. The YESHA Council invited me to debate the issue and after consultation with the Dean of our Law Faculty I agreed upon the condition that the debate will reflect all (or most) streams of thoughts in Israel, that it will be balanced and not one sided, and that it will be of academic nature.

In a previous Newsletter I already mentioned a pertinent Supreme Court case. On December 20, 2002, the Court passed an important judgment on the Zonschein case reaffirming the possibility of granting exemptions from military service for reasons of conscientious objection. It noted that "all agree that exemptions for conscientious reasons are included in those 'other reasons', which allow exemption from regular or reserve service." It refers to total conscientious objection only. In fact, it ruled out the possibility of selective objection (that is the exemption from service deriving from an objection to a specific war or military operation) for reasons of national security. The Court held that "the phenomenon of selective conscientious objection would be broader than 'full' objection, and would evoke an intense feeling of discrimination 'between blood and blood'. Moreover, it affects security considerations themselves, since a group of selective objectors would tend to increase in size. Additionally, in a pluralistic society such as ours, recognising selective conscientious objection may loosen the ties, which hold us together as a nation. Yesterday, the objection was against serving in South Lebanon. Today, the objection is against serving in Judea and Samaria. Tomorrow, the objection will be against vacating this or that settlement. The army of the nation may turn into an army of different groups comprised of various units, to each of which it would be conscientiously acceptable to act in certain areas, whereas it would be conscientiously unacceptable to act in others. In a polarised society such as ours, this consideration weighs heavily. Furthermore, it becomes difficult to distinguish between one who claims conscientious objection in good faith and one who, in actuality, objects to the policy of the government or the Knesset, as it is a fine distinction - occasionally an exceedingly fine distinction – between objecting to a state policy and between conscientious objection to carry out that policy."

Center for Democratic Studies

The Center is taking its formative shape. First on the agenda was to establish a reputable Governing Board that will involve capable people whose activities showed their commitment to the values and ideas that underlie the Center. The Board includes at this stage the following dignitaries:

Former Justice of the Supreme Court Dalia Dorner, a leading liberal voice in Israel whose imprint on our legal history is noticeable and admirable

Recipient of Israel Prize in Philosophy, Professor Asa Kasher of Tel Aviv University, a leading expert on ethics, with a sharp mind and careful eye

Rabbi Uri Regev, one of the leaders of the Reform Movement in Israel and in the world. He exemplifies humane Judaism in its best

Former Deputy Speaker of the Knesset (Meretz – the Civil Rights Party), Professor Naomi Chazan of the Hebrew University Dept. of Political Science, a most capable scholar who is spending her sabbatical now at MIT

Professor Eppie Yaar of Tel Aviv University, a leading sociologist who is known also for the Peace Index that he monitors for some years

Former Cabinet Minister (Labour) and Ambassador to the UN Gad Yaakobi, one of the brightest politicians I've ever known, a true intellectual with a passion for poetry

Professor Ben-Zion Zilberfarb of Bar Ilan University Department of Economics. He was the head of the Economic Planning Authority of the Israeli government (1982 –1985) and the Director General of the Ministry of Finance (1988 – 1999).

Head of the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute Dr. Shimshon Zelniker. Van Leer is a leading research center in Israel that has been working for many years to promote peace and understanding within Israel and with its neighbours

Professor Bernard Susser of Department of Political Science, Bar Ilan University. Barney is a leading political theorist in Israel. He supervised my MA thesis on Marx, Engels and Lenin some years ago (who counts…)

Professor Aharon Kellerman, former Vice President of my university, a man of many qualities and capabilities with lots of administrative experience

Professor Yedidya Stern of Bar Ilan University Faculty of Law, a leading activist in promoting understanding between secular and religious Jews, on constitutional issues, and a Senior Fellow at the Israel Democracy Institute

Mr. Gil Weiser, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the University of Haifa. He comes from the high-tech, a successful businessman who cares deeply about the future of Israeli democracy and who knows the inside out of my university

Professor Moshe Zeidner, Dean of Research whose responsibilities include overseeing the work of all centers within the university

I have also invited Professor Majid Al-Haj to be affiliated to my Center and he agreed. Majid heads the Center for Multiculturalism at my university and for this reason cannot be an official member of the Governing Board. He is a respected sociologist who works on the relationships between Arabs and Jews in Israel, and the absorption of the Russian immigrants in Israeli society.

The list is not conclusive as other members who have passion to better the future of Israeli democracy might join. I would like to have on board more business people, with contacts and access to people who care about Israel, and have the resources to invest in various projects and activities. I am also contemplating the establishment of an International Steering Committee. The Governing Board is scheduled to convene in early March and upon their approval I would like to invite people from four corners of the world to officially join the Center. Some already expressed interest, including Nobel Prize laureate Elie Wiesel.

Some of you took the initiative and sent checks in support of the Center. You touched my heart. I am most thankful for your care and concern.

There are some 400 people on this listserve, and more than 1500 people have visited the blog since its inception. If each will donate $100 the Center could kick-off to a good start. People who wish to donate money are welcome to send a check to:

Ms. Michal Zach

(for the Center for Democratic Studies)

The Research Authority

University of Haifa

Mount Carmel

Haifa 31905

Israel.

Those of you who wish to donate larger sums of money and want to receive charitable donation tax receipts are welcome to contact:

Ms. Estie Becker

Resource Development Department

University of Haifa

Mount Carmel

Haifa 31905

Israel.

besty@univ.haifa.ac.il

Using the T-Word

Together with a former student, Amit Rahat, I am conducting research on ombudsmen in the United Kingdom, Canada and Israel. For this purpose I recently visited the UK and met with some people in the BBC. I will not elaborate on my findings in this forum but would like to mention only one issue: The BBC cautious refrain from using the word "terrorism". Even those involved in the horrific seizure of a school in the town of Beslan on September 3, 2004 were not described as terrorists. I asked why. Senior people at the BBC explained that the BBC broadcasts worldwide to people with different point of views, and it does not wish to alienate anyone. They continued the explanation by the well-known cliché that one's terrorist is another's freedom fighter and therefore opt to the simple solution of not using the T-Word in principle. Then one of them maintained that a certain horrific act may be described as terrorist, but "we don't call the people who conduct the act as terrorist". Do you understand this?

Bear in mind that when the UK was subjected to IRA attacks the BBC had no problem calling the people involved "terrorist". After the Good Friday agreement terrorism no more exists. September 11 was tricky, though. Interesting.

Journalists are morally required to be conscious of the terminology they employ in their reports. An ephemeral terrorist organisation is not "an army." People who kidnap and murder randomly are not "students" or "saints" or "soldiers" or "freedom fighters." The killing of innocent civilians traveling on a bus or a train should not be described in terms of a "military operation." A difference exists between covering news and providing terrorists an equal platform to declare their agenda. To remain objective in the sense of moral neutrality with regard to terrorism is to betray ethics and morality. Terrorists deserve no prize for their brutality. Here I take issue with the BBC and also with the CBC Ombudsman, David Bazay, who in comments about the use of the word "terrorist" wrote that "There is nothing in the CBC's journalism policy that prevents the public broadcaster's journalists from calling a spade a spade or a terror attack a terror attack." But, at the same time, he instructed the CBC to be careful with the use of language. While quoting his colleague Jeffrey Dvorkin, Ombudsman for the American National Public Radio, Bazay explained that while the use of "the 't' word" may be accurate it also has a political and "extra-journalistic role of de-legitimizing one side and enthroning the views of the other." In his view, this is not the role of responsible journalism, "which is and should be to describe with accuracy and fairness events that listeners may choose to endorse or deplore." Indeed, this is the role of responsible journalism and therefore journalists should resort to the term "terrorism" when such acts are conducted. Bazay took pain to explain that sides to a given conflict use and abuse the word "terrorist" to frame the issues to advance their political agenda, but it does not matter how one side or another characterizes the acts of violence it carries. What does matter is whether the acts fall within the definition of terrorism. However, because the description of a given event as terrorist might be difficult and controversial, both the BBC and the CBC are opting, in general, for the simple solution of refraining from using the term.

I am most grateful to Wilfrid Knapp, Prinky and Adam Roberts, Eric Barendt, Jack Pole and Alan Budd for their kind hospitality.

Syrian Wins Martin Ennals Award for Human Rights Defenders

Aksam Noaisse, the Chairman of the Committees for the Defense of Democratic Liberties and Human Rights in Syria has won the prestigious Martin Ennals Award. Noaisse was one of the founding members of the Committees, created in 1989, and of the publication "Sawt al-Dimokratiyyah" (voice of democracy). Naisse has courageously spoken out in national, regional and international forums. He has been arrested six times, held incommunicado and tortured. He is currently not allowed to travel abroad. A trial against him will resume on 16 January 2005 and he risks 15 years prison.

The Martin Ennals Award for Human Rights Defenders (MEA) is a unique collaboration among eleven of the world's leading non-governmental human rights organizations to give protection to human rights defenders worldwide. The jury comprises Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Human Rights First, International Federation for Human Rights, the International Commission of Jurists, World Organization Against Torture, German Diakonie, International Service for Human Rights, International Alert, Huridocs and DCI.

Peace One Day

The British Council organized an evening to show the documentary film "Peace One Day" and have a Q&A session with the film maker Jeremy Gilley. The film documents the truly amazing journey of a visionary man, who is also a doer, who wanted to better this world by declaring one day of universal peace. To reach 365 days of global peace is somewhat more difficult, but let us start with one day during which all rivals will put down their guns, allow food and medicine to pass securely to people who need them. On this day there will be no firing, no bombings, no launching of missiles, no terrorism, no guerrilla warfare, no assassinations, no military operations. A global armistice and break of violence.

Just imagine a planning meeting of the heads of the Hamas in which the intelligence officer points out that tomorrow there is a golden opportunity to launch a massive suicide attack in the heart of Tel Aviv, but then a Hamas leader rise and say: We cannot. Tomorrow is the International Day of Peace.

Or that the heads of the security forces in Israel convene and the intelligence officer says that tomorrow there will be a golden opportunity to "eliminate" the head of operations of the Islamic Jihad, but then Sharon will respond: Not tomorrow. Tomorrow is the International Day of Peace.

To achieve this end, Gilley started by contacting Nobel Peace Laureates, received the support of some leading figures and then of Costa Rica and the United Kingdom, and in September 2001 the United Nations had passed GA Resolution 55/282 that accepted the idea and initiative. The motion was passed unanimously. 21 September has become the International Day of Peace.

Gilley is continuing his efforts to spread the news about peace-one-day and is now filming his second film in which he documents his efforts. Indeed, we all yearn for peace one day. 21 September can be a good start. Please mark the day in your calendars. (Inter alia, I suggested Gilley to contact all manufactures of diaries to note the day in their products).

If you can, arrange that your respective universities buy the DVD.

For further information, see http://www.peaceoneday.org/

Prince Harry in Nazi Uniform

The photo of the young Prince dressed up as a Nazi was, in one word, revolting. I presume this is the result of sheer ignorance. The guy does not know what he is doing, and not for the first time. Young people are prone to make mistakes more than older guys, but this one shows he lacks good education. God knows what he did at Eton. Apparently not much. Or maybe Eton does not teach WWII, the Blitz, and the horrors of the Nazi regime? I wonder. Young Harry thought that that custom would be most appropriate for the party he attended, that it will be "fun", "cool", and attract attention. Well, it certainly attracted attention, probably more than he wished in the first place. I hope he will now learn something about the people he wished to represent in his fun party.

Here in Israel young people in general don't use the swastika and other Nazi motifs. They understand it is beyond the acceptable. Only political opponents resort to Nazi symbols, dressing the leaders they oppose in Nazi uniform. You may recall the notorious photo of Prime Minister Rabin dressed in Himler's uniform. I read that soldiers in the occupied territories pride themselves with the symbol of the skull with two crossed bones. I assume they don't know much of their predecessors who used this symbol of death. What they want to say, mostly to their comrades as they paint this symbol on their own private closets and put up posters with the symbol in their own private rooms: Be Aware!! I am here to inflict death and mayhem. I am cool. I am not afraid. I am here to gun down Palestinians and to show them who is the boss. In a sense, the skull symbol serves the same purpose of the Nazi symbol in other parts of the world. But, of course, not in Harry's case.

Harry just wanted to be cool per se. Nothing beyond that. What troubles me is that this shallow man serves as an idol for many young people around the world. If he is wearing this so-called ghastly swastika, why won't we? The old generation is too rigid, they might say. It is actually cool to rebel against them and wear Nazi uniform. Who were the Nazis anyway? Germans. We have nothing against Germany. A beautiful country, actually, and a prospering one too. Germany has a long history, with one terribly dark chapter of which Harry and others know very little. Oswiecim is a mere foreign word of no significance and meaning.

British Theatre

Festen – a solid drama that shows British theatre at its best. Patriarch Helge Klingelfeldt is celebrating his 60th birthday at a magnificent old house in the Danish countryside. Surrounded by his loyal wife Else, his daughter Helene, sons Christian and Michael and a host of family and friends this promises to be a very special occasion. And then Christian proposed a toast that transforms the celebration into a painful journey to the dark side of the family. Paul Nicholls, who plays Christian, gives an electrifying memorable performance and holds the play together. You are in for a thrill.

Any idea what festen means? Ideas are welcomed.

Photos from Israel

I wanted to share with you some photos from Israel. Enjoy. These are just few gems to appreciate.

With my very best wishes, as ever,

Rafi

My last communications are available on http://almagor.blogspot.com
Earlier posts at my home page: http://lib-stu.haifa.ac.il/staff/rcohen-Almagor

Books archived at http://almagor.fetchauthor.info

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[1] Raphael Cohen-Almagor, “Cultural Pluralism and the Israeli Nation-Building Ideology”, International J. of Middle East Studies, Vol. 27 (1995): 461-484.

[2] Ian Lustick, Arabs in the Jewish State: Israel's Control of a National Minority (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980); David Kretzmer, The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987); Hillel Frisch, "Israel and Its Arab Citizens", in R. Cohen-Almagor (ed.), Israeli Democracy at the Crossroads (London: Routledge, forthcoming).

[3]. Majid Al-Haj, "The Impact of the Intifada on the Arabs in Israel: The Case of a Double Periphery", in Akiba A. Cohen and Gadi Wolfsfeld (eds.), Framing the Intifada. People and Media (Norwood: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1993): 64-75; Majid Al-Haj, "Whither the Green Line? Trends in the Orientation of the Palestinians in Israel and the Territories", in R. Cohen-Almagor (ed.), Israeli Democracy at the Crossroads. See also The Association for Civil Rights in Israel, Report 2002-2003 (Jerusalem): 17-23 (Hebrew).

[4] David Kretzmer, "Human Rights", in R. Cohen-Almagor (ed.), Israeli Democracy at the Crossroads.

[5] Ibid. See also Frances Raday, " Women Rights: Legal Aspects", in R. Cohen-Almagor (ed.), Israeli Democracy at the Crossroads.

[6] . For further discussion, R. Cohen-Almagor, “Israeli Democracy, Religion and the Practice of Halizah in Jewish Law”, UCLA Women's Law Journal, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Fall/Winter 2000): 45-65; Aviezer Ravitzky, "Is A Halachic State Possible? The Paradox of Jewish Theocracy" and Asa Kasher, “A Jewish and Democratic State”: Present Navigation in the Map of Interpretations", both in R. Cohen-Almagor (ed.), Israeli Democracy at the Crossroads.

[7] www.btselem.org; The Association for Civil Rights in Israel, Report 2002-2003 (Jerusalem): 30-33 (Hebrew).

· [8] http://btselem.org/

· [9] See, for instance, A.A.D. 10/94 Anonymous v. Minister of Defence, decision granted on 13 November 1997, involving Lebanese citizens who were kidnapped by Israel to serve as "negotiation cards" in the attempts to bring about the release of Israeli POWs.

· [10] Newsletter, International Commission of Jurists, No. 24 (Jan/March 1985), p. 53. For further discussion see Steven Greer, "Preventive Detention and Public Security: Law and Practice in Comparative Perspective", International J. of the Sociology of Law, Vol. 23 (1995): 45-58.

· [11] Cf. Palestine Gazette, No. 1442 (1945) (Supp. 2), at 1055.

· [12] 5739-1979, Laws of the State of Israel, Vol. 33 (1979), at 89.

· [13] Compare with the British Detention of Terrorists (Northern Ireland) Order 1972. Article 4 (1) of the Order empowers detaining any person ‘suspected of having been concerned in the commission or attempted commission of any act of terrorism or in the direction, organisation, or training of persons for the purpose of terrorism’ for a period of 28 days. At the end of that period the detainee should be released or could be further detained if the Chief Constable had referred his/her case to a judicially qualified commissioner appointed by the Secretary of State. For further discussion, see Antonio Vercher, Terrorism in Europe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), esp. pp. 18-28.

· [14] For a critical account of the use of some of these measures, see Geoffrey Bindman and Bill Bowring, Human Rights in a Period of Transition (London: The Law Society and the Bar of England and Wales, 1994).

· [15] Pnina Lahav speaks of a variant of Zionism, which she terms ‘catastrophe Zionism’, whose major goal is defence. Those who adhere to catastrophe Zionism adopt a worldview that is permeated by anxiety. See Lahav, "Foundations of Rights Jurisprudence in Israel: Chief Justice Agranat’s Legacy", Israel L. Rev., Vol. 24, No. 2 (1990): 211-269, esp. pp. 216-223.

· [16] The concept of due process of law is derived from English common law probably during the reigns of Henry I (1100-1135) and Henry II (1154-1189). Chapter 29 (Chapter 39 in a later version) of the Magna Carta of 1215 declares: ‘No free man shall be taken, outlawed, banished, or in any way destroyed, nor will we proceed against or prosecute him, except by the lawful judgement of his peers and by the law of the land’. For further discussion, see Henry J. Abraham, Freedom and the Court (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, Fourth Edition): 92-151; and Theodor Meron, Human Rights in International Strife: Their International Protection (Cambridge: Grotius, 1987), esp. pp. 18-22.

· [17] See detailed analysis in R. Cohen-Almagor, "Reflections on Administrative Detention in Israel: A Critique", in R. Cohen-Almagor (ed.), Challenges to Democracy: Essays in Honour and Memory of Isaiah Berlin (London: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2000): 203-241, and “Administrative Detention in Israel and its Employment as a Means of Combating Political Extremism”, New York International L. Rev., Vol. 9, No. 2 (1996): 1-25.

[18] For further discussion, see Prisoners of Peace, Report No. 16 (Jerusalem: B'tselem, June 1997); Dafna Golan, Detained without Trial (Jerusalem: B'tselem, October 1992) (both in Hebrew).

[19] R. Cohen-Almagor, "Final Word", in R. Cohen-Almagor (ed.), Israeli Democracy at the Crossroads.

· [20] R. Cohen-Almagor, "The best first plan", The Baltimore Sun (December 18, 2003); http://almagor.blogspot.com

· [21] Cf. H.C. 680/88. Schnitzer v. Chief Military Censor, P.D. 42 (iv), 617, p. 645.