March 24, 2005
Horror
in Tel-Aviv, Mass Murder in Darfur, Incitement, Talia Sasson's Report on the
Illegal Outposts in the West Bank, Racism, Center for Democratic Studies,
Crisis in High Education, Maale Edumim, Separating State from Religion, Poll
among Youth on Serving in the Territories, Israel Affairs, Vol. 11, No.
2 (April 2005), Lebanon, Hizballah and
Amal, Terri Schiavo,
Earth and Moon Viewer, Books
Dear friends and colleagues,
Horror
in Tel-Aviv
On
Friday, February 25, the horror returned to Tel Aviv. A suicide bomber wanted
to enter a dancing club, the guards inspected him and when he realized he will
not be able to enter he exploded at the entrance. Five people killed, and more
than fifty injured. My wife and I were fifteen minutes away from the place as
we returned from the theatre.
This
was a sad reminder that some Palestinian organizations will continue to attack
at the heart of Israel, that talks about "new paths" for peace failed
to convince them, that there is still great necessity for guards in every
public place in Israel (the industry was shrinking as some relaxed to think
that with Abu Mazen the horror is behind us), and that the Palestinian
Authority cannot avoid confronting the terror organizations, disarming them,
and sending their leaders to spend the next years of the lives behind bars. The
"politics of numbers" comes into play yet again. If the next
explosion will be too painful for Israel to bear, we will enter the
Palestinian cities with great force and then the result would be yet another
major setback for tranquility.
Mass Murder in Darfur
The Sudanese Government, using
Arab "Janjaweed" militias, its air force, and organized starvation,
is deliberately and systematically killing the black Sudanese of Darfur. Over a
million people, driven from their homes, now face death from starvation and
disease as the Government and militias attempt to prevent humanitarian aid from
reaching them. The same forces have destroyed the people of Darfur's
villages and crops, and poisoned their water supplies, and they continue to
murder, rape and terrorise.
The
International Community has tough words for Sudan
but threats to act are mild, with the strongest suggestions being economic
sanctions on Sudan.
But the Sudanese are accustomed to sanctions, and even the toughest sanctions
take months to have any impact. The Khartoum
government is skilled at using negotiations to delay. They know all they need
is another few weeks and their terrible work will be done.
Of all things we must not allow in Darfur, it
is delay. Only one thing will stop the killing in Sudan:
an immediate international intervention to protect the people of Darfur and deliver aid to them. I call upon governments
and the United Nations to intervene immediately to protect civilians and
guarantee the delivery of humanitarian aid in Darfur, Sudan.
I call on the UN Security Council to mandate the International Criminal Court
to investigate those responsible for the Darfur
genocide. Sign a
petition on http://www.darfurgenocide.org/action.htm
Incitement
The incitement continues. On February 27, 2005 head of SHABAC
Avi Dichter presented the cabinet with a selection of letters sent to senior
figures that included extremist statements. One of the letters read: "A din
rodef has been placed on the prime minister and he must be murdered."
To recall, din rodef was instrumental in the incitement campaign against
Yitzhak Rabin leading to his assassination on November 4, 1995. "Din
rodef" is an ancient rabbinical decree that allows Jews to kill other Jews
who worked for an enemy.
The letters also read "Yigal Amir lives, Rabin is dead, Sharon will die" and "Sharon will meet Arafat in hell."
Justice Minister Tzipi Livni told the cabinet that preparations for the
disengagement include the creation of dedicated units whose sole job will be to
combat incitement and those causing disorder. Minister
Haim Ramon attacked the justice system saying it was unacceptable that
blatantly inciteful statements can be made against Sharon and other senior figures without any
response from the legal system. He rightly asked for practical law enforcement
steps be taken.
Talia
Sasson's Report on the Illegal Outposts in the West Bank
On March 8, 2005 attorney Talia Sasson submitted her report on West Bank outposts to Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon. There were no great revelations, just systematic data that confirmed
what we already know. Some of the illegal
settlement outposts in the West Bank were both
planned and funded by the Housing Ministry, including a number of those built
on private Palestinian land. The report
essentially confirms longstanding complaints by Palestinians and activist
groups like Peace Now that successive Israeli governments, including those in
power after the signing of the Oslo Accords in the early 1990s, approved and
financed for decades the establishment of outpost settlements on
privately-owned Palestinian land.
In light of the harsh accusations, Sasson recommended that the
Housing Ministry be stripped of authority over construction of settlements in
the West Bank, and that this power be
transferred to the cabinet. Housing Minister Isaac Herzog (Labour) said following
the release of the report that every expense earmarked for the settlements will
now need the approval of the ministry's director-general. Up until now, the
heads of each department at the ministry have been able to sign off on expenses
for various construction and infrastructure matters at the settlements.
Sasson reported that a number of government ministries had
failed to hand over some of the information she requested. Therefore, the list
of outposts that appears in the report is not a complete one. "I do not
have a full picture of all the outposts," she said. The report names
"only" 105 illegal outposts in the West Bank.
Of them twenty four were established after March 2001, in blunt violation
of the Israeli government's promise to the Bush administration. Of the twenty
four, 15 were built on private Palestinian land.
Sasson also called on Attorney General Menachem Mazuz to look
into the involvement of government employees in the establishment of illegal
outposts, and prosecute the offenders.
Talia Sasson said the complacency over unauthorized settlement
outpost construction was not limited to the Housing Ministry alone, accusing
the IDF Civil Administration and the Defense Ministry of involvement. According
to Sasson, the Defense Ministry must approve any trailers being placed in the West Bank - which in fact it did, in contradiction of the
defense minister's instructions.
Sasson said she does not know whether the ministers themselves
knew what their ministries were doing, and that it is possible other ministries
were also involved in the outpost construction.
Following the report's publication, Yahad-Meretz Chairman Yossi
Beilin called for a formal government investigation into the matter, with
ministries legally compelled to provide all relevant information. Infrastructure Minister Benjamin Ben-Eliezer
called on the government to take "clear and drastic" action against
the outposts. Generally speaking, while the Labour ministers voiced alarm and
wished to take immediate steps against the outsposts, the Likud ministers were
far more moderate in their reaction. After all, the report is hardly news to
them.
The U.S.
administration warned Israel
that its failure to keep its promise to remove all outposts established in the
West Bank since March 2001 will harm relations between the countries, and could
have an impact on American aid to Israel. At their last meeting, U.S.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told Dov Weisglass, the prime minister's
adviser, that President Bush expects Jerusalem
to take immediate action based on the conclusions and recommendations in
Sasson's report on the outposts.
Talia Sasson
had worked in the Attorney General's office. Inter alia, she headed the small
unit that tracked down incitements and decided whether to press charges against
inciters. Recently she retired and now works as an independent lawyer.
A
few years ago I hosted her on one of my TV talk shows (Academic Channel),
together with the former Attorney General Michael Ben-Yair. The tension between
the two was noticeable. The "Incitement Unit" was established
immediately after the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, under the leadership of
Ben-Yair. I was surprised to know that the Unit was established more or less
without the blessing of Ben-Yair. I found this most interesting, especially
given the special circumstances that brought about the decision.
I
had talks with a few former attorney generals in Israel in which I raised the
issues that Sasson reported now, with particular alarm that some of the legal
outposts serve as hotbeds for political extremism, operating outside the
confines of the law, using the weapons supplied by the IDF against Palestinians
without too much interest of law enforcement authorities. There was, still is,
a common saying among radical settlers: The law stops at the Tapuach Junction
(Kfar Tapuach is settled by Kach followers, Meir Kahane's banned party). They
never seemed too surprised, going into lengthy explanations how difficult it is
to infiltrate those settlements and obtain the proof needed for prosecution,
the reluctance of the security forces to challenge those settlers, their fear
of the zealots, etc. This reminded me of South Africa: first you supply
radicals with weapons; then surprisingly the weapon is used against whoever is described
as an "enemy"; and it is too risky for the security forces to
intervene, thus turning a blind eye to what is going on. When you plant seeds
of hatred, you will reap blood.
Racism
A
new poll, published by Yedioth Ahronoth ("Racist? Me?") on March
22, 2005, p. 8 (24 Hours section) among Jews in Israel testifies about the
seriousness of racism in our society. Here are some of the findings:
23%
would not marry religious people, nor would like their children to marry
religious people;
15%
would not marry people of Middle-Eastern origins, nor would like their children
to marry people of Middle Eastern origins;
21%
would not marry people of Russian origins, nor would like their children to
marry people of Russian origins;
79%
would not marry Arab people, nor would like their children to marry Arab
people;
53%
are not willing to live next to an Arab family;
22%
are not willing to live next to an Ethiopian family;
38%
would not buy a used car from an Arab;
22%
believe that religious people get too many rights.
I
reiterate the importance of education in primary and high schools. Grass root
work is of immense importance. Alas it is not within the priorities of the
present Minister of Education. The Center
of Democratic Studies at the University of Haifa could do the job, if only we had
the resources to tackle the problem.
Center
for Democratic Studies
I
still have not nominated Chairperson of the Governing Board of the Center as I
did not find the right person to fill the position. I am looking for an affluent
Israeli, with connections in business and/or high tech, access to financial
resources who is committed to the ideas and principles of democracy, and would
be willing to dedicate time and energy to mobilize the funds necessary for the
multiple projects the Center would like to pursue. If you have any ideas and
suggestions regarding the appropriate such person, please let me know. Your
advice is highly appreciated.
Crisis
in High Education
During
the past few years the Ministry of Education had cut the budgets of all
universities in Israel
by some 40 (forty) percent! Each year a 10% cut was declared. All the fat in
the universities evaporated in 2001. Then the meat was eaten. Now they are
hurting the bones. The skeleton is fighting to remain alive against all odds.
All universities went into a severe crisis. Working conditions have become
difficult, very difficult. Photocopying papers became a luxury. The sad thing
is that no one cared. The presidents of all universities wanted a meeting with
Prime Minister Sharon. For two years they were begging to see him. However, Sharon's busy schedule
did not allow such opportunity. Israeli government has other priorities. Money
was funneled to colleges, yeshivas, revising high school teaching. The
government is not interested in providing quality education. It is interested
in providing popular education: granting degrees without much efforts, to
enable people to ask for an increase in their salaries. This way everyone is
happy, and the voices of alarm raised by the academia were lonely cries in the
wilderness. Scholarship, merit, excellence – all became obsolete. Instant education, this is what the people
want, or, better still, like coffee without coffee, soap without soap, why not
education without education? Degrees from tenth-rate institutions are bought
with money. One MP obtained degrees without attending the college in which he
was supposed to enroll, submitting papers of other students. He was caught with
hard evidence. No one knows how many do the same and complete their degrees in
such dishonest ways.
As
said, no one cared until Tel
Aviv University,
arguably in the worse condition of all universities, all rely on public
funding, decided to unify some departments and to close others. Last week Tel
Aviv students raised their outcry, and suddenly people begin to notice the
crisis. The universities are fighting for their lives. On March 28, 2005 a general strike is
declared in all universities. I hope this will be the first step in a long
battle against the "anti-elite" government to change its agenda and
thinking. Maybe Labour ministers will take issue and join our struggle. We need
to do something now in order to change the government's priorities, or else we
will witness the day when the first Israeli university will be required to
close its gates and declare bankruptcy.
Maale
Edumim
On
March 21, 2005 Israel
publicly confirmed plans to build 3,500 new housing units in the largest Jewish
settlement in the West Bank, Maale Adumim. At
present some 30,000 people live in Maale Adumim. The government often describe
Maale Adumim as part of "greater Jerusalem"
that will be part of Israel
in any future peace agreement. Palestinians angrily responded that such an
action would violate the Middle East peace plan and would be a major obstacle
to resolving bitter disputes over nearby Jerusalem.
In
practical terms, the expansion of Maale Adumim creates two major problems.
First, Palestinians living in East Jerusalem
and nearby areas will be effectively boxed in, with no room to grow. "This
project may be one of the biggest obstacles to reaching a two-state
solution," said Yariv Oppenheimer of Peace Now, an Israeli group that
monitors settlements. "This will cut off Jerusalem to the east with Jewish
settlements."
Also,
an expanded Maale Adumim would serve as a barrier between the northern and
southern parts of the West Bank. Palestinians
traveling between the two parts would face a lengthy detour, though Israeli
officials have hinted that they may build a bypass road.
Critics
also called the expansion a violation of Israel's pledge under the road map,
which calls for a freeze of all settlement activity. Israel has interpreted that to mean
that it can continue building in existing settlements. Israel also says the peace plan is
not currently being carried out because the Palestinian leadership has yet to
act against Palestinian factions responsible for attacks on Israelis, as the
plan requires.
About
230,000 Jewish settlers live in the West Bank,
and the number is increasing by at least 10,000 each year. In addition, more
than 200,000 Israelis live in East Jerusalem, which Israel annexed after capturing it
in the Arab-Israeli war of 1967.
The
same day of the Maale Adumim decision, March 21, Israel
handed over security control to the Palestinians in the West Bank town of Tulkarm, a hotbed of
Palestinian militants. Last month Israel
agreed to transfer security control of five Palestinian towns in the West Bank,
and Tulkarm is the second one to be handed over, after Jericho last week.
Another
recent positive development: Egypt
sent a new ambassador to Tel Aviv after a few years of a vacant position.
Separating
State from Religion
Further
testimony of the need to separate between state and religion is evident from
reading the latest report of the Central Bureau of Statistics. 7.089 Israelis,
8.2% of the total number of citizens that married in 2002, chose to marry
abroad. The report also shows that 74% of those marrying abroad are Israeli
Jews.
The
Israel Religious Action Center (IRAC) sent an urgent letter to the Prime
Minister, demanding that the work of the government committee aimed at solving
the plight of those "unable to marry" (minuei-chitun) be
renewed. In this way, according to the Reform Movement, the continuing harm to
the fundamental rights of hundreds of thousands of Israelis unable to marry in
Israel according to their conscience or are unable to marry at all -- can come
to an end.
"The
fact that thousands of Israelis go abroad each year, and are ready to present themselves
before a foreign authority as a result of no choice, testifies to the feeble
policy of Israel",
states (IRAC's) letter, quite rightly. The situation needs to be changed,
sooner the better, or more and more Israelis will fell alienated from the state
in which they live.
Poll
among Youth on Serving in the Territories
A
poll conducted in February 2005 by Bar Ilan University among 508 people, aged
16-18 (published by Maariv, March 9, 2005, pp. 12-13), about their
willingness to serve in the army, and in what capacity, shows that 76% of the
secular youth wishes to serve (83% among religious youth); 43% want to do
combat service (62% among religious youth); 13% refuse to evacuate settlements
(36% among the religious youth); 42% refuse to serve in the territories (29% of
the religious youth). Slowly but surely the occupied territories are conceived
as a liability by a growing number of people. Slowly but surely the settlements
are loosing their legitimacy in the public eye. Common sense does prevail. Sometimes
it hesitates, but at the end it will win its way. Israel is on the right track, after
so many years of empowering the occupation and deligetimizing the Palestinians.
More and more people believe that two-state solution is the only viable
solution to end the bloodshed in our troubled region. Hallelujah.
Israel Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 2 (April 2005)
I
am the editor of special issue of this journal that appears in London. This volume is quite special. Usually
when academics edit books we invite fellow academics to write the chapters.
However, decision makers are often critical of this practice, especially when
academics reflect on their doing. They argue, quite rightly, that it is very
simple to sit outside the tent and to piss inside, that the academics' outlook
would have been quite different were they the bearers of responsibility. With
responsibility comes a very different perspective that could not comfortably
accommodate the moral outlook that academics advocate.
For
these reasons, I decided that a volume on Israeli institutions should be
written by people who served in power positions. Most of the articles were
written by decision makers, and they are fascinating. When you read, note not
only the content but also what they decided not to address. Of all my edited
volumes, I am particularly proud of this one. Hereby the table of contents:
Introduction
Raphael Cohen-Almagor
General
The
Crisis of Governance: Government Instability and the Civil Service
David Nachmias and Ori Arbel-Ganz
Citizenship Education in Israel – A Jewish-Democratic State
Orit Ichilov, Gavriel
Salomon and Dan Inbar
The Military-Political Complex: The IDF’s Influence
over Policy towards the Palestinians Since 1987
Yoram Peri
On the Need for A Constitution
Meir
Shamgar
Institutions
Presidency
in Israel:
Formal Authority and Personal Experience
Yitzhak
Navon
The Government
Gad
Yaakobi
The Knesset
Naomi
Chazan
The Attorney General in Israel
– A Delicate Balance of Powers and Responsibilities in a Jewish and Democratic
State
Elyakim
Rubinstein
Particularistic
Considerations and the Absence of Strategic Assessment in the Israeli Public
Administration: The Role of the State
Comptroller
Eliezer Goldberg
The Press Council
Raphael Cohen-Almagor
Final Word
Israeli
Institutions at the Crossroads
Raphael Cohen-Almagor
I thank the Journal's chief editor, Prof. Efraim
Karsh, for his thoughtful cooperation. This volume will also appear as a book
by Routledge later this year. Notification will be announced in due course.
Lebanon, Hizballah and
Amal
Infra excerpts of a recent article published by the
GLORIA Center, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol.9, No.1 (March
2005). The author is Dr. Rodger Shanahan, a Visiting Fellow
at the Research Institute for Asia and the Pacific, University of Sydney, who
teaches in the university's Department of Arabic and Islamic
Studies. The author shows the extent of Syria's involvement in Lebanon's internal politics, and
emphasizes the rise of the Hizballah. Israel
is investing lot of efforts in convincing Europe
to include the Hizballah in its black list of terrorist organizations. For many
European countries the Hizballah is considered as political organization that
was involved in a just guerrilla warfare against the IDF in Lebanon. Not
much attention was given to its launching of rockets on Israeli towns across
the border, although I should say that since the American presence in Iraq
those incidents became rare.
Hizballah Rising:
The Political Battle for the Loyalty of the
Shi'a of Lebanon
By Rodger Shanahan
While
the future political direction taken by the Shi'a majority in Iraq is of immense interest to U.S. policy makers, a
longer-running political contest is still being played out in another part of
the Arab world for the political loyalty of the same community. Since the
re-emergence of elections following the end of the civil war in Lebanon, where
the Shi'a represent the largest of the communal groups,[1]
both Amal and Hizballah have been forced to run on joint electoral tickets for
the national elections. Running on joint lists thus allowed the two Shi'a
political parties represented in parliament to avoid a direct electoral
showdown. In the local government elections held in May and June 2004, however,
candidates ran on separate electoral tickets, giving a better indication of
each party's popularity. On the face of it, the results indicate that Hizballah
has moved well ahead of Amal as the preferred political representative of the
Shi'a community. However, as is the case with anything related to Lebanese
politics, the results not only reflect the local political popularity of the
two parties, but were also heavily influenced by the broader strategic desires
of the dominant foreign force in Lebanon:
Syria.
The
contest between Hizballah and Amal for the position of pre-eminent
representative of the Shi'a community has, at times, been a heated one.
Although Amal had its genesis in the Movement of the Dispossessed (Harakat
al-Mahrumin), founded by the charismatic scholar ('alim) Musa
as-Sadr, it turned briefly to the secular leadership of Husayn Husayni in 1979,
and since 1980, Nabih Berri. Hizballah, on the other hand, has retained the
leadership of the party in the hands of the scholars, in line with its
ideological linkage with, and jurisprudential loyalty to, the Iranian Supreme
Leader Ayatollah Khamene'i. Indeed, many of Hizballah's early founders came
from the ranks of disaffected Amal members who were disillusioned with the
party's embrace of the secular political system. Both Islamic Amal members and
members of the Da'wa who had joined Amal were prominent in the
establishment of Hizballah. Like all groups vying for the political loyalty of
the same constituency, however, the two groups developed into fierce rivals,
and conflict between the two groups has generally existed right below the
surface. Between 1985 and 1988, at the height of the intra-communal dispute,
Hizballah and Amal militia members fought a series of bloody engagements in the
south of the country. More recently though, any violence between the two parties
has been small scale and very localized, and is normally centered over local
electoral disputes.
Because
of the complex nature of Lebanese politics, and the use by Syria of the
Lebanese political process in pursuit of its own foreign political objectives,
it is difficult to draw clear conclusions from events such as elections. In the
case of the 2004 municipal elections, however, it is clear that Hizballah
emerged as a much stronger party than its rival Amal. In the south of the
country, Hizballah emerged victorious in over 60 percent of municipalities
(compared with 55 percent in 1998), while Amal captured only 30 percent of
municipalities (down from 45 percent in 1998). Hizballah also did very well in
southern Beirut
and the Biqa', particularly in Ba'albak, where it had taken its support for
granted in 1998 and been dealt a heavy blow, winning only a few of the
municipalities. With the benefit of a well-organized campaign in the region,
Hizballah gained control in 27 of the 30 municipalities that it contested in
the Biqa'.[2]
Hizballah's
relative success can be put down to a number of factors, some of which emanate
from purely domestic politics, and others that are of longer-term strategic
importance. As far as Syria
was concerned, the dynamics of this municipal election were different from
others, in that Damascus
was happy for a more realistic reflection of local political attitudes towards
Hizballah and Amal to be displayed. Whereas it has been Syria's wish for the
two parties to maintain a balance during national elections in order to ensure
that no one communal group becomes dominant enough to challenge Syrian primacy,
in the case of the Shi'a parties there was a relatively low-key approach
taken to these local elections. As a consequence, Hizballah was able to display
its strength in the heartlands of the Lebanese Shi'a: the Biqa', the southern
suburbs (dahiyya) of Beirut, and South Lebanon. That is not to say that there was no
action on the part of the Syrians to influence the outcomes. In the Biqa' for
example, Hizballah formed an electoral alliance with the pro-Syrian Ba'th
party, which made it difficult for Amal to form an effective, politically
popular counter-alliance.
Syria's decision to
ultimately allow both parties to contest the elections without being forced
into an electoral alliance with each other was motivated in part by external
considerations. No doubt realizing the level of popular support that Hizballah
possessed, Syria realized that the elections would provide the United States,
in particular, with a public example of how genuinely popular the party was
politically. Following the late 2001 proscription of Hizballah as a terrorist
organization by the United States,
the Syrian government wished to signal to Washington
the reality of the situation on the ground in Lebanon. By association, Syria, as the hegemon within Lebanon, was also signaling to the United States
its own continuing relevance within the region. This was particularly important
following the passing of the Syria Accountability Act and the Lebanese
Sovereignty Restoration Act in October 2003 by the U.S. House of
Representatives. The Syria Accountability Act, for example, stated that "...the
Government of Syria should immediately and unconditionally halt support for
terrorism, permanently and openly declare its total renunciation of all forms
of terrorism, and close all terrorist offices and facilities in Syria,
including the offices of Hizballah."[3] By illustrating to the world the
political popularity of Hizballah within Lebanon,
Syria hoped to dilute the
impact of the bill and show the United States
that Hizballah was a legitimate political reality within Lebanon. Such
was the intent of the statement by Syrian president Bashar Assad when he
claimed that the elections "defined the true political sizes" in Lebanon.[4]
Of
course, more than just Syrian political considerations account for Hizballah's
success. The party is genuinely popular, both as a consequence of its
resistance activities that prompted the 2000 withdrawal of the Israeli Defense
Force (IDF) from the country's south, as well as its ability to achieve the
return of prisoners from Israeli jails in return for the remains of IDF
soldiers. There were concerns in some quarters that Hizballah's popularity was
rooted too deeply in support for its resistance against the Israelis occupying South Lebanon. For Hizballah, the withdrawal of the
Israelis in 2000 provided a great fillip to the organization, and gave it the
ability to announce both its Lebanese nationalist credentials, as well as its
wider authority as the only Arab group to defeat Israel militarily. In the immediate
aftermath of the perceived victory, it has also given the party's machinery the
ability to cement its southern support. The party was instrumental in repairing
village housing and some infrastructure damaged during years of resistance,
while at the same time the creation of the dispute surrounding the ownership of
the Sheba'a farms area allowed Hizballah to maintain its armed militias and to
undertake military operations against Israel. The refusal of the Lebanese
government to use its military to control the border region also allows
Hizballah a free hand. Without the resistance, Hizballah fears becoming a
sectarian form of the emasculated Amal. With its military wing however, the
party has a regional relevance that its opposition is denied.
While
its success against the IDF gained it great kudos, the military wing of
Hizballah these days must be managed far more judiciously by Secretary-General
Hassan Nasrallah than in the pre-2000 period. While Israel
remains an unpopular neighbor amongst the Lebanese (particularly amongst those
from the south), the United Nations' rejection of Lebanon's (Syrian-inspired) claims
to the Sheba'a Farms has presented the Islamic Resistance with a conundrum.
With no unfulfilled UN Resolution behind its military operations, Hizballah's
military actions in the south are carried out without the full support of the
local population, especially given the Israeli reactions which follow. The more
that Hizballah carries out military action in the Sheba'a farms for its own and
others' strategic purposes, the more it risks alienating the Lebanese polity,
the majority of whom lack any affinity with the Sheba'a farms issue.
Hizballah
appears to understand the limitations of relying too heavily on its military
component, however, and the party planned for the period following the
withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon. It has
always been active within the Lebanese Shi'a community as a significant
provider of social services, and has been careful in maintaining a reputation
for probity that eludes Amal. Of particular note is its ability to mobilize its
supporters to achieve both its strategic and local political purposes. This is
one aspect that will be of the utmost importance to the party in the long term
as it continues to establish itself as a major player in the Lebanese political
scene. In May 2004, the party was able to stage a mass rally of over 250,000
people in Beirut to protest at U.S. military incursions into the Iraqi holy
sites at Karbala
and Najaf, indicating its mass appeal.[6]
Illustrative of the ability of the party to mobilize its support base at the
local level was the fact that voter turnout was particularly good in the
regions where Hizballah was strong. In Ba'albak, for example, over 70 percent
of registered voters participated, while the figure for Nabatiyyah in the South
was approximately 65 percent of voters. This compares with a figure of just
over 20 percent for Beirut, and 30 percent for
Sunni-dominated Tripoli.
While
there is little doubt that Hizballah has become a well-organized, unified and
multi-faceted organization, its rival for the loyalty of the Shi'a community
has suffered in comparison. The municipal election results capped several bad
years for Amal since their performance in the 1998 municipal elections. Amal's
standing as a representative political party has fallen significantly since
that time, particularly at the local level. Originally founded as a party
designed to represent the interests of the economically and politically
disenfranchised Shi'a population, its establishment heralded the emergence of a
sectarian-led attempt to alter the political status quo that had for centuries
deprived the community of a political voice. The early years of the party were
full of promise, but more recently the very same party has lost much of its
moral authority as its closeness with the government has led to charges of
corruption against it. Amal is battling to stay level with Hizballah, whose
members are meticulous about maintaining a public reputation for financial
probity and an active opposition stance within government.
One of the consequences
of this fall in popularity of the Amal movement is the emergence of internal
disputes within the party. This was illustrated in March 2003, when Nabih Berri
expelled six members from the party, including three members of parliament, two
of whom were ministers.[7]
The future for Amal appears uncertain. The party is
dominated by Nabih Berri, who has proven to be a staunch supporter of Syria. Although
a dominant force, the recent expulsion from the party of several high-powered
members attests to the fact that Berri, not for the first time, faces
challenges to his authority from within the party. At the same time, the
willingness of Amal's Central Council to unanimously confirm his decision to
expel members attests to the fact that Berri is still very much in control of
the party. While national parliamentary elections are due to be held in 2005,
the nature of the Lebanese political system and Syria's place in it should
guarantee parity between Amal and Hizballah. Syria has always been careful to
maintain a degree of balance between the two parties, and while it was willing
to send a message by allowing Hizballah to flex its muscles during the local
government elections, its desire for balance will likely see it force the two
parties into running joint electoral tickets again in 2005. Similarly, having
seen Hizballah's political strength demonstrated, Syria is likely to continue backing
Berri, both because he has been a loyal ally and because they fear tilting the
Shi'a political balance towards Hizballah.
While Hizballah is also dependent on both Syria and Iran to varying degrees, the party
has earned a reputation for integrity that eludes Amal. That having been said,
neither party attracts many active supporters outside the Shi'a community,
limiting either's claims to be truly national parties.
Hizballah has a long-term political strategy regarding
its role within Lebanon.
While it long ago acquiesced to the realities of multi-confessional Lebanon by rejecting its revolutionary strategy
for the achievement of an Islamic state, it has never rejected the desire to
see Lebanon
ruled in accordance with Islamic precepts as its ultimate objective.[9]
While this continues to mean that it is viewed with suspicion by many Lebanese,
the party has saved its fiery rhetoric for external issues, such as United States intervention in Iraq and the
continued Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory. Domestically, it has
taken a strategic decision to act as the responsible political opposition,
while pushing for electoral reforms that would ensure the Shi'a's numerical
power is translated into political power. Both Amal and Hizballah have as one
of their major aims to cease the sectarian basis of parliamentary
representation that guarantees a political over-representation of the non-Shi'a
population.[10]
The parties have also sought to change the electoral law to lower the
voting age from 21 to 18, which would similarly strengthen the hand of the
Shi'a, given that this demographic is dominated by the Shi'a.
Hizballah understands that its political strategy within
Lebanon
must take into account three groups. First and foremost, it needs to gain the
loyalty of a majority of the Shi'a community, as it is this group that will
provide it with victory at the ballot box, and ensure its longevity as a
political movement. Secondly, it needs to be accepted as a legitimate and
responsible political party by the broader Lebanese polity. While the ultimate
aims of Hizballah in terms of the Islamization of society mean that it will not
be politically supported by many, if any, of the non-Shi'a Lebanese
(particularly the Christian and Druze minorities), it aspires to be regarded as
a responsible political player so that it can eventually achieve major
leadership positions within the Lebanese political system that will allow it to
achieve its goal. This is evident in Hizballah's successful attempts to
position itself as the party representing the economically disadvantaged,
regardless of communal identity. To that end it has an active involvement in
the Lebanese trade union movement, while Hassan Nasrallah's held a meeting with
then-Prime Minister Hariri in June 2004 to discuss the socio-economic impact of
Lebanon's $34 billion debt
(representing 185 per cent of Lebanon's
GDP).[11]
In addition to the balancing act it must undergo to navigate the difficult
shoals of Lebanese domestic politics, it must also deal with Syria. As a
party that portrays itself as a champion of Lebanese nationalism, exemplified
by its militia's victory over the IDF, it must play a game of realpolitik
with Syria.
Support for Hizballah by Syria
is dependent on Damascus's
own interests. For that reason, Hizballah maintains good relations with Syria
(a move at odds with its nationalist credentials) while building itself up
politically for the day when Hizballah's resistance is of no use for the
advancement of Syria's regional interests. While these three lines of strategy
are difficult to achieve simultaneously, the 2004 local government success over
Amal illustrates that the strategy is paying dividends within the community.
Terri Schiavo
On March 21, 2005 American Congress gave
jurisdiction over Terri Schiavo to federal courts, an extraordinary legislative
move that could empower a U.S.
judge to order the reinsertion of a feeding tube that a state court allowed to
be removed.
Voting 203 to 58, the House joined the
Senate in approving the measure and rushing it to President Bush. He signed the
bill into law, saying, "I will continue to stand on the side of those
defending life for all Americans, including those with disabilities."
This statement, like many others, manifest the
level of ignorance of people who speak about the case, and contribute to its
being one of the loudest medical ethics dramas in history. Terri Schiavo is a
peon in the hands of partisan people, with partisan agendas. However, I don't
think anyone is capable of helping her.
When I embarked on my research on the right to die
with dignity back in 1991, it was clear to me that I will not be able to study
all the horrible diseases that exist on this planet. I decided to study one
hopeless medical condition that I thought was the worse, and I thought that if
I would be able to make intelligible conclusions about this condition then ipso
facto the conclusions could relate to other medical conditions down the
scale. At that time I thought the state of Post-Coma Unawareness, known in the
medical circles as Persistent
Vegetative State
(a term I resent as I think it is unethical and does not serve the patient's
best interests), is the worse medical condition. Since then I changed my mind
and now I think locked-in syndrome is arguably worse, but I dedicated some years
of my life to study PCU patients, reading every article I could reach, and
visiting relevant departments in medical centers in Israel,
Canada, the USA and the United Kingdom. In my research
conclusions (The Right to Die with Dignity: An Argument in Ethics, Medicine,
and Law, Piscataway, NJ.: Rutgers University Press, 2001) I urged hospitals
as a policy not to cease treatment of post-traumatic PCU patients younger than
50 year-old within a period of less than two years. The two-year waiting period
should be regarded as the minimum period of evaluation before forgoing hopes
for patients’ rehabilitation and return to some form of cognition.
Terri Schiavo was born on December 3, 1963.
She is younger than 50. However, the cause of condition was not traumatic. In
February 1990 she suffered cardiac arrest; doctors believe a potassium
imbalance caused her heart attack, which led to brain damage due to lack of
oxygen, and she has been in this condition for more than fifteen years. There
are a very few recorded patients in history who woke up after such a long
period of time. All of them suffered irreparable brain damage and remained
helpless and absolutely dependent on others until their very last day. I don't
know what motives drive the Schindler family but I don't think their tireless
efforts serve Terri Schiavo's best interests. One positive development that may
result of this tragic controversy is that maybe more efforts and funding will
be directed to study PCU, and the brain in general. Possibly PCU patients in
the US
will be better treated and maintained. Terri, I am afraid, is beyond all this.
Earth and Moon Viewer
See http://www.fourmilab.ch/earthview/vplanet.html
http://www.fourmilab.ch/cgi-bin/uncgi/Earth?imgsize=1024=/FONT>&opt
We
need to invest more in protecting our planet. It is beautiful.
Viewing the Earth
You can view either a map of the
Earth showing the day and night regions at this moment, or view the Earth
from the Sun, the Moon, the
night side
of the Earth, above any location on the planet specified by latitude, longitude and
altitude, from a satellite in Earth
orbit, or above various cities around
the globe.
Images
can be generated based on a full-colour image of the Earth by day and
night, a topographical map of the Earth,
up-to-date weather satellite imagery, or a composite image of cloud cover
superimposed on a map of the Earth, a colour composite which shows
clouds, land and sea temperatures, and ice, or the global distribution of water vapour. Expert mode allows you additional control over the generation
of the image. You can compose a custom request with frequently-used parameters and save it as a
hotlist or bookmark item in your browser. Please consult the Details for additional information and answers to
frequently-asked questions.
Viewing the Moon
In addition to the Earth, you
can also view the Moon from the Earth,
Sun,
night
side, above named
formations on the lunar surface. or as a map
showing day and night. You can also make expert and custom images of the
Moon. A related document compares the appearance of the Moon at perigee and
apogee, including an interactive Perigee and Apogee
Calculator.
Books
Idith Zertal and Akiva Eldar, Lords
of the Land (Or Yehuda: Kinneret, Zmora-Bitan, Dvir, 2004) (Hebrew). The
book provides a detailed review of the history of settlements since 1967. I
expect an English translation soon.
With my very best
wishes, as ever,
Rafi
My last communications are available on http://almagor.blogspot.com
Earlier posts at my home page: http://lib-stu.haifa.ac.il/staff/rcohen-Almagor
Books archived at
http://almagor.fetchauthor.info
